Donald Joseph Kagay (Albany State College)
De Re Militari (1997)
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the role of the town in the medieval Crown of Aragon as a source and conduit of supplies to the royal host. Before assessing these urban logistical activities, however, the commonly-accepted vassalic duties which underpinned them must be understood. In a seminal article written almost thirty years ago, Thomas Bisson pointed out the martial nature of representation in the Middle Ages by delineating the close relationship of the vassalic duties of auxilium “aid” and consilium “counsel”.(1) The bond between public and private in such obligations was a mottled one and none was more so than the private vassalic support of a seigneurial or royal army which, however, by its very existence focused on “public matters” and affected the well being of an entire patria “realm”.(2) The most significant of these private/public duties, servitium “service”, stood as a generic responsibility which had tied dependant to lord since Visigothic times.(3) In military terms, such service manifested itself as participation in both the foray (cavalcada) and the host (ost).(4) Ancillary duties to such military service were those of alberga, statica, and cena. These consisted of the temporary hospitality which a vassal owed his lord whenever demanded in either peace or war. Such shelter and provender was owed not only to the lord but also to his retainers as well as their mounts.(5)
When the territorial sovereign in the Crown of Aragon had need of an army and the supplies to maintain it, he, like any great lord, turned to his vassals and, by extension, his subjects. In the mountain land of Aragon, feudal ties and all the duties which went with them were normally renewed on oath at the beginning of each reign by “all men…of the kingdom”.(6) In Catalonia, the martial obligations of vassals, explained in the twelfth-century law code, the Usatges of Barcelona, included customary limits of cavalcade and host service, the protection of an endangered lord on the battlefield and, most importantly for our purposes, the surrender of one’s castle to his lord “as many times as he should require it”. In this last instance, the sovereign could claim provisioning for a customary limit, normally specified in the convenientia or “feudal pact”.(7) The Usatges article, which the Crown time and again used to call up the martial and logistical support of its subjects, was the Princeps namque. This law declared that if the ruler of Catalonia found himself in danger from his enemies, all his subjects were to come to his aid as quickly as they could. If they failed to do so, they were considered guilty of “dereliction of duty…since no one must fail the ruler in such a great matter.”(8) In reality, the Princeps namque transcended feudal ties, making army service and support the business of the realm at large. With this royal and feudal legal background in mind, the role of a key segment of the Crown of Aragon, the towns, in army maintenance can be investigated.
Any discussion of the supply or transport of troops in the Spain of any era must start with a view of the landscape itself. With a mean elevation of over two-thousand feet, the Iberian peninsula qualifies as one of the most mountainous countries in Europe.(9) Ringed by cordilleras and deep valleys, no region is more mountainous than that delimited by the old Crown of Aragon in the peninsula’s northeastern corner. With a long and regular coastline but few suitable harbors, the region came to be dominated by its great ports, Barcelona and Valencia. At the opposite pole of power stood the upland city of Zaragoza, which acted as the commercial gate to Castile. Along the Roman roads which traversed the Catalan and Valencian littoral and passed through the broad inland basin of the Ebro River, smaller but no less vibrant towns—Gerona, Tarragona, Tortosa, Teruel and Lerida to name just a few—rose to prominence in the centuries after the Muslim conquest.(10) Communications along this road grid was fairly easy throughout much of the early Middle Ages with no more than two weeks travel time separating one end of the realm from the other.(11) In the interior away from the comfort of a Roman road, trails and canñadas “sheep runs” known since prehistoric times were followed.(12)
To understand how Aragonese and Catalan armies sustained themselves in such a sparsely populated and largely inaccessible landscape which was, however, ringed with towns, we can do no better than to turn to two Carolingian capitularies which laid out military guidelines that remained largely in place across Europe until the end of the Middle Ages. In these laws of 804 and 811, Charlemagne required that all forces he summoned to serve should bring with them bread and other supplies sufficient for three month’s campaigning.(13) This model of a temporary host that was bound to sustain itself for a limited time was a constant in all medieval warfare. In the Crown of Aragon, clergy, nobility and townsmen were summoned for army service by letter or oral message delivered by royal officials or messengers.(14) The summoned troops were to appear at a specified place, generally at the town nearest the campaign zone. They were to carry with them “arms, equipment, and bread” for a period ranging from three days to three months.(15) Though they could be retained in service after this limit, all their provisioning needs would be met by the king. As James I told his army which had served past its customary limit of duty in the siege of Valencia of 1238:
If any of you happen to lose a horse or anything else, I will make it good and will supply your needs fully.(16)
Though the number of soldiers so supplied was never great except during James I’s invasions of Majorca(1230-2) and Valencia(1234-44)(17), the strain such a responsibility put on a land-rich but money-poor sovereign could not fail but resonate through the other pockets of hard currency in the Crown of Aragon, the most significant of which resided in the towns. In reality, the search for logistical support was a skill that every successful Aragonese king learned very young. With very little money in his coffers at any one time, the sovereign had to resort to a mix of extortion and promotion merely to keep his retainers and officials housed and fed.(18) When added stress was put on this system of enforced generosity by the summoning of a parliament or an army, the king again had to turn to the town to see that the new challenge was met.(19)
As Jomini has aptly demonstrated, an army of any era must address the problem of supplying itself in one of three ways: (1) live off the land, (2) to continually transport stores to the front, or (3) to establish supply depots in strategic sites before the army takes to the field.(20) In one way or another, the impermanent hosts of the medieval Crown of Aragon engaged in all three practices. They lived off the land whenever possible and were aided in such endeavors by a remarkable set of irregulars, the almogavares, famed as much for their valor as for their rapacity and skill in survival.(21) In the Sicilian campaigns of the 1280s, we see such daring commanders as Roger de Luria solving his supply problems by capturing a French grain ship. After distributing rations to all his troops in the field and the castle garrisons, he sold the remaining wheat on the open market and then paid his soldiers from the proceeds.(22) Other great war leaders like Jaime I were able to supply his troops with food and weapons from captured enemy fortresses.(23)
Though such fortuitous provisioning practices could save an army from starvation, they offered little chance of continued success in a landscape dominated by enemy castles. In most of the reconquest campaigns fought over northeastern Spain in the thirteenth century, Muslim defenders customarily harvested as much grain as they could, transported it to their fortresses and destroyed the rest in the field.(24) This forced on the Christian attackers the imperative of tending to their own supply needs. Again, a good portion of such armies looked to their own logistical requirements for a specified time.(25) When this time limit of obliged service past, then the sovereign took over the full responsibility of supplying the majority of his troops. The focus of this royal activity was the army camp which was transformed from a cluster of largely autonomous tents and companies to a population which looked to the political and military commander for its daily bread.(26)
In this phase of royal re-supply, the king provided for his army in much the same way he maintained his court. Though in desperate straits, he might rely on his great nobles or Muslim collaborators to bring in supplies for a force on the verge of starvation and mutiny, the sovereign increasingly turned to his household staff and territorial officialdom to provide a stable supply base for his troops.(27) Nearby towns and monasteries became the sources of much needed grain(28), horses(29), weapons(30), and artillery(31). Because the king now owed his troops constant supplies and a set soldier’s fee or sollata, lengthy sieges or, in fact, any military operation which continued past the army’s customary self-support limit caused the Crown “great expense”.(32) When operating funds ran out, the Crown and its agents turned to town councils as well as clerical and Jewish residents of the urban sites. Through forced loans and grants made in hope of some future royal largesse, army shortfalls were made up and supplies again flowed to the fighting men.(33) In addition to such grants, royal officials customarily turned to certain fines, dues and outright exactions to keep the provisioning effort of the army solvent.(35) In spite of this striking transformation, the army camp, producing no food of its own except through hunting, was constantly in need of supply replenishment. When the sovereign was foolish or unfortunate enough to have more than one army in the field at the same time, the situation became even more complicated as the two war zones competed with each other for supplies, much as if they themselves were enemies.(36) When such crises were resolved and supplies were again stockpiled in the royal camps, however, it was the Muslim adversary who was eventually “conquered by hunger”.(37)
In the third mode of supply, the warehousing of provisions, the towns became the true center of the Crown’s logistical efforts. In the planned but aborted expeditions to the Holy Land in 1269 and to Tunis some ten years later(38), the Aragonese sovereigns James I and his son Peter III took as long as half a year to assure they would have a secure base of supply and transport against foreign realms. From the merchant fleets of Barcelona, Valencia or Tortosa, a suitable number of ships were leased or donated by shipowners for the duration of the expedition. The fleet was ordered to assemble at any of a number of ports along the Costa Brava or Costa Dorada. After its conquest in 1232, Majorca served as an emergency staging point.(39) To assure men and mounts would have sufficient food and fodder, the Aragonese kings, like their counterparts in France, Philip Augustus and Saint Louis(40), were adept at demanding, begging or cajoling funding from the parliament, papacy, local clergy and town councils.(41) From the general war chest, which such donations found their way into, the Crown financed a major grain and weapon stockpiling effort at the site chosen for the army’s embarkation. Because some lead up time was given the royal agents charged with gathering supplies, they were able to purchase in bulk across the realm with considerable savings to their royal master.(42) Though thus avoiding the widespread profiteering common during the re-supply phase(43), the king and his servants were soon faced with another quandary—where to put the mountain of supplies until the army assembled? Despite the dangers of theft and spoilage, the only viable solution was to either load ships in advance of the troops’ arrival or to construct makeshift storage bins near the port facilities.(44) Either strategy transformed sometimes minor ports into major entrepots and facilitated the loading and transfer of troops.(45) In neither 1269 nor 1279, however, was victory granted to the Aragonese armies, but this can generally be attributed to a cruel sea rather than lack of logistical preparation.
No matter how great the mountain of supplies or how efficiently they were gathered, the army remained unaffected by such efforts until the provisions reached it. Naval transport was the most cost-effective means of moving large numbers of troops and amounts of materiel to the front. Shipowners, subject to both the town council and such regulatory boards as the Consulate of the Sea, were normally paid a set rate for transporting men, provisions, horses and artillery. They could opt to gamble, however, on the army’s success by agreeing to put their vessels at the king’s service in exchange for a specified booty share.(46)
Even with the advantages of ship transport, the sorry state of roads and the few navigable rivers in the Crown of Aragon often severely limited supply by sea. Thus when an army campaigned away from the coast or out of reach of the Roman road network in terrain where wheeled transport could not operate, it relied on the most common form of transportation in much of Spain, the mule train.(47) With layers of saddlebags hanging across their flanks and other loads lashed over their backs, such pack animals, bound together into long files and led by muleteers, were a common sight in the Iberian Peninsula until the second half of the twentieth century.(48) The mule train was so important for commercial as well as military exchange that James I afforded his “special protection” to all such bestias and their drivers within his realms.(49) Even with its importance, the mule had some inherent disadvantages. Though each animal could be burdened with a cargo weight of up to four hundred pounds, two hundred was more common.(50) This meant that even such relatively small parties as the royal court or the household of the crown prince required well over a hundred animals.(51) Medieval armies could need up to ten thousand mules; in the last reconquest siege, that of Granada, sixty thousand of the beasts were pressed into service.(52) Since the lumbering mule train was an easy target of enemy attack, it was put under protection of a company of knights who were also fed from the transported supplies. The longer the trip, then, the smaller the consignment reaching the army.(53) Once the muleteers unloaded their cargo at the camp, their commission was complete and they drove their animals back along the roads, picking up goods in towns and villages along the way to be sold in the regional capitals. It would be interesting to see but difficult to document how much this wartime mule traffic impacted the town economies of the Crown of Aragon.
From the foregoing, it must be seen that the administration of supply had as much to do with the towns which provided such necessities as with the army which was sustained by these provisions. No matter how medieval forces were sustained in the field, the source of such logistical support invariably sprang from an existing network of roads, clerical and lay agricultural enterprises, markets and commerce which tied town to hinterland. The most important element in this economic equation was the town. It was, after all, urban government, inhabitants, money and transport which helped gather the flour, biscuits, wheat, oats, vegetables, wine, arrows, swords, artillery and all the other necessities of war and then facilitated the movement of such supplies into the camp of the campaigning army.(54) Since troops, either encamped or on the move, can consume prodigious amounts of supplies, the logistical support system was essential; for, as Cardinal Richelieu, the ultimate destroyer of Spanish military power, once said, “more armies are ruined by want and disorder than by the efforts of their enemies.”(55) With the increased scope of war in the later medieval and early modern period, armies could no longer be fed by the fairly simple system of supply and transport discussed in this paper. The town, once an adjunct of the domestic army, could now be seen as an enemy. As Spanish armies came to dominate much of Europe in the sixteenth century, this latent hostility had dire consequences for towns in the path of war, a number of which felt the wrath of hungry or unpaid Iberian troops.(56)
In spite of such breakdowns, the relationship of town to war has remained a significant one since ancient times. If certain scholars are to be believed, the very act of feeding armies—large groups of men who grew no food but still had to be fed regularly—was one of the emotive forces in the emergence and spread of urban civilization in the ancient world.(57) By the same token, the medieval town in service of royal war pointed the way to a modern era, in which the territorial state is encapsulated in and broadly ministered to by the emergence of large scale urbanism.(58)
1) Thomas N. Bisson, “The Military Origins of Medieval Representation,” American Historical Review [AMR] 71(1966):1199-1216.
2) George Duby, “Private Power, Public Power,” Revelations of the Medieval World vol 2 of A History of Private Life, ed. Philippe Aries and George Duby, 4 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 8-10; Fidel Fita y Colom‚, “Cortes y usajes de Barcelona (10 Marzo, 1131). Texto in‚dito,” Boletin de Real Academia de Historia 4(1884):79.
3) Eulalia Rod¢n Binu‚ “El lenguaje t‚cnico del feudalismo en el siglo XI en Catalu§a (contribuci¢n al estudio del lat¡n medieval)”, Escuela de filolog¡a de Barcelona: filolog¡a cl sica, 16. (Barcelona: Consejo superior de investigaciones cient¡ficas, 1957), 235; Abilio Barbero and Marcelo Vigil, La formaci¢n del feudalismo en la pen¡nsula ib‚rica, (1978; reprint, Barcelona: Editorial Cr¡tica, 1982), 170.
4) Rod¢n Binu‚, 50, 142-3; Luis Garc¡a de Valdeavellano y Arcimus, Curso de historia de las instituci¢nes espa§oles de los origenes al final de la edad media, (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1968), 375.
5) Rod¢n Binu‚, 15, 240-1; Valdeavellano, 403, 602.
6) Thomas N. Bisson, “The Problem of Feudal Monarchy: Aragon, Catalonia, and France,” Speculum 53(1978):465.
7) Usatges de Barcelona. El codi a mitjan segle XII, ed. Joan Bastardas (Barcelona: Fundaci¢ Noguera, 1984), arts, 26, 30-1, pp. 72, 76.
8) Ibid., art. 64, p. 102; Francesch Carreras i Candi, “Rebeli¢ de nobleza catalan contra Jaume I en 1255,” Boletin del Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona 47(1912): doc. 35, p. 536.
9) Michael Kenny, A Spanish Tapestry. Town and Country in Castile, (1961; reprint, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1969), 8.
10) Josiah Cox Russell, Medieval Regions and their Cities, (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1972), 166-75; Raymond D. Chevallier, Roman Roads, trans. N. H. Field (London: 1976), 157; J. Lee Shneidman, The Rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire, 1200-1350, 2 vols (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 1:369.
11) Shneidman, 1:370; Marjorie Nice Boyer, “A Day’s Journey in Medieval France,” Speculum 26(1951):604-6; Albert C. Leighton, Transport & Communication in Early Medieval Europe, A.D. 500-1000, (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1972), 53-7.
12) Thomas F. Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages: Comparative Perspectives on Social and Cultural Formation, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 23-4.
13) A.V. B. Norman, The Medieval Soldier, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), 32-3; John Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-1200, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 14-5.
14) Archivo de la Corona de Arag¢n , Cartas reales de Jaime I (extra series), no. 33(1); Documenta Selecta. Mutuas Civitatis Arago-Cathalaunicae et Ecclesiae Relationes Illustrantia, ed. Johannes Vincke (Barcelona: Balmes, 1936), docs. 41, 52, 559, pp. 21-2, 27, 420; Joaqu¡n Miret i Sans, Itinerari de Jaume I “el Conqueridor”, (Barcelona: Institut d’estidis catalans, 1918), p. 501.
15) Donald J. Kagay, “Structures of Baronial Dissent and Revolt under James I (1213-76),” Mediaevistik 1(1988):64; Antonio Palomeque Torres, “Contribuci¢n al estudio del ejercito en los estados de la reconquista,” Anuario de Historia del Derecho Espa§ol 15(1944):234-7; Paul Douglas Humphries, “Of Arms and Men: Siege and Battle Tactics in the Catalan Grand Chronicles,” Military Affairs 48-9(1984-5):174.
16) ACA, Cancilleria real, R. 20, f. 350v; Jaume I, Llibre dels feyts En Jacme in Les quatre grans croniques: Jaume I, Bernat Desclot, Ramon Muntaner, Pere III, (Barcelona: Selecta, 1971), chap. 68, p. 40; Miret y Sans, Itinerari, 142.
17) Alvaro Santamaria, “La expansion pol¡tica militar de la Corona de Arag¢n bajo la direcci¢n de Jaime,” X Congr‚s d’historia de la corona d’Arag¢ [Jaime I y su ‚poca], ed. C.E. Dufourcq, Federico Udina Martorell et. al., 3 vols. to date (Zaragoza: Consejo superior de investigaciones cientificas, 1979), Ponencias, 122-3.
18) Pere IV el Cerimoni¢s, Ordenaciones fetes per lo molt alt senyor En Pere ter‡, rey d’Arag¢ sobra lo regiment de tots los officials de la sua cort in Colecci¢n de documentos in‚ditos del Archivo general de la corona de Arag¢n, ed. Prospero Bofarull y Moscar¢, 4 vols. (Barcelona: Imprenta del Archivo, 1847-1910), 5:13, 83-5; Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia Under the Early Count-Kings (1152-1213), ed. and trans. Thomas N. Bisson, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 2:doc. 4, p. 107; Ferran Soldevila, Pere el Gran, 2 pts in 4 vols. in Mämories, Secci¢ historico-arqueol¢gica, vols. 11, 13, 16, 22 (Barcelona: Institut d’estudis catalans, 1968), 2:doc. 4, p. 428; Shneidman, 1:136.
19) Joseph F. O’Callaghan, The Cortes of Castile-Leon, 1188-1350, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 67-9; Donald J. Kagay, “The Development of the Cortes in the Crown of Aragon, 1064-1327,” Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1981, 361-6.
20) Henri, Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. Capt. G. H. Mendell and Lieut. W. P. Craighill (1862; reprint, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1971), 129-31.
21) Manuel G¢mez de Valenzuela, La vida cotidiana en Arag¢n durante la alta edad media, (Zaragoza: Libreria General, 1980), 133-4; Ramon Muntaner, The Chronicle of Muntaner Translated from the Catalan, trans. Lady Henrietta Goodenough, Hakluyt Society Publications, Series 2, nos. 47, 50 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1920-1), 47:chap. 12, pp. 39-40. Muntaner’s description of the almogavares supply practices is revealing:
And they went each with his knapsack on his shoulder; for do not think they were taking any pack mules. Rather each carried his bread in his knapsack as the almogavares are accustomed and brought up to do; for when they go on a raid each man carried one loaf for each day and some water and herbs and they spend as much time as suits them.
22) Ibid., 50:chap. 194, p. 470.
23) LF, chaps. 51, 121, 128, pp. 30, 121, 128.
24) ACA, Cartas reales, Jaime I, nos. 72, 79; LF, chaps. 21, 180, pp. 12, 81.
25) James F. Powers, A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, (Berkeley: Unversity of California Press, 1989), 117, 150-1.
26) Duby, 18.
27) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 14, f. 89; LF, chaps. 128, 212-3, 220, pp. 63, 91, 94; Lope Pascual Mart¡nez, “Los oficios en la corte de Jaime I, X CHCA”, Comunicaci¢nes, 1-2:500-1, 512-3. For a comparison of English, French and Aragonese military pay levels in the thirteenth century, see Robert Ignatius Burns, S.J., The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia. Reconstruction of a Thirteenth-Century Frontier, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 1:xii; Fred Cazel, Jr, “Financing the Crusade,” A History of the Crusades, ed. Kenneth Setton et al., 6 vols. (Madison, Wisc: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962-9), 6:147; Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (1980; reprint, London: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 94-5.
28) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 14, f. 80; LF, chaps. 215-6, 407, pp. 92, 149; Documentos de Jaime I de Aragon, ed. Ambrosio Huici Miranda and Mar¡a Desamparados Cabanes Pecourt, 4 vols to date, in Textos Medievales, 49-51 (Valencia: Anubar, 1976ff), 1:doc. 123, p. 229; Miret i Sans, Itinerari, 386. For customary annual grain payments rather than emergency grain grants of Aragonese towns, see CDIACA, 8:doc. 52, pp. 151-2.
29) LF, chaps 60, 220, pp. 35, 94; DS, doc. 409, p. 295. James clearly saw the importance of horses to ultimate victory, reminding his retainers that one horse was “worth more than twenty Saracens”.
30) Pere IV, Ordinacions, in CDACA, 5:83-5.
31) LF, chaps. 15, 29, 40, 69, 129, 156-7, 172, 209, 261, 460, pp. 9, 17-8, 24, 40, 63, 73, 78-9, 87-8, 107-8; Bonifacio Palacios Martin, “La frontera de Aragon con Castilla en la ‚poca de Jaime I,” X CHCA, Comunicaciones, 1-2:494.
32) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 20, ff. 342-5; Miret i Sans, Itinerari, 532-3; Valdeavellano, 623; Robert Ignatius Burns, S. J. Islam Under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of Valencia, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 161.
33) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 13, ff. 223v, 225; R. 23, f. 56v; Cartas reales, Jaime I(extra-series), no. 61(1); LF, chaps. 483, 492-3, pp. 168, 171; DJ, 1:docs. 110, 123, 146, 239, pp. 205-6, 229-30, 263-4; DS, docs. 103, 340, 516, 557, pp. 58, 241-2, 381-2, 420; Miret i Sans, Itinerari, 358; Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Spain, trans. Louis Schoffman, 2 vols. (1945; reprint, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961), 1:84-6.
34) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 23, ff. 8v-9, 70v; Cartas reales, Jaime I (extra series), nos. 61(2), 64(3); Pergaminos de Jaime I, no. 1916. The redemptio exercitus, like scutage, was a customary payment in lieu of military service; the defectus servitii was a fine for dereliction of military service. The questia was an arbitrary exaction.
35) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 10, f. 4; Cartas reales, Jaime I, no. 24; LF, chaps. 180, 265, pp. 81, 109; Muntaner, 1: chaps. 125, 136, pp. 313-4, 346-7; Miret i Sans, Itinerari, 503, 506; Bisson, Medieval Crown, 66; Miller, 133-4.
36) LF, chaps. 215-6, p. 92.
37) Robert Ignatius Burns, S. J., Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 35-6.
38) Bisson, Medieval Crown, 88; Ferran Soldevila, Jaume I. Pere el Gran in Historia de Catalunya. Biografies catalanes, 5 (1955; reprint, Barcelona: Edicions Vicens-Vives, 1980), 97.
39) LF, chaps 55, 482-3, pp. 32, 168; Francesch Carreras y Candi, “La creuda a Terra Santa,” I Congr‚s d’historia de la corona d’Arag¢, dedicat al rey En Jaume I y la seva ‚poca, 2 vols. paginated as one (Barcelona: Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 1909-1913), 1:123-8.
40) John W. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus. Foundations of Royal Power in the Middle Ages, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 166-7, 277-84; William Chester Jordan, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade. A Study in Rulership, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 76-7.
41) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 14, f. 62; Cartas reales, Jaime I (extra series), no. 61(1); Bulas, Legajo X, nos. 47, 50; Lf, chaps. 381, 389-90, 534, pp. 141-4, 180; DJ, 1:doc. 239, pp. 388-9; 3:docs. 432-2, pp. 227-30; Maureen Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, 1244-1291 in The History of Christian Thought, 11, ed. Heiko Oberman (Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1975), 137-48; Miret i Sans, Itinerari, 424.
42) LF, chaps. 25, 71, 220, pp. 14, 41-2, 94; ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 13, f. 286v; Miret i Sans, Itinerari, 382; Thomas N. Bisson, “Las finanzas del joven Jaime I(1213-1228),” X CHCA, Comunicaci¢nes, 1-2:doc. 94, p. 108; Francisco Sevillano Colom, Valencia urbana medieval a travis del oficio de Musta‡af, (Valencia: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1957), 15-31.
43) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 23, f. 56; LF, chap. 407, p. 149. For comparison with profiteering during Granada war, see Fernando del Pulgar, Cronica de los se§ores reyes cat¢licos Fon Fernando y Do§a Isabel de Castilla y de Aragon, Biblioteca de Autores Espa§oles, 70 (Madrid, 1978), chap. 118, pp. 496-7.
44) Muntaner, chap. 46, pp. 111-2.
45) Both James I and Pedro III used the small port of Salou as an embarkation point.
46) ACA, Canciller¡a real, R. 20, f. 296; Pergaminos de Jaime I, no. 1975; Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1975), chap. 393, p. 233; Miret i Sans, Itinerari, 46, 524.
47) Richard W. Bulliet, The Camel and the Wheel, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 20. Bulliet contends that there was little wheeled traffic in the Iberian Peninsula before the early modern era. For improved roads and increased cart traffic during the latter stages of the Granada campaign, see Jaime Vicens-Vives, “The economy of Ferdinand and Isabella’s Reign,” Spain in the Fifteenth Century, ed. Roger Highfield, trans. Frances M. L¢pez-Morillas (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 267.
48) Ferdnand Braudel, The Meditarranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 1:189; Richard Ford, A Hand-Book for Travellers in Spain and Readers at Home, 3 vols. (1845: reprint, Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966), 1:70-3.
49) DJ, 1:doc. 18, p. 53.
50) Thomas Savery, “The Mule,” Scientific American 223, no. 6(1970):104; Albert C. Leighton, “The Mule as a Cultural Invention,” Technology and Culture 8, no. 1(1967):50-1; Ford, 1:71.
51) Muntaner, 50:chap. 173, p. 419.
52) LF, chap. 219, p. 93; Townsend Miller, The Castles and the Crown, (1963; reprint, New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), 122-3.
53) Muntaner, 50:chap. 196, pp. 474-5.
54) Muntaner, 50:chap. 252, p. 605; Pere I, Ordinacions, 5:26-7; Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 123-8. Engels’s daily consumption figures for Alexander’s army gives a good comparison base for other Mediterranean armies throughout the Middle Ages: two-and-a-half pounds of grain and two quarts of water per man; twenty-four to thirty-two pounds of fodder and eight gallons of water per horse or mule.
55) Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (London, 1977), 8
56) I. A. A. Thompson, War and Government in Hapsburg Spain, (London, 1976), 11-37; J> R. Hale, “War and Public Opinion in Renaissance Italy,” Renaissance War Studies, (London, 1983), 378.
57) Bruce Kraig, “Feeding the Troops, 3000 B.C.E.,” Military History Quarterly 4, no. 4(1992):18-23
58) Fernand Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life vol 1 of Civilization & Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, trans. Sian Reynolds, 3 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 1:556-8.