It
was the Romans who popularized displays of strength and
might to intimidate their neighbors into submission. If an enemy proved obstinate, Rome
relentlessly made war upon them until they accepted the privilege of subordinate
ally status; or they were annihilated. Adrian Goldsworthy, in his
book Roman Warfare, broadly, “traces the development of warfare
within the context of the evolution of the army and state.” (p. 28).
Goldsworthy anticipates questions the reader may have about a number of
topics: the reliability of source material, the way two armies would have
met in the field in a particular battle, and issues of historiography. These
anticipations effectively complement the flow of the book. This volume
has excellent color illustrations, maps, and pictures on nearly every page.
These images help to reinforce the reading material in a way that surpasses
words. Goldsworthy has produced a book that is readable, fact-filled,
and highly entertaining. The fact that the reader is not bogged-down
by a flood of dates and names helps to focus the reader
on the truly formative events of Roman military history.
Goldsworthy
begins his discussion by highlighting the Greek connection to Roman warfare.
Though the sources are murky, there is enough evidence to conclude that
the hoplite and phalanx were the primary method of making war in early
Rome. Working as a well-oiled machine trumped individual skills.
What mattered was the cohesion of the phalanx and nothing else. The Roman
Army of the sixth century BC could muster roughly 4,000 men. Campaigning
was limited because most hoplites were farmers. Under the Republic,
cavalry supplemented the phalanx. During this time, war was conducted
on a small scale with battles being fought in close proximity. Battles
were typically raids with the objective of relieving the adversary of their
wealth. “The earliest myths of Rome’s history show a
willingness to absorb outsiders into the community, an attitude quite unlike
that of most Greek city states who were highly jealous of the privileges
of citizenship.” (p. 40)
In
the mid-Republic, the Roman army was organized into ten maniples with each
maniple consisting of three lines made up of hastati, principes,
and triarii. Heavy infantry was complemented by a contingent
called an ala composed of barbarian units numbering 4,000-5,000
infantry and 900 cavalry. At this time, Roman armies were not professionalized
but made up of a citizen militia called upon only to combat imminent threats.
Military service was expected and most men were proud to serve. The Roman
army adopted a checkerboard formation to facilitate cavalry support and
to provide protection to cavalry on their return. Goldsworthy stresses
the importance of maintaining high morale and formation. Hand-to-hand
combat is brutal and bloody, notes Goldsworthy, and most modern readers
fail to conceptualize this often overlooked aspect. In order to ensure
a tight formation and obedience, commanders praised and rewarded their
soldiers. Interestingly, the highest rate of casualties was not incurred
in battle but in flight.
Goldsworthy briefly covers
the First Punic War taking note of the evolution of warships and the introduction
of the “Crow,” a device used to bridge two ships and hold them
together so the Romans could engage the Carthaginians in hand-to-hand combat. The
Carthaginians were veterans who had proved their mettle in battle and led
by Hannibal, they were a formidable adversary. Though superior in
many tactical and technical aspects, the Carthaginians were unable to take
heavy losses. Their philosophy was to seek a favorable position, inflict
serious losses, and sue for a favorable peace, for, “a struggle to
the death would have been in no one’s interest.” (p. 71) The
general’s function, according to Goldsworthy, was to bolster his
men’s confidence to stratospheric levels before an engagement and
hold a strong position. Rome proved to be an unusual enemy because
of their strategic vision of war. A truce was unacceptable. A
treaty would only be entertained if their enemy admitted defeat and came
to terms. The Carthaginians were stunned to meet such an uncompromising
opponent: “When wars were decided as soon as one side admitted defeat,
it was very difficult for any state to beat a people who were never willing
to concede this.” (p. 85).
A
preoccupation with wealth and glory fueled Rome’s wandering eye. The
period from 202 BC to AD 14 witnessed Rome’s greatest expansion,
conquest, and the transition to a professional army. Goldsworthy
terms Roman expansion as “a never-ending search for fresh peoples
to defeat.” (p. 92). In northern Italy, Rome fought ferocious
barbarians called Gauls. The key to Roman success was the triplex
acies. The idea of Empire became a source of inspiration and
springboard for further conquest and expansion in the first half of the
second century BC. The professional army that emerged in this period
was drawn from a class of landless poor to entice men with little prospects
to a military career. Moreover, the cohort replaced the maniple. This
led to the emergence of a new class of technical specialists within the
army. Goldsworthy mirrors J.E. Lendon in his discussion of conquest,
focusing on Julius Caesar’s style of command. Caesar understood
the psychology of war praising his men for their valor and rewarding them
with military honors and coin. Caesar orchestrated his campaigns
in close proximity to the battle yet was not close enough to shout out
orders to his officers. He placed a great amount of trust in his
senior officers to carry out his orders and gave them the flexibility to
take initiative. However, Caesar understood fighting from the front
not only inspired his men to fight harder, but also could change the tide
of war in his favor. At the battle of Sambrae in 57 BC, Caesar rushed
to engage the enemy to rally his men when the situation turned dire. This
behavior was not typical. Goldsworthy notes a general’s role
was to
“lead and control his army.”
The
army of the Principate focused less on legionaries’ loyalty to their
respective commanders by placing themselves under oath to the Emperor. Promotion
eluded soldiers with little education, but rapid advancement was not uncommon
for men who were well connected. Training and tactics became the
cornerstone of the army emphasizing drill, discipline, and order. A
recruit’s first priority was to learn how to stay in formation and
keep pace with his comrades. The tactics were simple but effective: a silent
advance followed up by shock combat. The frontiers of the Empire were fluid
zones of commerce and trade between Romans and barbarians. It was common
practice for small barbarian bands to raid Roman settlements and return
heavy- laden with plunder. Raids were not of much concern unless
they went unchecked thereby telegraphing Roman vulnerability. The
Romans took these raids as a serious threat and would seek reprisals, which
included the taking of cattle as hostages from the Germans. To curb
germinating thoughts of rebellion or war, the Romans constructed structures
such as Hadrian’s Wall as a statement of Rome’s power. The
idea was to inspire awe in their enemies and to draw them into submission
without spilling Roman blood.
The
Late Roman Empire was plagued by civil wars and usurpations. Leadership
of the armies was given to men from the equestrian rank rather than the
traditional senatorial rank. This move was intended to remove potential
rivals from the Emperor but instead opened the door to greater intrigue
and facilitated a meteoric rise in assassination plots. This period also
witnessed the decline of the Roman army. According to Goldsworthy,
they were unable to approach the enemy in silence or in proper order. Moreover,
Goldsworthy refutes the suggestion that cavalry were a dominant force in
the fourth century. Troops were divided into two main groups: the comitatenses and
the limitanei. The former were stationed in the interior while
the latter were stationed along the frontier. In AD 350, there were
three major field armies and none were able to respond to more than one
threat reducing their efficacy. By AD 400, this number increased
substantially to position small armies along the frontier.
The
collapse in the West was accompanied by the reliance placed upon allies
known as Foederati, barbarian units led by their own leaders. Along
with the changing makeup of the army, the empire was divided into smaller
provinces to offset weak central authority. A Vegetian strategy was
adopted avoiding battle unless the Roman army held a strong advantage. Heavy
infantry was no longer the bread-and-butter of the Roman army; they merely
provided a line of defense. The age of cavalry had arrived.
There
are many parallels between Goldsworthy and Lendon. Both authors are
of the same mind concerning single combat, willful disobedience, competition,
personal glory, individual boldness, and command style. It would
be reasonable to suggest that Goldsworthy and Lendon take similar approaches
to Roman military history and interpret it in connection with the Homeric
past. There is considerable overlap in topic coverage, especially
in competition, glory, and prestige. Competition was inculcated from birth
and was practiced by all levels of society. So powerful was the drive
of competition, that Cassius Longinus, a consul of Rome, “decided
on his own initiative to march his army overland to Macedonia. By
chance the Senate heard of his expedition and were able to send a commission
to restrain him…. This is just another example of the Roman aristocracy’s
lust for glory affecting their behavior in the provinces.” (p. 99)
Longinus willfully defied his orders because he lived by a Homeric code
that required him to take action even if it meant to disobey orders from
the Senate. What is curious about this episode is that Longinus was
not reprimanded or punished for his actions. Rash behavior exhibited by
a general and consul of Rome, more likely, was understood as an acceptable
manifestation of Romanitas rather than willful disobedience and
insubordination.
Goldsworthy,
however, has a different understanding of virtus: contrary to the
embodiment of Homeric values. “Virtus,” Goldsworthy
observes, “was the word used to describe the military virtues which
a Roman senator was expected to display because of his birth and upbringing. Virtus included
the practical ability to lead and control an army, the physical courage
needed to perform this role moving around close behind the battle line
and the moral courage never to admit the possibility of defeat.” (p.
115-16) This broad definition is personified, in Goldsworthy’s
opinion, by Julius Caesar. Lendon offers an alternative understanding
of virtus and uses Titus as his exemplar. Titus, however,
differed from Julius Caesar in many respects but most importantly in command
style. Julius Caesar was a seasoned commander and a brilliant general
who studied the ancients with a passion. Titus was a young buck who
liked to flirt with danger and put himself in compromising positions. While
Caesar tended to oversee operations from a safe distance, Titus repeatedly
fought side-by-side with his men. Caesar and Titus were capable generals
who adopted a command style that fit with their respective personalities
and predispositions. Although both men share many admirable qualities,
Titus lacked Caesar’s experience and the lessons learned from those
hard-fought battles. Caesar fought with his mind, while Titus fought
with his heart.
Goldsworthy
effortlessly weaves historiographical issues into his narrative with great
skill. These debates range from the use of decorations and military honors
to critical reviews of Caesar’s generalship. Goldsworthy summarily
accepts or rejects propositions with an arsenal of knowledge and common
sense. One historical debate stands out from the rest because Goldsworthy
deals with it throughout his book: were the Romans imperialists or did
a Grand Strategy dictate their actions? At the turn of the twentieth
century, many historians
“believed that the Romans were not willing imperialists, but had
been drawn on to fight war after war to defend themselves and their allies
against real or imagined threats.” (p. 90) In recent years,
however, revisionists have labeled Roman expansion as the “exploitation
and repression of indigenous cultures.” (p. 90) This accusation
is familiar to historians of the Crusades. Some historians believe
that many Crusaders were enticed to the Holy Land by the allure of land,
wealth, and prestige. Jonathan Riley-Smith has defended the Crusaders’ motives
and has shown that Crusaders were motivated by religious conviction and
conscience—not by material gain. Like Riley-Smith, Goldsworthy
has assumed the unenviable task to defend the Roman Empire against the
indictment of imperialism. Goldsworthy argues that historians mistake
an aggressive foreign policy for imperialist motives. Roman strategy
was concerned with neutralizing potential threats either through diplomacy,
by way of treaty, or through a brutal war that crippled their war-making
ability. It is easy to confuse Rome’s aggressive and uncompromising
military strategies as a pretext for conquest and expansion. Goldsworthy
vindicated Roman Grand Strategy as a strategy of survival and a means of
keeping the balance-of-power intact. In an age where war is a last
resort, moderns may be more shocked by Rome’s ruthless behavior to
insure their sovereignty and judge them unfairly.
Roman
warfare grew from petty raids in its early history to fielding legions
that intimidated rivals into submission and inspired fear in those who
proved more confident. The outcome was assured because, as Goldsworthy
noted, the Romans would never admit defeat in an age where negotiation
and limited loss in manpower was preferred. The ability to absorb
other peoples, particularly the barbarians, aided Rome’s expansion
and helped them field armies that could meet any challenge. Their
flexibility and intensive training regimen boosted their self-confidence
and morale. They became highly specialized in the Late Antique period
and were staffed with engineers and reconnaissance units. Goldsworthy
emphasizes the Roman Army’s ability to absorb heavy losses and replenish
the ranks efficiently—an option not available to most ancient armies. This
book is a fantastic volume that offers a well-balanced treatment of Roman
warfare without the dense verbiage. Goldsworthy’s book is an
excellent introductory text to ancient military history with user-friendly
appendices.