LATIN RESPONSES TO OTTOMAN EXPANSION BEFORE 1389*

Anthony LUTTRELL

In their many references to the Turks before 1389 the Latins seldom wrote specifically of the Ottomans as a separate power, though they sometimes mentioned or alluded to their leaders Osman, Orkhan or Murad, or to their forces. The Latins of the East must have always have been aware that there were different groupings among the Turks, and after about 1354 the Christians in the Balkans were usually facing the Ottomans or their companions. The Latins in the West had for centuries been accustomed to the idea of the Turks in general and their opinions of them were often most disparaging;¹ on the other hand, there was a long-standing view of the Turks as Teutri or Trojan who were somehow related to the Franks, a notion repeated by the crusading propagandist Philippe de Mézières in 1389.² There were few if any Latin missionaries active among the Anatolian Turks during the fourteenth century,³ but the Latins knew the Turks as mercenaries and allies, in thirteenth-century Greece for example; as enemies, pirates and raiders, especially along the coasts of Asia Minor, to whom some Westerners paid tribute; as infidels who appeared, often vaguely, in Western written sources.

* This paper is limited to a consideration of Latin responses in the period down to 1389; it attempts no general survey of Turkish, Greek or Latin affairs and omits consideration of Serbian, Hungarian and other Balkan responses. The author is most grateful to Elizabeth Zachariadou for extensive help, particularly with Byzantine references, to Stephen Reinert, especially for information contained in his article in this volume, and to Kate Fleet, for observations on the Genoese sources.


³. Cf. J. RICHARD, La Papauté et les Missions d’Orient au Moyen Âge (XIIe-XVe siècles), (Rome 1977). The general absence of Latin conversion activity in fourteenth-century Anatolia may have resulted from the lack of any strong central ruler around whom to concentrate missionary work and from the strength of Muslim fervour in Anatolia.
and against whom a crusade might be launched, as in 1344 at Smyrna; and as merchants with whom the Latins had commercial dealings. Turks could send peace envoys to the pope at Avignon, pay tribute to the Hospitallers of Rhodes, or make arrangements and truces which might, on occasion, establish peace on land accompanied by war at sea. Most Turkish fleets were markedly inferior to those of the Latins; the latter's great advantage lay in the galleys which protected their long-distance trade and their Aegean island bases, but they were weak on land except where they occupied defensible coastal positions.

As long as the Ottomans had little or no access to the sea and no competent fleet to use upon it there were only limited contacts with the Latins. A description of the East written apparently by a French author in about 1308 mentioned, without naming the victor or the site of the battle, the great victory won in 1302 by Osman, the first Ottoman ruler, over the Greeks near Baphthus; it referred to the widespread devastation which the Turci in general had inflicted on the inhabitants of Asia Minor. The Catalans and their companions, who originally went to oppose the Turks in the Anatolian lands facing Constantinople and who eventually fought both against and alongside various Turkish forces between 1303 and 1307, wintered on the Cyzicus peninsula on the Asiatic coast of the Sea of Marmora in 1303/4 and skirmished with certain Turks at Gallipoli. The Catalans probably knew a number of Turks, some of them former allies, who belonged to, or were later absorbed into, the evolving Ottoman grouping. The Genoese at Pera above all, and to a lesser extent other Latins at Constantinople, were evidently aware that the Turks were advancing in Bithynia and in some cases they had contacts with them. In 1311 two Genoese galleys were sent by the Greek emperor to ferry back to Anatolia a group of Turks who had sacked Gallipoli after leaving the Catalans in Thessaly, but instead the Genoese killed many of them and took them away to Italy. Later, in 1323, ten Genoese galleys were captured by the Emir of Sinope and some of those taken remained prisoners.


8. MUNTANER, cap. 241; GREGORAS, v. I, p. 253-254. LAIOU, Andronicus II, p. 166, 232-233, and JACOBY, p. 233-234, document another group of Turks who left the Catalans and were ferried to Anatolia by ten Genoese ships in 1312/1313.
in Turkish hands for many years.\textsuperscript{9} There must also have been commercial relations. Describing conditions before about 1340, Francesco Balducci Pegolotti mentioned an inferior sort of alum known as ghiaghillo or giachile which came from a place four days' journey inland but could be had at Türiye on the coast directly north of Bursa.\textsuperscript{10} Latin merchants in the East probably sent rather reliable reports to their home towns, yet some Western chroniclers provided curiously inaccurate news of the Turks, as in the case of the Florentine Giovanni Villani.\textsuperscript{11}

The conquest of Byzantium from the Greeks was long a dominant ambition of many Latins, such as Pope Benedict XI in 1304 and Clement V thereafter, who used the danger to Constantinople from the Turks to justify proposals for attacks on the Greeks. Only in March 1325 did Venice, apparently for the first time, envisage a coalition against those Turks who were raiding the Latin islands or attacking Westerners in alliance with the Catalans of Athens, though these were not Ottomans but the Turks of the Anatolian coastal emirates in an area where there were strong Venetian interests.\textsuperscript{12} The Eastern question slowly became a Turkish one. Crusading theorists who knew the region, such as Guillaume Adam writing in 1313 and Burcard in about 1332, spoke in terms of Latin armies on their way to Syria crossing the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles and attacking the Turks. Such an expedition would undoubtedly have met Ottoman resistance, but Constantinople and Jerusalem were the real objectives;\textsuperscript{13} these writers did not explicitly distinguish the Ottomans as a separate power, though Guillaume Adam wrote of those “Turks who are near Constantinople”.\textsuperscript{14} The Ottoman leader Orkhan had at least thirty ships by the 1330's, and by about 1346 he was absorbing the Emirate of Karasi with its fleet and its access to the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{15} The Genoese of Pera seem to have been in touch with Orkhan in 1337 and to have favoured his plans to attack Constantinople.\textsuperscript{16} In 1339 the Byzantine emperor Andronikos III sent a mission to Pope Benedict XII which spoke of retaking towns which had fallen to the Turks and of reviving old proposals for an ecclesiastical council to settle religious differences between Greeks and Latins.\textsuperscript{17} The papacy was being made aware that a specifically Ottoman threat was increasing.

\textsuperscript{9} References in LAIOU, \textit{Andronicus II}, p. 301; BALARD, \textit{Romanie}, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{11} On Giovanni Villani's "fantasies", LEMERLE, \textit{Aydin}, p. 189 n. 3, 192 n. 2, 4.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Recueil}, v. II, p. 539-542.
\textsuperscript{15} ZACHARIADOU, \textit{Trade and Crusade}, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{16} GREGORAS, v. I, p. 539.
\textsuperscript{17} K. SETTON, The Byzantine Background to the Italian Renaissance, \textit{Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society}, 100 (1956) 42-43.
During the 1340’s there was civil war within Byzantium in which John VI Kantakouzenos allied with Orkhan and in 1346 even gave the Ottoman ruler his daughter in marriage. In 1345 that emperor, evidently worried about Western reactions to such dealings, vaguely explained the military necessity of resisting the Turkish threat to two Franciscans sent to him from Pera.¹⁸ Three years later an embassy from Kantakouzenos was in Avignon again proposing a council and declaring his willingness to join in an attack on the Turks of Aydin around Smyrna, even though he was in fact allied to them; Kantakouzenos perhaps hoped to improve his position against all Turks, including Orkhan.¹⁹ There may have been individual Latins who fought alongside the emperor’s Ottoman allies, for on 15 May 1347, in recognition of certain unspecified services, Kantakouzenos authorized Guillaume Poujoize and Jean Braidy, both citizens of Metz, to add the imperial eagle to their arms.²⁰ Meanwhile, there was no official papal response to the Greek initiative. The Latins had captured the castle by the sea at Smyrna from the Turks of Aydin in 1344 but they held it with increasing difficulty in the face of an overwhelming economic crisis, the great plague, civil strife in Byzantium and, from 1351, open war between Venice and Genoa.

A major conflict between the Christian powers at Constantinople naturally led to Ottoman involvement. The Venetian fleet spent some time on the Ottoman coast in 1351 but the Venetians had in some way annoyed Orkhan.²¹ By early November Orkhan’s envoys were negotiating with the Genoese at Pera and, as the Florentine chronicler Matteo Villani was somewhat inaccurately aware, nine light Turkish vessels or parascarmi and 1000 archers stationed both at Pera and afloat fought alongside the Genoese in the great battle with the Venetian-Catalan-Byzantine fleet in the Bosphorus on 13 February 1352; the Turks’ expenses were recorded at Pera sixteen days after the battle. Turkish informers provided much information to the Genoese who in turn sent embassies and gifts to the Ottomans. The latter supplied the Genoese with provisions, and thirty Genoese galleys sailed to Ottoman territories in Anatolia to load flour. At some point after the battle envoys from Pera concluded a formal treaty with Orkhan, apparently the first between a Western power and the Ottomans, and in the early spring the Genoese fleet took shelter in Ottoman ports. Genoa’s enemies sent representatives who tried without success to get Orkhan to abandon the Genoese.²² Later in 1352 the

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20. J. SCHNEIDER, Un Gentilhomme de Ville: Sire Nicole Louve, Citain de Metz (1387-1462), La Noblesse au Moyen Âge: XIe-XVe siècles, ed. P. CONTAMINE, (Paris 1976) p. 183 n. 2. Professor Schneider kindly provided a photocopy of the text, in French, of the otherwise unknown imperial bull he cites.
Genoese ferried Turkish forces to Europe and in October the Turks defeated the Serbs at Python south of Edirne.  

At this time Kantakouzenos’ forces included both Catalan troops and various Turks who served him side by side. In May 1352 Kantakouzenos was compelled to make an alliance with the Genoese by which he accepted the Genoese treaty with Orkhan, but in 1354 the Ottomans occupied Gallipoli and established a more permanent presence in Europe. On 20 September 1355 Orkhan wrote from Nicaea to Genoa repeating a demand made in 1352 or 1353 requesting tax exemptions at Pera for two burgesses of Pera, Filippo Demerode and Bonifacio da Sauro who had negotiated the 1352 treaty and were by 1355 in the sultan’s service. The authorities at Genoa acceded in a fulsome reply in Italian made on 21 March 1356 which referred to Orkhan as their brother and as the father of the Genoese of Pera, recalling his great assistance to them in 1352; this exemption was confirmed at Genoa on 20 November 1358 when reference was made to the concordium Orkhan had made with the Genoese after the battle of 1352. In December 1358 Orkhan instructed his son Suleiman not to interfere with Genoese shipping passing Gallipoli and to act in conformity with the Genoese treaty, presumably that of 1352.

passim; see also H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades: 1329-1451, A History of the Crusades, ed. K. Setton, v. VI, (Madison 1989) p. 230-231, where Balard’s materials are not used; BALARD, p. 444, places the treaty after the battle. Matteo Villani, v. I, p. 200, stated that the Turks sent sixty armed ships to aid the Genoese. N. Jorga, Latins et Grecs d’Orient et l’Établissement des Turcs en Europe, BZ, 14 (1906) 211, followed by Inalcik, p. 231, refers to the 1000 archers, part of them on Genoese ships, and Orkhan’s interview with the Genoese leader Paganino Doria at Chalcedon, but his sources do not support these inferences. E. Zachariadou, S’enrichir en Asie Mineure au XIVe Siècle, in: Hommes et Richesses dans l’Empire byzantin, v. II: VIIe-XVe Siècle, ed. V. Kravari et al., (Paris 1991) p. 222-223, citing Gregorios, v. III, p. 91, refers to a Genoese embassy sent late in 1351 to Orkhan to seek his alliance and to promise annual tribute, and notes that after February 1352 the Genoese recruited Turkish troops in Bithynia with the permission of Orkhan for which the Genoese had to pay him. According to Inalcik, p. 231, Orkhan himself took part in the battle; he cites later texts in L. Belgrano, Prima Serie di Documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera, Atti SLSP, 13 (1877-1884) 127, 129. Jorga, Latins et Grecs, p. 211, also claims that it was the Ottomans who attacked Korone and Methone in 1352, but his source, the text in: S. Ljubicic, Monumenta spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, v. III-IV, (Zagreb 1872-1874), v. III, p. 240, did not indicate any Ottoman participation.

The Latins reacted sluggishly to the Ottomans’ occupation of Gallipoli in March 1354 and to their invasion of Thrace, though by August the Venetian bailo at Constantinople was sending his government a general warning of the dangers posed by the Turkish advances. In 1355 John V Palaeologos secured control of Constantinople. A Latin through his mother, Anna of Savoy, he endlessly deluded himself with hopes of Western military aid to be gained by religious concessions. In 1356 Pope Innocent VI reactivated the Latin league against Aydin, and he instructed the Genoese and the Cypriots to assist John V against the Ottomans if he were to accept an ecclesiastical union. In the following year Innocent sent Pierre Thomas as his legate to Constantinople to prepare such a union and to initiate military action. The legate’s biographer, Philippe de Mézières, later wrote rather vaguely of the Genoese and other Latins being encouraged against the Turks in the maintenance of a holy war. In 1358 John V made a peace treaty with Orkhan but when Pierre Thomas returned to Constantinople in 1359 he pressed for religious changes on the part of the Greeks and he also led perhaps the first Latin military assault on the Ottomans, in which a force of Hospitallers, Venetians, Genoese, English and Greeks captured and burned Lampsakos, an Ottoman port on the coast opposite Gallipoli; the Turci counter-attacked noisily, ululantes et vociferantes, and the Christians retreated with some difficulty.

Almost immediately Pierre Thomas left Constantinople, where he had apparently concentrated on doctrinal matters, and Western resources and activities were subsequently directed towards Cyprus and Jerusalem, with Latin attacks against the Turks along the southern coasts of Anatolia and the major crusade which sacked Alexandria in 1365. This allowed the Ottomans to continue their advances, as some Westerners were aware; Matteo Villani, for example, reported as of about 1361 that from their base at Gallipoli the Turks had used their shipping to attack Constantinople and had taken the town of Dimotica while the emperor quarrelled with Orkhan. In 1362 the Venetians did propose a specifically anti-Ottoman league in which a total of eight Genoese and Venetian galleys would patrol the waters from Gallipoli to the Black Sea in order to cut off the Turks.

29. ZACHARIADOU, Trade and Crusade, p. 64-65.
31. ZACHARIADOU, Trade and Crusade, p. 65.
32. Text in SMET, p. 85-86. ZACHARIADOU, Trade and Crusade, p. 65-66, notes that the Byzantine sources ignore this episode. The Turkish tradition seems to confirm the Latin account, and may also reflect a possible Latin attack on Saros Bay to the north of the Gallipoli peninsula at the same time: INALCIK, p. 237-238. Whether the Genoese involved were from Pera, which had a truce with Orkhan, is uncertain.
from Europe. It was in 1364 that the Greek scholar-politician Demetrios Kydones complained that the Latins did nothing, that the Turks were laughing about them and that Constantinople would fall. Kydones was soon proved wrong. In 1366 John V’s cousin Amedeo of Savoy, who had originally intended to crusade in the southern Cypriot sphere, went instead to recapture Gallipoli; in 1367 he also took two Ottoman fortresses on the European coast of the Sea of Marmora. Amedeo’s success was well recognized in the West, notably in the great fresco done at Santa Maria Novella in Florence in about 1368 which apparently included his portrait. He persuaded John V to travel to Rome to submit in person to the pope, but even that produced no further material support for Byzantium. The Venetians had refused to join Amedeo, whose expedition threatened their commercial relations with the Turks; in fact in April 1365 they were hoping to secure a trading counter from Orkhan’s successor Murad whom they had heard to be favourably disposed towards them. In 1368 an embassy leaving Venice for Constantinople knew that Murad wished to discuss the setting up of a Venetian counter at Skutari opposite Constantinople, and it had, optimistically, been empowered to make an arrangement by which Murad would pay to fortify the place and Venetian merchants would enjoy tax exemptions there and in other Ottoman ports.

In 1371 the Turks won a major victory over the Serbs at Černomen, putting the whole Balkans and in the long term even Hungary and Italy, under threat. King Lewis of Hungary, while proclaiming his anti-Ottoman crusading zeal, exploited the situation to advance Hungarian expansion at the expense of the Bulgars and his other Christian neighbours, and it was only gradually that Ottomans and Hungarians moved towards a direct military conflict. This confrontation was confused by hostilities between Hungary and Venice. When in 1373 the Hungarians sent troops to help Padua in its war with the Venetians, the latter sought Ottoman assistance and by June some 5000 Turkish foot archers sent by Murad from the Hungarian frontier were serving around Padua in north-east Italy. They were by no means invincible, and in fact the Paduan chronicler noted that in flight they dropped their weapons and “ran strongly like the devil”.

35. Ibid., 259.
However, they caused considerable damage, and their arms and scimitars, their long hats and their exceptional archery skills made an impression on the local Italians.\(^{40}\)

After 1371 the West was unable to ignore the Ottoman threat but despite much talk and many negotiations it would not send effective aid. In 1372 there had been a project, said by the pope to be "for the exaltation of the Christian faith and the honour of the Roman Church", to send an expedition to Durazzo and the regnum Albanie under Enguerand de Coucy, and in 1376 the French and Navarrese companies raised by Louis of Evreux did occupy Durazzo.\(^{41}\) The Venetians were negotiating with Murad in 1376 and despatched an embassy to secure his alliance against the Genoese in 1377.\(^{42}\) A major war had broken out in 1376 between Venice and Genoa in the course of which all parties allied or negotiated with different groups of Turks. In April 1377 the Genoese sent an envoy to Murad carrying presents worth 1400 florins.\(^{43}\) This situation was further complicated by parallel struggles within the families of both the emperor and the sultan. John V retook Constantinople with Ottoman help in 1379 and in 1381 the Genoese made peace with Venice and with Murad. but it was too late; in 1376 Pope Gregory XI had left Avignon for Rome where he died in 1378 and there followed the dual election resulting in a papal schism which virtually excluded any coordinated Latin action in the East for nearly twenty years.\(^{44}\)

The leadership of the Latin response devolved above all on the papacy, and Gregory XI had explicitly accepted the primacy among Levantine problems of the Ottoman threat. In 1375 he wrote to Queen Giovanna of Naples: "Opposing the Turks can not only be considered a work of faith, but it is a better contribution towards the defence of the Principality of Achaea and the Kingdom of Naples; it is easier and more important to help those in danger, lest they perish, than to attempt at present the recovery of the holy land which has been occupied for so long".\(^{45}\) Gregory made extensive diplomatic efforts and wrote numerous letters in his attempts to organize resistance, but divergent Latin interests always disrupted his coalitions. An anti-Ottoman congress summoned to Thebes in 1372 never met; Venetians and Genoese took opposing sides at Constantinople where by 1376 intervention was virtually impossible; Lewis of Hungary preferred to attack the Bulgars; there were distracting problems in Cilician Armenia, Cyprus, Smyrna and Latin Greece. Behind these difficulties lay an overwhelming economic and

\(^{40}\) Istoria Padovana, RISP, v. XVII, (Milan 1730) 176-184; INALCII, p. 243, wrongly places these operations in Dalmatia.


\(^{42}\) Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, p. 74 n. 328.

\(^{43}\) Baldar, Romante, v. I, p. 89.


demographic crisis, aggravated by endemic warfare and plague, in the West. The Latins never focussed firmly on the Turkish problem. In particular, the papacy gave precedence to its Italian wars and the return of the curia to Rome. Thus Gregory XI spent an annual average of at least 194,000 florins, and probably much more, in Italy, while for the struggle in the East he allocated a mere 3000 florins per annum to be extracted from the Cypriot clergy. Latin responses to the Turkish threat involved extensive diplomatic correspondence but were supported by minimal resources; as a result they achieved little.46

Unable to persuade the secular powers into concerted or even unilateral action, Gregory XI made sustained efforts to mount an anti-Turkish passagium at no expense to the papacy by turning to the Hospitalers of Rhodes, an arm of the Roman Church over which he exercised a direct jurisdiction. Rhodes and Smyrna, which the Hospital defended, were not in the path of the Ottoman advance until immediately after 1389, though fifty Hospitalers had participated in the attack on Lampsakos in 1359.47 There was a policy or party, both at Avignon and at Rhodes, which favoured the transfer of the Hospital, wholly or in part, to mainland Greece where its territorial and economic base would have been greatly enlarged and where it could have been seen to be standing more directly between Western Europe and Turkish — and increasingly Ottoman — menaces. In 1356 there had been a scheme to establish the Hospital in the Morea, possibly at Corinth. During the 1380’s the Master of Rhodes was seeking to acquire various dynastic claims to the Principality of the Morea, and between 1397 and 1404 the Hospitalers defended Corinth and the Despotate of the Morea against the Ottomans.48 Gregory’s response to the Turkish advances into Europe fell within this long-term programme of using the Hospital against the Ottomans in mainland Greece.

In 1373 Gregory XI launched a great inquest into the Hospital’s Western resources and summoned an assembly of Hospitalers to Avignon. He had also to consider a precise destination for his passagium. In 1374 he consulted the Venetians who replied that there were many suitable objectives “in the parts of Constantinople or Romania.” Gregory sent two theologians and two Hospitalers to Constantinople and they returned in the autumn of 1375 with an offer from John V to hand over Thessaloniki and another city, presumably Gallipoli, to be garrisoned by the Hospital if the pope would send an expedition to free “the part of Greece” from the Turks. Gregory formally summoned the Hospitalers’ passagium in December 1375, and in 1376 the Master of Rhodes wrote of an expedition to the Duchy of Athens. Meanwhile events at Constantinople were making intervention there impractical. Instead in 1377 the Hospitalers arranged a five-year lease on the Principality of Achaea, which they then occupied, and

46. LUTTRELL Latin Greece, XV passim. P. THIBAUD. Pope Gregory XI (1370-1378) and the Crusade, Canadian Journal of History, 20 (1985), is not satisfactory.
47. SMET, p. 85.
another lease on the town of Vonitzia in the Gulf of Arta. In 1378 a pathetically small group of Hospitallers was ambushed and defeated near Arta by its Christian Albanian ruler, Ghin Boua Spata. The real objective of this expedition was never stated, but there may well have been Ottoman raids in the area. Years later, after 1420, the Cretan Emmanuele Piloti claimed that with five galleys the Hospitallers could have forced both the Egyptian Mamluks and the Turks off the seas and have compelled them to pay tribute, and could even have prevented the Ottomans from establishing themselves in Europe, but Piloti did not make it clear what period he had in mind; in any case, he must have known that the Hospital could not normally maintain more than one or two galleys.

The Ottomans’ advances continued and so did Venetian negotiations with them. In November 1381 an envoy to Murad was to ask him to prevent his subjects from attacking Venetian lands. The Venetians exchanged envoys with Murad in 1384, thanking him for his favours, refusing to attack Pera, seeking the release of prisoners taken by the Turks on Negroponte, and inquiring about customs concessions on grain and alum, and about the trading counter they hoped to set up in Ottoman territory. In July 1385 the Venetian Rector of Pteion, who had connections with Murad, was to visit the sultan privately to sound out his intentions towards Venice. The Venetians concluded a treaty with Murad in or soon after 1385, but in 1387 and 1388 relations became strained. In 1387 Venetian embassies travelled to protest against Ottoman attacks on Negroponte and on Korone and Methone in the Morea, but Murad and his vizier Ali Pasha demanded armed help and tribute from the Venetians while failing to return captives they had taken. A new envoy was sent in 1388 to explain that the Venetians would not send troops to fight for Murad. The latter was supporting Theodore, the Greek Despot of the Morea, who was obstructing Venetian attempts to secure control of Argos and Nauplia in the Morea. The Venetians tried to placate Murad diplomatically, but they also considered the creation of an anti-Ottoman coalition to defend the Morea and resist Murad’s advances into the Balkans. Turkish expansion was compelling the Venetians to modify

their policy of avoiding the costly occupation, administration and defence of extensive island and mainland sites; they took over Corfu in 1386, and in 1387 their captains on Corfu made a local agreement, quite probably involving the payment of tribute, with the Turks.\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{53}} Venetian policy remained as ambiguous as ever, and from 1386 to 1389 the senate was envisaging intervention to save Avlona and above all Durazzo from conquest by the Ottomans.\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{54}}

The Roman pope Urban VI, having abandoned the Hospitallers in Epiros in 1378, did little for the East thereafter, though he sent an envoy to Thessaloniki and Constantinople after 1383, and in 1388 he gave orders for two galleys, which never materialized, to fight the Turks.\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{55}} The Ottomans attacked the Catalans of the Duchy of Athens in 1385, and in 1387 they took Thessaloniki; Nerio Acciaiuoli, Lord of Corinth, was accused of causing the Turks to launch attacks against the Venetians in 1388.\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{56}} The Genoese at Constantinople had concluded a peace with Murad in 1381 and in 1382 John V made a treaty with the Genoese which included an agreement that neither party would fight the sultan.\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{57}} On 8 June 1387 two representatives of Genoa, not of Pera, went to the cassale of Mallaina, possibly Malagina near Bursa, and in the courtyard of Murad’s residence there they and the sultan ratified treaties made with Orkhan, possibly including that of 1352, and with Murad, possibly including that of 1381; Bartolomeo de Lamgascho, burgess of Pera, translated the text from Greek into Latin. It was agreed that monies taken from Giovanni Demelode by the collectors of the commerchium and the censaria or brokerage dues with respect to goods of Murad which had been bought and sold in Pera should, with the exception of the tax of 8 carats per 100 hyperpers paid for the censaria, be restored; that Murad’s Turkish subjects should pay no commerchium on goods imported or exported at Pera but should pay the brokerage tax of 8 carats per 100 hyperpers; that the Genoese were to be free to trade in Ottoman domains without molestation, paying only the normal commerchium as agreed of old; that Genoese ships could load victuals in Ottoman ports, paying the same reduced taxes as the Muslims, Greeks, Venetians and others; that both sides would return escaped slaves or pay for them; and that the Genoese would enforce this agreement on those of Pera.\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{58}} Subsequently, in

seem not to have been Ottomans but Turks from Phocaea: B. KREKIĆ, \textit{Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Age}, (Paris - The Hague 1961) p. 42-43, 222-223.

\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{53}} ZACHARIADOU, \textit{Marginalia}, p. 201-202.


\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{55}} DENNIS, \textit{The Reign of Manuel II}, p. 132-150; LUTTRELL, \textit{Latin Greece}, XIV, p. 580-581, 584 n. 11.

\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{56}} SETTON, \textit{The Papacy and the Levant}, v. I, p. 239, 247 n. 70.

\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{57}} DENNIS, \textit{The Reign of Manuel II}, p. 43-44, 50-51.

\footnote{Latin RESPONSES\textsuperscript{58}} Text in BELGRANO, p. 146-149; cf. BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, \textit{Recherches}, p. 241-243.
1390, 1391 and 1392, Ottoman representatives were well received in Pera.\textsuperscript{59}

The succession of apparent changes or fluctuations in policy, of leagues against the Ottomans alternating or combining with truces and commercial arrangements, was not the result of mere vacillation, but was rather a long-term habit of applying short-term solutions to immediate problems as situations and personalities changed in both East and West, as decisions were taken on the spot in the Levant or imposed at long-distance from Avignon, Genoa, Venice and elsewhere. Too often the decisive considerations were commercial; there was only a limited underlying determination to oppose the Turks because they were infidels. Following their treaty of June 1387 with Murad, the Genoese launched proposals advanced some time before June 1388 for a Christian alliance to include Venice, Byzantium and the Hospitallers of Rhodes.\textsuperscript{60} In October and November 1388 the Genoese again proposed the creation of a naval league including Crete, Naxos, Chios, and Rhodes to oppose Murad — \textit{Moratus Bey et eius secta} — and other Turks, and this was agreed later in that year; it was possibly a defensive arrangement designed to resist an anticipated Ottoman attack.\textsuperscript{61} Yet in the next year, after the battle at Kosovo in which Murad was killed, an envoy from Pera went to the new sultan, Murad's son Bayezid, and on 26 October 1389 the existing Ottoman treaties were renewed at Pera.\textsuperscript{62} For Froissart, writing perhaps a decade later, it was the Genoese who defended Pera and Constantinople and who prevented the Turks reaching Naples and Rome,\textsuperscript{63} yet Genoese policy was really just as ambiguous as that of Venice.

In the margin of major political developments there were other Latin contacts with the Ottomans. Particularly close to the Turks was the Genoese family of Gattilusio which from 1355 held Lesbos and was connected by marriage to the imperial Palaeologi. Francesco Gattilusio supported John V against the Ottomans\textsuperscript{64} and took part in the reconquest of Gallipoli in 1366,\textsuperscript{65} but his son, the second Francesco, was more cautious. He joined the anti-Ottoman league of 1388 but somewhat later, in 1396, he failed to go, as obliged, to the aid of Pera against the Turks.\textsuperscript{66} In 1396 and 1397 he arranged with Bayezid for the ransom of the Latins captured at Nikopolis,\textsuperscript{67} but the French mistrusted him as the sultan's

On Malagina, see REINERT, in this volume, p. 179, and n. 31, and C. FOSS. Eliano di Camilla had gone from Pera to treat with Murad in 1386: BALARD, \textit{Romanie}, v. I, p. 92-93.


“friend”; indeed in 1399 he warned the Ottomans of an imminent Latin attack.68

Distant Latins came into contact with the Ottomans for a variety of reasons. Thus English contingents fought at Lampsakos in 1359 and at Gallipoli in 1366.69 John Lord Mowbray was killed fighting the “Turks” and was buried at Pera in 1368, while two of Richard II’s household knights, Sir William Neville and Sir John Clanvowe who were friends of the poet Geoffrey Chaucer, both died during 1391 in Pera where they may have been on a royal mission concerned with aid for Constantinople.70 In February or March 1388 the future French Marshal, Jean de Boucicaut, and his companion Renault de Roye sent from Constantinople to Murad, who was then near Gallipoli, for safe conducts, which were readily granted. Murad received them with a great feast and they stayed with him for three months and offered to fight for him against any Muslim enemy; none was available. The sultan, whom they must have regarded as in some sense a chivalric companion, thanked them and provided them with an escort to the Hungarian frontier.71 The chronicler Jean Froissart said that Boucicaut and four companions made this visit to “the very valiant” Murad as part of a journey which also involved a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.72 Before 1389 pilgrims did not normally come into contact with the Ottomans, and the travel or espionage literature of men such as Johan Schiltberger, Bertrand de la Broquière and Ghiilbert de Lannoy all came after 1400.73 The Ottomans evidently employed some Latins and a few must have learnt some Turkish, as had Jacques de Helley, a French knight who had been in Murad’s service before 1389 and who was able to speak at least a little Turkish during the great battle at Nikopolis in 1396.74

The French chroniclers failed to present coherently the information which reached them from the East. In 1384 the young Charles VI of France was told that Murad had dreamed that a false god named Apollo offered him a gold crown in the presence of thirteen prostrate Western princes.75 In June 1384 the exotic Leo

68. DENNIS, Byzantium and the Franks, I, p. 17, 18 n. 41.
72. FROISSART, v. XII, p. 39; v. XIV, p. 381.
VI, the exiled King of Cilician Armenia, arrived in Paris and addressed the royal council on Eastern affairs. He then went in the following year to London where he urged peace with the French and an Eastern crusade, after which the English king sent ambassadors to negotiate in France.76 Froissart, who was presumably writing somewhat later and perhaps even after the disaster at Nikopolis in 1396, put into Leo’s mouth a speech to the French king and court which was extraordinarily garbled but perhaps reflected the mental picture of Turkish affairs held by even a knowledgeable Westerner in about 1389 or a little later. Froissart was deeply confused, in a way that Leo VI could never possibly have been, between Tures and Tartares; between the Ottoman sultan, the Sultan of Babylon or Cairo, and the Mongol ruler Timur or one of his lieutenants, called the takon, takem or cakem – presumably the Hakem – of Tartarie; between Serbia and “Hungary”; and between the Greek emperor and the titular Latin Emperor of Constantinople. Froissart even thought that it was the Turks who had murdered King Pierre of Cyprus in 1369.

Leo VI reportedly spoke to the French court of Amadeo of Savoy taking Gallipoli from the “Tartars” in 1366. According to Leo, Murad reconquered Gallipoli by force; his officials, or those of the takon, were already established within Constantinople; and the Turks derided the Latins who were divided by their allegiance to rival popes. In a confusing speech from Leo, Murad was said to be a valiant and noble man who loved the French language and wished to see France. That sultan demanded submission but left in peace his vassals, who included the Turkish lords of Satalia, Ephesus and Miletus whom Leo’s speech mentioned repeatedly. He had an army of 100,000 and a bodyguard of 10,000; he always lived in camp and his ninety-year-old father accompanied him everywhere. Murad wanted to conquer all “Hungary” and reach Rome where he hoped to be crowned by the rulers of Tartary, Baghdad and Cairo, but he was ambushed and defeated by the brave Lazara, presumably the Serbian ruler Lazar, who refused to submit. Leo’s speech, made in 1384 well before the battle of Kosovo at which Murad and Lazar were both killed in 1389, broke off before that point and strangely Froissart never mentioned that battle.77 Lazar did apparently impose some sort of check on Murad at Pločnik in 1386 and he won a notable victory against an Ottoman force at Bileća in Bosnia during August 1388.78

Froissart recounted how Boucicaut returned from “Greece and Turkey” with news of the sultan’s plans to attack “Hungary”, upon which the French king and his people desired to go to defend “Hungary” and Constantinople and also to recover Cilician Armenia.79 In reality, Boucicaut returned from Jerusalem by

77. FROISSART, v. XI, p. 229-249; Leo’s “speech” deserves detailed analysis.
78. REINERT, in this volume, p. 176-178, 193-194; cf. INALCIK, p. 247. The confused Western accounts of Balkan affairs deserve detailed examination in the light of Reinert’s clarifications of events.
way of Rhodes and Venice after the battle at Kosovo and was in Burgundy by October 1389. 60 Froissart described Murad as l’Amorath-Baquin which may have meant “Emir Beg”; Bayezid he called Baasach dit Amorath-Baquin. 81 The chronicler of Saint Denys reported more plausibly that French nobles returning from Jerusalem brought news of a “Hungarian” defeat by Murad, presumably referring to that of the Serbs at Kosovo. Murad, who was called Lamorat-Baxim and was said to be a subditus of the Emperor of Persia, was described as having spies in the West to inform him of the intentions of Western governments and as wanting to visit France when he had finished with “Austria”. The Sultan was reported as desiring to meet the French king, who was said to wish to engage him in personal armed combat. Murad was held to treat his opponents humanely and to allow them to choose to become tributaries rather than be sent into exile; with a safe conduct one could travel safely in his lands. 82

In close touch with Leo VI was Philippe de Mézières, the companion and biographer of the papal legate Pierre Thomas, a former Chancellor of Cyprus, the counsellor of Charles V of France and tutor to his son Charles VI, and a passionate devotee of the cause of Jerusalem. Writing in 1397, Mézières referred to Murad’s comparatively minor origins, his military and diplomatic prowess and his subjugation of much of Byzantium and the Balkans, and he noted that the Turks had met very stiff resistance and had suffered heavy losses at Kosovo in 1389. 83 Mézières’ crusading propaganda included the old notion that one path to the recovery of Jerusalem lay through Anatolia, an idea which survived throughout the fourteenth century and was partly inspired by the reading of chronicles concerning Godefroi de Bouillon and the First Crusade. 84 In his lengthy Songe du viel Pelerin, which was completed between June and October 1389, Mézières wrote that Murad and the Turks had conquered the empires of Constantinople and Bulgaria, the kingdom of Serbia and other lands, and that it was to be feared that in ten years Murad or his successor would be in Southern Italy and Germany; none could be found to resist them for long. In a passage at the end of his work, evidently written after Kosovo, Mézières mentioned that Murad and one of his sons had been killed in a Christian victory in Albanie. Here too he proposed a Jerusalem crusade passing through Constantinople and suppressing the Turks en route. 85

80. Livre des Fais, p. 64.
82. Religieux de Saint-Denys, v. I, p. 708-710; confused Western reactions to Kosovo are studied in T. Emmert, Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389, (New York 1990) p. 48-60. It was not possible to consult the contributions to Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle, ed. W. Vucinich - T. Emmert, (Minneapolis 1991).
84. J. Williamson, Philippe de Mézières et l’Influence du Cycle de la Croisade au 14e Siècle [unpublished typescript kindly provided by the author].
In the West the crusade had long provided an excuse for lay rulers to seek ecclesiastical taxation. The Ottoman danger was also a useful diplomatic card which was being employed in the 1380's as a cover or justification for negotiations primarily designed to secure an Anglo-French peace or the termination of the papal schism, and it was indeed true that these were obstacles to crusading action. Yet the Latins confused their strategic priorities. A crusade of 1390 went to Mahdia in Tunisia. The disaster which befell the Serbs at Kosovo in June 1389 produced initial misunderstandings and even rejoicings. According to the monk of Saint Denys, who was clearly confused and who misplaced the information under the year 1395, Venetian envoys reached Paris in July and reported Murad’s death and a Christian victory without mentioning that the Serbian leader Lazar had been killed; the chronicler confused Lazar with the King of Hungary and described Murad’s son and successor Bayezid as his nepos. He also reported that on hearing the first news from Kosovo the French king and his uncles actually went to give thanks at Notre Dame. A contemporary Florentine chronicler also retailed much rumour and fanciful detail about the battle, claiming that some Genoese and other Christians had fought for the Turks there.

For a long time there was little sign that the Latins regarded the Ottomans as a special kind of Turk. By 1389 they did appreciate the seriousness of the Ottoman threat but they were too occupied with Western problems and commercial considerations, too divided among themselves, too apt to treat the crusade as a means of taxation and too hostile to the Greeks to take strong and united action. That came in 1396 with the crusade which was crushed at Nikopolis but which may none the less have saved Constantinople for nearly sixty years. In 1402 the Ottomans were in their turn badly beaten near Ankara where the Sultan Bayezid was captured by Timur, but even then the Latins failed to attack the Ottoman survivors. Venetian and Genoese shipping ferried the fleeing Turks to safety in Europe, and in 1403 the Christian powers made a treaty with Bayezid’s son Suleiman against Timur. After many decades of compromise and ambiguity, the Latins had come to see the Ottomans as an essential component of the Levantine establishment whose disappearance they could scarcely envisage; they were as much concerned to preserve as to reshape or destroy the Ottoman regime.

88. Religieux du Saint-Denys, v. II, p. 386-390; possible interpretations of these confusions are discussed in EMMERT, p. 51-54, 177-179.