The conduct of war has never been a simple affair and Eric McGeer’s
erudite investigation of Byzantine military thinking amply confirms this point.
The tome details the painstaking efforts and detailed planning which Byzantium
undertook for the preparation, conduct, and completion of its military campaigns.
The fact that McGeer’s books is going into its second edition attests
to its quality. At the same time, it reflects the ongoing interest among
scholars and commentators in the strategic culture of the Byzantine Empire.
The volume is divided into two parts. The first one includes both the original
texts and the translations of the Praecepta militaria of
the Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969) and chapters
56 through 65 of the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos
(c.980–c.1010), who was a general during the reign of Emperor
Basil II. The obvious reason for including both treatises is that the excerpt
from Ouranos’ Taktika merely paraphrases Phokas’ Praecepta.
In this respect, the parallel assessment of both treatises provides an opportunity
for uncovering context-specific nuances that each which goes beyond the mere
comparative analysis of two fairly similar texts. More importantly however
the inclusion of both treatises reveals the complex interaction between continuity
and change in Byzantine strategic thought. For instance, it is believed that
the Praecepta is a compilation of earlier military texts that have long
disappeared and which have been enhanced by Phokas’ own observations.
The Taktika confirms the vitality of this tradition in which Ouranos
expands on Phokas’ precepts by adding insights from his own military
experience.
The second part of the volume provides McGeer’s historical commentary
to both treatises. This section includes five chapters detailing different
aspects of the military campaigns conducted by the Byzantine Empire. It outlines
the different relations between the infantry, the cavalry, and the heavy cavalry,
the distinct deployments and tactics employed by these forces, the significance
of pre-deployment preparations and precautions, as well as the significance
of the military camp to Byzantine warfare conduct. McGeer’s commentary
provides an apt and much-needed context for the historiographic engagement
with the military strategy of Byzantium. Such an account provides thoughtful
consideration of the significance of the Praecepta and the Taktika.
At the same time, it also assists the understanding of the concerns preoccupying
Byzantine generals--and, by extension, medieval strategists--in preparation,
during, and after the battle. Such ability to relate the issues consuming Byzantine
military planners endows the volume with immediacy that will be appreciated
not only by historians, but also by many in the armed forces confronting not
too dissimilar problems in contemporary battlefields.
Both parts of the volume emphasize the premium placed by Byzantine strategists
to adaptation. As McGeer insists, the insistence on “adapting themselves
appropriately”
(225) provides the cornerstone of Byzantine military thinking. Thus,
while both the Praecepta and the Taktika reveal their authors’ preoccupation
with order, discipline, and predictability, the treatises also reveal a profound
awareness of the unpredictability of warfare. In this setting unintended consequences
can become a significant constitutive feature of any battle. That is why, both
Phokas and Ouranos place special significance on the preparedness of the individual
soldier and his readiness to respond appropriately to any contingency. For
Byzantine strategists, appropriate response is associated with the training
of the troops, their armament and welfare, intimate knowledge of the terrain,
and maintaining discipline regardless of the circumstances. In this setting,
the ability of the individual soldier to adapt to changing circumstances emerges
as a central feature in the ability of the Byzantine army to succeed in battle.
The volume therefore reveals that the need for adaptation leads Byzantine
strategists to adopt qualitatively different tactics depending on the enemy.
As McGeer demonstrates the Arab campaigns of Byzantium
were conducted differently from the Balkan campaigns. In this respect, both
the Praecepta and the Taktika demonstrate an intimate knowledge
of the ways in which the different adversaries of the Byzantine Empire fight
and how can such idiosyncrasies be used to the advantage of Byzantium. At the
same time, the treatises reveal peculiarities of the Byzantine forces as well.
For instance, Phokas’ Praecepta insists that soldiers need to “fast
for three days before the battle” (59) in order to purify themselves.
This instruction draws attention to the significant role played by religion
in the Byzantine way of war.
In this setting, McGeer’s volume brings to life not only the strategies
of the Byzantine Empire, but also the people engaged in its warfare. His account
also demonstrates that the success of the Byzantine military effort was underpinned
by the constant strive for adaptation to changing circumstances. Yet, whenever
their strategists stopped paying heed to the potential unintended effects of
their actions, Byzantium’s forces became maladapted to the shifting circumstances.
In this setting they were often routed or destroyed. Thus, according to both
Phokas and Ouranos the failure of on the battlefield is the result of three
mutually-reinforcing factors: (i) “lack of
foresight and investigation [of the enemy];” (ii) “failure to secure
the route homewards;”
and (iii) “overconfidence induced by the deceptive actions of a clever
foe.”
(345-347) In other words, these are mistakes emanating either from the
inability to maintain the appropriate military conduct as scripted by the treatises
or from the failure to provide decisive leadership prepared to adapt in the
face of unpredictable contingency.
In this respect, it is expected that the new edition of McGeer’s book
will be invaluable for understanding the military thinking behind the campaigns
of the Byzantine Empire. At the same time, the prescient commentaries provided
in the second part of the volume offer meaningful explanation of the specific
context and circumstances to which the Praecepta and the Taktika were
applied. Thus, while the volume will be of interest both to students and scholars
of Byzantine military history and strategy, McGeer has
also produced the kind of examination that is bound to trigger debate and invite
(if not beckon) its readers to pursue further the propositions made on its
pages.