Too little attention and credit, it seems to us, has been given to the Italian maritime republics for their participation in the crusades. The general histories, relying primarily upon Frankish chronicles, mention them here and there, sometimes a sentence or a paragraph, occasionally a few pages.\(^1\) The historians of the crusades generally do give credit to the Italians for essential naval support and for the transportation of supplies and reinforcements, but often they find the concessions gained by merchant-republics in the conquered territories to be excessive and extortionate. When they consider the motivations of the Italians, and especially, the Venetians, moreover, they very often stress their commercial interest while disparaging their religion and their crusading zeal.\(^2\)

Limiting ourselves for now to the role of the Venetians in

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\(^1\) We are very grateful to L.B. ROBBERT for making available to us the manuscript of her *The Venetian Colonies and the Crusades*, to appear in K.M. SETTON, ed., *A History of the Crusades*, 5 vols., Philadelphia and Madison, Wisc. 1958-. We also wish to thank R.E. LERNER for his close reading and criticism of a version of this work presented by KATELE before the Western Michigan Medieval Conference in May of 1983.

the First Crusade, we will argue: that the Venetians made a very significant contribution to the conquest of the Latin Kingdom; that the privileges that they secured were not excessive when put into the balance with their efforts or with the gains of the other maritime republics, or, for that matter, of the knightly crusaders; and that a subtle mixture of spiritual and secular motives guided their conduct just as it did that of other crusaders.

That the Venetian fleet did not appear in the Holy Land until after the fall of Jerusalem is true, and it is often held as a black mark against the Republic. The Venetians' tardy arrival on the scene of combat leads many historians to argue that they had little or no religious motivation, and took the Cross only after they realized that events had turned in favor of the Westerners and that Genoa and Pisa were challenging Venice's Levantine supremacy. John L. LaMonte even suggests that Venice supplied a larger force than Genoa or Pisa in order to gain wider concessions than those commercial rivals had already acquired.

Actually, a bit more than a year after receiving word of Urban II's appeal for a crusade at Clermont (27 November 1095) the Venetians were organizing an expedition. Andrea Dandolo tells us that shortly after Vitale Michiel assumed the dogeship he dispatched envoys to the Dalmatian towns to seek participation in a Venetian fleet for the Holy Land, and


two surviving agreements from Spalato and Trau confirm the fourteenth century chronicler's account. Dandolo even seems to say that they took the Cross at this time, although the Monk of the Lido, a more contemporary source, places this event two years later. At any rate, it is certain that Venetian preparations were underway not later than 1097.

There is some evidence that Venetians fought at the siege of Antioch in 1097-1098. Gilo, who wrote his account about 1120 and had not been present, mentions a Venetian following Fulcher, the first crusader to mount the wall, on a scaling ladder. The anonymous *Estoire de Jerusalem et d'Antioche*, a selectively abridged version of Fulcher of Chartres with an admixture of legendary material, lists the Venetians in the order of the battle. Other sources fail to

5. Michiel probably succeeded at the very end of 1096, for his predecessor was buried on Christmas Day of that year. We are told that he became doge in 1096, but since the Venetian year 1097 did not begin until March 1, it is possible that he was not elected until early 1097, although 1096 (modern style) is usually given. It is unlikely, though possible, that the envoys were dispatched before the end of December. A. DANDOLO, *Chronica*, E. PASTORELLO, ed., R.I.S., XII, i, 221; P. GIUSTINIANI, *Venetiarum historia vulgo Pietro Justiniano Justiniani filio adiudicata*, R. CESSI and F. BENATO, eds., Venice 1964, p. 86; *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae, et Slavoniae*, I.K. SAKCINSKI, ed., 2 vols., Zagreb 1874, I, 187-188; G. M. THOMAS, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte Venedig*, 3 vols., 1856-57, reprinted Amsterdam 1967, I, 63-64. Although only the agreements from Spalato and Trau are extant, other Dalmatian towns also probably agreed to join the venture. MANFRONI, op. cit., I, 141. Manfroni also suggests that the negative assessments of Venice's belated participation may result from the scarcity of reliable sources discussing the Republic's preparations for the First Crusade. Ibid, I, 137. Manfroni, who is very good, naturally read a lot of Italian sources overlooked by most crusading historians. The documentation above, however, is actually ample and conclusive that Venice was preparing for a crusade in 1096. The Renaissance historian and humanist, A. NAVAGERO, tells of papal envoys sent to Venice to seek Venetian participation. *Historia veneta*, R.I.S., XXIII, col. 962.

6. «Vitalis Michiel dux statuitur anno Domini millesimo nonagesimo sexto. Quo creato, Veneti, crucem assumentes, subsidium in aquisignione terre Sancte mitere decernunt; et per legatos suos; Badoarium Daspinale et Faledrum Stornato, Dalmatinos, ut conferant, requiritur; illi autem, fidelis celo et promise fidelitatis, ascenciunt.» DANDOLO, op. cit., p. 221. MONK OF THE LIDO, *Historia de translatione Magni Nicolai*, R.H.C., Occ., V, 255. DANDOLO wrote in the mid-fourteenth century, the Monk of the Lido shortly after 1116.

7. «Non hunc tardat onus clypei, sed ad ardua pronus Evolat arma gerens, scalaeque viriliter haerens. / Illum Veneticus sequitur. Stupet hostis iniquus, Ut stetit in muris Fulcherius...» GILÒ, *Historia gestarum vae nostri temporis Jerusolymitanae*, R.H.C., Occ., V, 765. The Fulcher mentioned was called Fulcher of Chartres, but, according to Hagenmeyer, was not the same as the chronicler. See «Einleitung,» in FULCHER OF CHARTRES, *Historia Hierosolymitana* (1095-1127), ed. by H. HAGENMEYER, Heidelberg 1913, p. 7 and no. 4. Other sources name Fulcher, but omit mention of the Venetian. RAYMOND OF AGUILERS, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Jerusalem*, R.H.C., Occ., III, 251; ROBERT THE MONK, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, R.H.C., Occ., III, 800.

8. «Premiers s'en issi Hues li Maines, amprés le quens de Flandre et le quens dou Perche;
mention any Venetians engaged in fighting, but do note that Venetians and other seafarers brought supplies and pilgrims. In one instance Baldric of Dol notes that they had arms, men, machinery, and supplies on board. We known that Venetian ships were included in the motley fleet that accompanied the crusaders offshore and provided them with food and other supplies as they marched along the coast from northern Lebanon to Jaffa. Very likely some Venetians did join in combat before the conquest of Jerusalem. The privileges that Bohemund I granted to Venice, dated by Tafel and Thomas in 1098-1099, might have been a reward for such service, although we think it more likely that the Norman gave the privileges to assure the steady arrival of supplies to his new stronghold. We agree with earlier authors that these vessels belonged to private entrepreneurs and had no communal backing.

The Venetians did not get an official expedition underway until the summer of 1099, perhaps because of sensitivity to the feelings of their Byzantine patron, Emperor Alexius ampres s'en issirent Buaiamont et Tanquéré, et li dus Robert de Normandie, et li quens de Bretelagne, et li dus Godefoiz de Buillon, et li quens Reynald d'Orenses; amprés cil de Rome trés que au monz, cil de Pise, de Jene, de Venise, de Hongrie, de Norwogre, o toz lez austres Crestiens.» Li Estoire de Jerusalem et d'Antioche, R.H.C., Occ., V, 637.

9. William of Tyre, Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum, R.H.C., Occ., I, 310; P. Tudebode, Historia de Hierosolimitano itinere, J.H. Hill and L.L. Hill, eds., Paris 1977, p. 131 (The Hills have also translated it in «Memos of the American Philosophical Society», Cl, 1974, p. 35); Raymond of Agilers, op. cit., pp. 248, 276, and 290. See also F.C. Lane, Venice: a Maritime Republic, Baltimore 1973, p. 32; von Heyd, op. cit., I, 133; A.C. Krey, The First Crusade, Princeton 1921, p. 295. M. Mollat points out that the main forces of the First Crusade traveled by land because they could not afford the high cost of transport by sea, since they planned to forage for food in the lands along the way, whereas, traveling by sea, they would have had to pay for it. Moreover, it is doubtful whether even Venice at that date was able to transport large numbers of men and mounts. Problèmes navals de l'histoire des croisades, «Cahiers de civilisation médiévale,» 10 (1967), 345-359.


11. Grousset, op. cit., I, 142, citing William of Tyre, op. cit., p. 310. During the course of our work on this article, the University of Illinois Library has misplaced the first volume of the R.H.C., Occ., but we have verified the reference in Guillaume de Tyr et ses continuateurs, ed. by P. Paris, 2 vols., Paris 1879-80, I, 244-245, and also in ibid., A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea, trans. and annotated by E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey, 2 vols., New York 1943, I, 330.

12. We have only the confirmation of Baldwin I's concessions by Reginald of Chatillon (1153) and Baldwin III (1167-1183), and they neither date it nor mention why it was granted. Tafel and Thomas, op. cit., I, 64, 95, 102-103, 133-135, 148-150, and 175-177.

Comnenus, who had recently granted the Republic highly advantageous commercial privileges in the Golden Bull of 1082. The emperor viewed the crusading army and especially the hated Bohemond of Taranto with justified suspicion. The delay, on the other hand, may simply have been required to prepare so large a fleet. Venice provided 200 vessels in 1099, while Pisa had supplied 120 in 1098, and Genoese private entrepreneurs only thirteen in 1097.14 Frederic Lane has pointed out how weighty an undertaking was the mobilization of a war fleet. The government had to decide whether to withdraw its vessels and crews from trade in order to devote those resources of capital and labor to fighting. It was by no means certain that the return would compensate for the profits lost, the ships sunk or damaged, and the manpower sacrificed.15

Venice in 1099, like Pisa in 1098, but unlike Genoa in 1097, as Joshua Prawer notes, responded to the papal appeal with an «official» venture, organized and financed by communal authorities.16 The doge proposed taking the Cross, the arengo of citizens approved it, and vows were taken in the setting of a formal, civic ceremony. Vitale Michiel reminded the citizens assembled at St. Mark's of both spiritual and material rewards to be reaped by crusading, as Urban II had exhorted the Franks at Clermont.


Enrico Contarini, Bishop of Castello and son of a former doge, was named spiritual head of the Venetian crusade and Giovanni Michiel, the present doge's son, received the naval command. The Patriarch of Grado, Pietro Badoer, delivered to Contarini a banner emblazoned with the Cross and Doge Vitale Michiel presented the banner of St. Mark to his son.\footnote{17}

The Venetian fleet departed the lagoons in July, 1099, delaying along the Dalmatian coast to secure the fidelity of the towns and supplement their forces with the men and supplies pledged to the Republic in 1097.\footnote{18} Without further delay they sailed directly to Rhodes, where the Venetian sources tell us that Michiel chose to anchor in order to avoid, as was customary, voyaging during the season of winter storms. On the other hand, Rhodes was the taking-off point for commerce from the Aegean to the Holy Land, Pisans had recently occupied Byzantine Corfu, and a Pisan fleet was known to be in the vicinity, so very likely the Venetians also wished to secure Rhodes in their own interest and in that of their Byzantine ally.\footnote{19} Contarini and Michiel sent letters to the Holy Land, informing the crusading magnates that they could be expected at Jaffa in the spring of 1100.\footnote{20} In the meantime, Emperor Alexius Comnenus, growing agitated with the Venetian's decision to support the crusading barons, warned the Republic that aid to the crusaders made a mockery of its alliance with Byzantium and would have grave consequences for its Byzantine privileges. The emperor's threats, pleas, and promises of rewards, however, did not move the Venetians. Bishop Contarini admonished them that no crown awaited those who merely set out, but only those who would persevere. If they pursued transitory gains, turning their backs upon the Cross of Christ, they would incur the wrath of God and shame before men.\footnote{21}

\footnote{17} Monk of the Lido, op. cit., p. 255; Dandolo, op. cit., p. 221.
\footnote{18} Annales Venetici breves, H. Simonsfeld, ed., M.G.H., SS., XIV, 70; Monk of the Lido, op. cit., p. 256; Dandolo, op. cit., p. 221. On the additional forces from Dalmatia, see Errera, art. cit., p. 250, n. 2, and Cesst, Repubblica di Venezia..., I, 135.
\footnote{19} Monk of the Lido, op. cit., pp. 256-257; Dandolo, op. cit., p. 221; Lane, Venice..., p. 32.
\footnote{21} Monk of the Lido, op. cit., p. 257; Wiel, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
As winter approached, the survivors of the aforementioned Pisan fleet, which had been defeated by the Byzantines, reached Rhodes, also planning to seek harbor there and probably to secure the strategic island for their city and their commerce. The Venetians attacked and defeated the fifty Pisan vessels. Without loss of Venetian blood, the monk of the Lido tells us, the crusaders from the lagoons took or destroyed twenty-eight of the fifty. Shortly thereafter, against the wishes of their Byzantine allies, they returned the captured vessels to the conquered, along with all prisoners except thirty-six voluntary hostages from the 4,000 taken. Dandolo explains that the Venetians were so generous because they carried the Cross of the Lord on their souls, not merely upon their shoulders. In return the Venetians stipulated that the Pisans should «never again enter Romania (the Byzantine Empire) for commercial purposes, (and) they will never again fight Christians in any way, unless for the devotion of the Holy Sepulchre.» As Prawer remarks, these conditions bear testimony to the blend of «piety and greed» characteristic of the Venetian undertaking. We would


23. The Monk of the Lido says that the Venetians sent out only thirty of their armed vessels against the Pisans. Ibid., p. 258. Dandolo, with M. Sanuto following, patriotically reduces the number to twenty. Dandolo, op. cit., p. 221; Sanuto, op. cit., p. 164. Sanuto also skews the chronology, placing the battle in the midst of the search for the body of St. Nicholas. Manfroni, suggests that even the Monk of the Lido cannot be trusted in his claim that the Venetians sent out thirty vessels to combat Pisa's fifty. He instead suspects that the Venetians won because of superior numbers, since the Pisans were hardly novices in naval warfare. Op. cit., I, 142-143. Wiel agrees. Op. cit., p. 77. We would add that the Venetians were probably not so foolhardy as to risk defeat unnecessarily.


26. Prawer, The Crusaders' Kingdom..., p. 489. Manfroni stresses the material aspect of
emphasize the presence of this mixture in the hearts of almost all crusaders.

En route to the Holy Land the Venetians engaged in a curious bit of relic hunting and competition with the Apulian port of Bari. On 27 May 1100 the fleet reached Myra on the south coast of Asia Minor. Here they sought the relics of St. Nicholas, which, as some of them perhaps knew, had already been snatched by merchants of Bari in 1087 to aid them in their failing commercial competition against the Republic of St. Mark. Equally larcenous Venetians apparently had plotted to steal the relics at that time to adorn the new Church of St. Nicholas on the Lido, but their rivals beat them to the body and transported it to Bari. The crusading Venetians of 1100 understandably had some trouble locating their intended booty, since the saint now resided in southern Italy, but, undaunted, they tortured four custodians of the Church of Holy Zion until the poor creatures directed them to the relics of two saints, one of which was the uncle and namesake of the already departed St. Nicholas. They steadfastly denied, however, that they knew where the more famous St. Nicholas rested, which, indeed, was true. After the Venetians had ransacked the church in their search for the younger Nicholas, he finally revealed himself by the customary saintly odor, so the Venetians made off with some body or other, or perhaps with scraps left by their predecessors. In the rivalry between Bari and Venice, therefore, the Venetians could clearly claim the relic of St. Nicholas, since they had the body of the uncle and some thing that they called the body of the nephew. Although we modern historians are inclined to mock the theft of relics as a perversion of religion, the men and women of the Middle Ages did not regard it in that way. Moreover, for present purposes, it is evidence of a profound religious sentiment, however perverse from our point of view, which the Venetians shared fully with their contemporaries.27

the agreement, alleging that the Monk of the Lido had forgotten the initial religious purpose of the undertaking. Op. cit., I, 143.

The fleet arrived at Jaffa around 10 June, finding the Franks in dire need of supplies and money, which made the arrival of the Venetians very welcome. According to the monk of the Lido, the newcomers provisioned the crusading barons, partly by way of gift and partly for money. Godfrey of Bouillon explained the crusaders’ plans to conquer the Palestinian coast. He was, however, short-handed: Fulcher of Chartres tells us that he had 300 knights and 300 foot; Albert of Aachen reports only 200 knights, but 1,000 foot. Moreover, the Franks held only Jaffa on the coast, so Godfrey urged the sea-going Venetians to aid him. The crusaders from the Adriatic replied that they had come to the Holy Land precisely for that purpose.28

The Venetians agreed to aid the army in the Holy Land in a siege of Acre from 24 June to 15 August. In return, the Republic would receive a church and a marketplace in all towns taken by the army, immunity from all taxes, one-third of the booty in any town taken jointly (two-thirds to the Franks, «because they were not wealthy, and they labored more and longer in God’s service»), half the loot and possession of the town if they took Tripoli, and freedom from the customary law of shipwreck.29 Critics often charge that the plight of Godfrey of Bouillon gave Venice a strong

28. Monk of the Lido, op. cit., p. 271; Annales Venetici breves, p. 70; Sanuto, op. cit., p. 164; Albert of Aachen, Historia Hierosolymitanae expeditionis, R.H.C., Occ., IV, 503, 507, 517, 519; Fulcher of Chartres, op. cit., p. 389. Although the sources are not in agreement upon the specific numbers, they do confirm that the numbers were small. See Fink, art. cit., p. 375; Lane, Venice..., p. 32; J. Prawer, The Crusader Nobility and the Feudal System, trans. by F. Cheyette, in J. Prawer, Crusader Institutions, Oxford 1980, p. 21. Prawer’s article first appeared in «Moyen Age,» LXV (1959), 41-74, and first appeared in English in F. Cheyette, ed., Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe, New York 1968. J. Riley-Smith warns that we should not be misled by Fulcher’s figures (and presumably also by Albert’s), because they do not include troops under the command of other leaders. The Motives of the Earliest Crusaders and the settlement of Palestine, 1095-1100, «English Historical Review,» 98 (1983), 723-724.

29. Monk of the Lido, op. cit., p. 272. As published, the provisions of the treaty are placed in quotation marks, as if the the Monk of the Lido had the text before him. Runciman, op. cit., I, 313; R. Röhrich, Regesta Regni Hierosolymitanæ, Innsbruck 1893, p. 4; J. Prawer, The Italians in the Latin Kingdom, in Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp. 221-222. This article is an enlarged version of I Veneziani e le colonie veneziane nel Regno Latino de Gerusalemme. See also Cessi, Le colonie..., pp. 34-35; R. Cessi, Politica, economia, religione, in Storia di Venezia, vol. II, Venice, n.d., p. 341; Id., Repubblica di Venezia..., I, 136-137.
argument for exacting the highest concessions.  

There were, however, precedents for such grants: the Genoese had received a market, a church, and thirty houses in Antioch, and Pisa had acquired a section of Jaffa. The Venetian privileges do not seem exorbitant considering that the Republic provided a larger fleet than either of its counterparts. Moreover, if we compare the skimpy French forces with the size of the Venetian armament, the terms of the accord seem even more reasonable. Carile estimates that a fleet of similar size a century later required 17,264 men: that fleet on the Fourth Crusade, it is true, probably had larger galleys, but it consisted of fifty to sixty galleys and the remainder were roundships for carrying other crusaders, and roundships require a much smaller crew. If we knew the types of vessels included in the fleet of 1099 we could better estimate the number of Venetians. Presumably there were some roundships to carry supplies, but, since there were no foreign pilgrims, it seems a fair assumption that more than half the two hundred were light war galleys. If we estimate rather conservatively that each galley bore forty fighting men, then, if half the vessels were galleys, the Venetians contributed 4,000 on the galleys; if three-quarters were galleys, 6,000; if ninety percent, then 7,600. It is more difficult to estimate the number of fighting men on the roundships. The largest roundships of the day could transport 1000 pilgrims or 100 knights, their retainers, and their horses. We know that some cargo was carried, and we would assume that not all the roundships were of the largest size. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that

30. E.g.: «...the colossal price which Godfrey was prepared to pay...» H.E. MAYER, The Crusades, 1st Germ. ed., 1965, trans. by J. GILLINGHAM and revised and updated by the author, New York and Oxford 1972, p. 67; «...ma, (Michiel) conscio della sua potenza navale, impose condizioni gravissime...» MANFRONI, op. cit., I, 143; «He (Michiel) was not, either, burdened with false modesty, and was also able to make the most of the circumstances existing in his favor.» WIEL, op. cit., p. 79; «Before agreeing to take part in the capture of a city, the merchants demanded privileges therein.» BENVENISTI, op. cit., p. 4 (Note that he does not refer to the Venetians as crusaders); «...this was the beginning of a long series of privileges granted to the various communes at Acre even before its capture.» Ibid., p. 79. Even CESSI finds the privileges rather onerous. Politica, economia, religione, p. 341.

31. LAMONTE, op. cit., p. 266; MANFRONI, op. cit., I, 139; R. CESSI, Le colonie..., p. 31.
each roundship carried some fighting men, say fifty, again a very conservative estimate. Then, if fifty percent were roundships, 5,000 men; if twenty-five percent, 2,500; if ten percent, then 500. In short, we estimate conservatively a Venetian force of 8,100 to 9,000 men, which compares very favorably to the number that Godfrey could muster. Naval warfare, moreover, costs more, and, according to Lane, requires greater skills than fighting on land. In any case, it seems clear that the Venetians contributed more than an equal share to the combined operation. If they shared the burden of battle, why should the conquests fall entirely to Godfrey and his followers? 

Before the Venetians arrived at Acre word came of the death of Godfrey, so Michiel and Tancred agreed to attack instead Haifa, a smaller town across the Gulf of Acre. The siege dragged on from 25 July until 20 August, five days past the agreed date for the Venetians to remain, largely because Tancred, angered by Godfrey’s promise of Haifa to Geldemar Carpenal, sulked, like Achilles, in his tent. Not only Venetians, it appears, mingled selfish motives with crusading zeal. When the disappointed Venetians withdrew from the harbor into the Gulf of Acre, Archbishop Daimbert persuaded Tancred to join the fray, lest his allies simply sail away. The town was then taken and looted, although the Monk of the Lido and Albert of Aachen tell us that the Venetians had no share in the booty. 

32. LANE estimates that the light galleys of the eleventh century bore at least forty to sixty oarmen, and we must add a few officers and marines. Venice..., p. 29. R.W. UNGER says twenty to thirty oarmen, although some of the longer galleys had as many as sixty or eighty. The figures on the capacity of roundships also come from him. The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600, London-Montreal 1980, pp. 122-123. PRAWER suggests that the Monk of the Lido, our only source for the accord, writing after 1116, when tax exemptions and possessions in Palestinian cities were more common, projected his understanding of commercial concessions backward sixteen years to the agreement of 1100. I Veneziani..., pp. 632-633. If he is correct, and the Venetians merely were to share in the spoils, their gains would have fallen short of those of the other maritime powers. We think that in the absence of contrary evidence we should follow the Monk of the Lido, even though Prawe’s suggestion would strengthen our argument.

33. MONK OF THE LIDO, op. cit., pp. 275-278; ALBERT OF AACHEN, op. cit., pp. 521-523; M. SANUTO (TORSELLO), Secreta fidelium Crucis, Hanover ed. of 1611, Toronto and Buffalo 1972, p. 151; DANDOLO, op. cit., p. 223 (Dandolo has them previously capturing Acre); M.
tasty plum than Acre. An insignificant port, it was not much more than a small Jewish colony built around an inconsequential Egyptian garrison. It offered Venice little as a trading center, and was virtually deserted after the Christian forces took it. All in all, the Venetians provided notable assistance in an endeavor, which, in terms of their economic interest, was at most an investment in future possibilities.

For the next eight years we hear nothing of Venetians fighting in the Holy Land. Did the political failure of the first expedition, along with a Venetian desire to placate the Byzantines, as Cessi argues, dissuade them from returning? Strategically, abstention from crusading had its costs, since the Genoese took the lead in these intervening years, securing new privileges in the Kingdom of Jerusalem (1101 and 1104) and in the Principality of Antioch (1101). We should not assume, however, that Venice lost its interest in Palestinian affairs, ignored religious inspirations, and was content with its lines of traffic from the Adriatic to the Bosphorus. As in the years preceding the Contarini-Michiel voyage, private Venetian vessels, as well as those from other lands, continued to furnish provisions to the crusader states and to transport pilgrims, who, says Fulcher of Chartres, were received in the Holy Land like saints, since land communications with Europe had been cut. It must be admitted that some

35. Cessi, Repubblica di Venezia..., I, 137, where the author states that the most important result of the expedition was the acquisition of the relic of St. Nicholas; id., Le colonie..., p. 35; id., Politica, economia, religione..., p. 343.
Venetian merchants also provided supplies to the enemy. In the same year the Republic, in conjunction with Ravenna, assisted Countess Matilda of Tuscany in the recovery of Ferrara. Two years after the elevation of Michiel's successor, Ordelafo Falier, their quondam ally Coloman invaded and occupied Dalmatian towns subject to Venice, such as Spalato and Zara, promising the local inhabitants extensive privileges in exchange for their loyalty. In response Falier commissioned a fleet, which suppressed the rebellions. Byzantine hostility toward the crusaders, moreover, had deepened steadily. Emperor Alexius claimed that Antioch and Edessa both belonged to him on the basis of his agreements with the Frankish leaders. In turn, Bohemond besieged Durazzo in 1108. The emperor implored Genoa, Pisa, and Venice to join Constantinople in crushing Bohemond, but only the Venetians responded with a fleet. It is not clear whether the Venetians actually come to blows with the Normans, but they did play a key role in blocking Bohemond's communications between Apulia and Durazzo. Finally, natural disasters, such as fires, earthquakes, and violent sea-storms ravaged the islands in the lagoons during Falier's reign. It was then that Malamocco, the old center of population and commerce, was submerged. It is no great wonder that the

Venetians did not mount a crusading expedition at such a tumultuous time.

Some Venetians did participate in the unsuccessful siege of Sidon in 1108. That portion of the coast, including the ports from Tyre to Beirut, remained in the hands of the Moslems, cutting communications between the northern crusader states and the south. Albert of Aachen implies that a number of vessels from various Italian ports were conveniently on hand. King Baldwin «assembled a large naval and land force from the diverse nations of the kingdom of Italy, namely Pisans, Genoese, and also Venetians, Amalfitans, and those who are accustomed to sail about to capture and plunder in the manner of pirates.» There is no indication that these represented organized crusading fleets. They were probably engaged in trade and possibly piracy.

Between 19 October and 4 December 1110, 100 Venetian vessels commanded by Doge Falier joined King Sigurd of Norway’s fleet to take Sidon. In return for their help, King Baldwin I granted the Venetians a street (thereafter the vicus Venetorum) and a marketplace in Acre, the use of their own weights and measures, and jurisdiction over Venetians residing there. Genoa already had obtained one-third of that city, as well as one-third of its port revenues in 1104. The sources do not suggest a businesslike treaty concluded before the siege. Perhaps the Venetians acquired their first

46. «Baldewinus rex, contractis undique copiis a mari et terra ex diversis nationibus regni Italiae, videlicet Pisanorum, Genuensium ac Venediorum, Malfetanorum, et omnium eorum qui more praedonum expugnare et expoliare solent navigantes», ALBERT OF AACHEN, op. cit., p. 652.


48. The original document is not extant, but it is referred to in subsequent concessions. TAFEL and THOMAS, op. cit., I, 86, 91, 145. ANDOLO, Chronica, p. 228; PRAWER, Italians in the Latin Kingdom..., p. 222; HEYD, op. cit., I, 142 and 151; MANFRONI, op. cit., I, 155-156; ERRERA, op. cit., pp. 273-275. Errera believes the fleet was only a small one. CESSI wonders why the Venetians obtained privileges at Acre, not Sidon. Le colonie ..., pp. 40-41. Probably because Acre was a more important port. WIEL incorrectly states that the privileges were at Sidon. Op. cit., pp. 82-83.
privileges in Acre as a reward for their efforts at Sidon or in approximate conformity with the treaty of 1100.

Soon after the crushing defeat of the crusaders at the Field of Blood in 1119, King Baldwin II and Gormond, Patriarch of Jerusalem, requested help from the papacy and Venice. With Genoa and Pisa locked in a struggle over Corsica, the Latin Kingdom had no choice but to turn to the Venetians. The king required a naval force to match the potent Egyptian fleet, and he offered the Republic commercial privileges in return. Pope Calixtus II reinforced the appeal, calling upon the Venetians to go on crusade for the cause of Christ. ⁵⁰

Fulcher of Chartres informs us that «the Venetians were inspired to sail with a great fleet to Syria in order with the help of God to extend Jerusalem and the area adjacent, all for the advantage and glory of Christendom.»⁵¹ Doge Domenico Michiel summoned an arengo at St. Mark’s. The patriarch of Grado read the pope’s letters to the citizens and Michiel followed with a speech detailing the plight of their fellow Christians in the Holy Land and reminding them that honor and reward were readily available. Once more the appeal was made to mixed motives. The doge and many Venetians then took the Cross. Michiel reverently raised the banner of St. Peter sent by the pope, encouraging all to proceed in the name of God. ⁵²

Well before Easter of 1121, probably late in 1120, the doge

49. LaMonTe, op. cit., p. 264.
summoned all Venetians in the Byzantine Empire and elsewhere to return to Venice to participate in preparing a fleet and an army to go to the aid of the Latin Kingdom. Those who did not obey should suffer forfeiture of all their goods, and this penalty was, in fact, imposed upon one Enrico Zusto.53 In light of this suspension of foreign commerce upon which Venetian prosperity was based we have difficulty in comprehending how scholars can continue to insist upon a Venetian penchant for not letting spiritual concerns cost them money.54

The Venetian fleet, commanded by the doge, set sail in August 1122. We are not certain of its size. William of Tyre numbers forty galleys, twenty-eight beaked roundships (chatz or gatti), and four very large transports for carrying supplies.55 Fulcher of Chartres speaks of 120 vessels, including gatti, merchantmen, and triremes, in addition to smaller boats and skiffs.56 Venetian sources, written much later and probably exaggerating, would have us believe that there were 200 vessels.57 Many scholars prefer to follow William of Tyre, arguing his familiarity with Syrian affairs, but they often neglect to mention that the archbishop wrote only after 1167, relying on previous accounts and oral testimony.58 The number of men and horses and the quality of supplies transported leads us to suspect that William of Tyre's estimate is low. By the time the fleet had gathered increments from the Dalmatian coast, it included 15,000 armed crusaders, 300 horses, and an unspecified number of unarmed pilgrims. Also on board were long timbers for constructing siege machinery and carpenters to do the job.59

53. Famiglia Zusto, ed. by L. LANFRANCHI, in Fonti per la storia di Venezia, sec. III, Archivi privati, Venice 1955, pp. 26-27. To the best of our knowledge this recall of merchants and their ships has not been known to historians of the crusades.
54. See n. 2 for some examples.
56. Fulcher of Chartres, op. cit., p. 656.
If we hesitate to accept the figure that Venetian chronicles provide, Fulcher of Chartres' estimate of 120 major vessels may be the best choice. It is likely that he learned about its size from eye witnesses. He reports that the sight of the brightly painted vessels was a delight to all who saw them.

The Venetians coasted along Dalmatia and stopped at Corfu. In reprisal for the failure of Emperor John II Comnenus to renew his father's Chrysobull of 1082, the Venetians besieged the stronghold belonging to their former allies. Early in the spring of 1123, messengers from the Levant arrived to urge the Venetians on to the Holy Land, where Baldwin II had been taken prisoner. The Venetians thereupon abandoned the siege of Corfu and set out once more. During the voyage they stopped, however, to plunder the Greek islands of Chios, Lesbos and Rhodes.

As in 1100, the Venetians docked at Cyprus to obtain news about the current state of affairs in the Levant. Here they learned that Jaffa was the target of a formidable Egyptian fleet, which had been dispatched to supplement the land forces already attacking the city. Michiel ordered his vessels to proceed directly to the Holy Land. When they arrived in Acre they learned that the Christians had triumphed at Jaffa for men and horses, but says there were more than 300 vessels. Op. cit., I, 602, F. Cognasso also adopts 300 vessels. Op. cit., p. 32. Fulcher of Chartres, it is true, explicitly excludes small vessels from his 120 vessels. Op. cit., p. 656.

60. H. S. Fink, ed., in Ryan's trans. of Fulcher of Chartres, op. cit., p. 238, n. 2. The Pactum Warmundi, the treaty concluded after the Battle of Ascalon, says that Michiel sailed with «innumera classium militieque multitudine...» Tafel and Thomas, op. cit., I, 84. Michael of Edessa reports that the Venetians came with «considerable forces.» Chronique de Mattheiu d'Edesse (962-1136), avec la continuation de Grégoire le Prêtre jusqu'en 1162, ed. and trans. by E. Dulaurier, in Bibliothèque historique arménienne ou choix des principaux historiens arméniens, Paris 1858, p. 314. One hundred twenty vessels could accommodate 15,000 men if there were a sufficient number of roundships. We know there were some. See the Battle of Ascalon. Infra, p. 32. William of Tyre's numbers, however, would not work for 15,000. Each gatto or chatz would have had to accommodate more than 250 men beyond its 200 oarsmen. This seems unlikely, although the gatto was enough like a roundship or transport to be used as a decoy in the Battle of Ascalon.


and that the Farimid fleet had turned back toward Ascalon. The Venetians pursued them. Nearing the enemy, Michiel disposed his vessels astutely, hoping that the Egyptians would assume the oncoming ships were merchantmen transporting pilgrims via Cyprus to the Holy Land. He achieved the illusion of easy prey by keeping the swift and warlike galleys out of sight behind the beaked gatti and the transport roundships. As the fleet sailed forward with favorable winds through the calm sea in the early morning light of 30 May 1123, the Egyptians saw the approaching «merchant ships» and «began to exult as if their booty were already in hand and prepared to sail against the Venetians and boldly engage them in battle. The crews of the Venetians’ forward vessels feigned fright until the galleys burst forth. Startled, the Egyptian commanders hurried their men into fighting positions, but found themselves quickly surrounded. In the ensuing encounter, the Venetians captured four galleys, four gatti, one roundship, and many prisoners. As the surviving Egyptian vessels sailed southward toward Al-'Arish, Michiel attempted unsuccessfully to overtake them. The Venetians did find, however, ten Egyptian merchant transports to loot. Fulcher adds, «thus the Lord gratified his servants many times over with the rewards of abundance.» To this contemporary, at any rate, the Venetians were worthy followers of God.

The rout off Ascalon may outweigh any other contribution by the Republic of St. Mark to the conquest of the Latin Kingdom. It won the security of Christian ports from Jaffa to


65. «Et quum Saraceni decem et octo naves de classe Venetica perspicerent ad se appropriare, tanquam de emolumento jam adquisito coeperunt exsultare, et contra Venticos aptaverunt se navigare et ad pugnam eos audacter suscipere.» FULCHER OF CHARTRES, op. cit., p. 671; WILLIAM OF TYRE, op. cit., p. 546; Secunda pars Historiae Hierosolymitanae, R.H.C, Occ., III, 581.

Acre and assured their vital maritime communications with the West. It dealt a fatal blow to Moslem maritime power and prevented the enemy from receiving supplies easily. The Venetians again had not bargained for specific privileges prior to the Battle of Ascalon, but had only vague promises from Baldwin II's letters of 1119. Certainly, they had booty from the ten captured merchantmen. But the Republic made serious sacrifices as well. At a time when relations with Constantinople were far from congenial, the Venetians could have relied upon Alexandria for the Levantine trade, but they could hardly do so after crushing the Fatimid fleet.

When they reached Acre, the Venetians received a warm welcome from an embassy sent by Gormond, Patriarch of Jerusalem, Constable William of Bures, and Pagan, the captive king's chancellor. They congratulated the victors for their triumph off Ascalon, conveyed the anticipation with which the people of the Holy City awaited their arrival, and offered them warm hospitality as if they were citizens of Jerusalem. Doge Michiel and some of the other high-ranking Venetians traveled to Jerusalem to attend Christmas mass and to confer with the Frankish magnates. Fulcher of Chartres says they participated «devoutly». The barons inquired whether the Venetians would be willing to commit themselves for a while longer to the work of God and the needs of the kingdom. «In reply, the doge said that he had come with that purpose especially in view and intended to give himself entirely to that.» Two major Saracen

68. TAFEL and THOMAS, op. cit., I, 84; WILLIAM OF TYRE, op. cit., p. 550, where the archbishop includes a copy of the document.
70. «Ubi etiam ab regni, se ad tempus aliquod manciparet, respondit quod ad hoc specialiter venerat, et ad hoc tota eius dirigebatur intentio.» WILLIAM OF TYRE, op. cit., p. 549. Trans. by E.A. BABCOCK, in A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea, annotated by A.C. KREY, New York 1943, I, 551. William also speaks of the doge’s devout wish to visit the Holy Places. FULCHER OF CHARTRES, op. cit., pp. 693-694; SANUTO (TORSELLO), op. cit., p. 159; M. SANUTO, op. cit., p. 186. PRAWER finds the doge’s response pompous. The Crusaders’ Kingdom..., p. 86. Perhaps so, but it is a sort of statement found repeatedly in medieval chronicles.
strongholds remained for the crusaders to overcome: Ascalon and Tyre. The decision about which of the two to attack was not reached with ease.\footnote{71} The magnates of the south, from Jerusalem, Ramla, Jaffa, Nablus, and the surrounding areas, proposed an attack upon Ascalon, explaining that it was closer and would be defeated with much less trouble. The barons from the north, Acre, Nazareth, Sidon, Beirut, Tiberias, Jubail, and other cities, maintained that Tyre was the more potent threat to the Christians. Both were probably correct, since Tyre was crucial to the security of the entire coast and was presumably more strongly defended. Each party naturally lobbied for the city which was nearer to its holdings and therefore posed more personal danger.\footnote{72} Although Sir Steven Runciman claims that the final decision rested with the Venetians, we have no evidence that the doge expressed any preference.\footnote{73} The lords settled the debate by putting the question to God’s judgment through a resort to lot.\footnote{74} Tyre was chosen after an «innocent orphan» drew a slip of parchment from the altar.\footnote{75}

Constable William of Bures and Patriarch Gormond, representing the captive king and the other ecclesiastical and lay lords negotiated a treaty with the Venetians for the combined assault on Tyre. The \textit{Pactum Warnundi} (Treaty of Gormond) notes that it fulfills Baldwin’s pledges of benefits. It stipulates that in each city of the Latin Kingdom the Venetians should obtain a street and a marketplace, a church, a bath, and an oven. In the marketplace of Jerusalem they should receive holdings equal to those of the king.\footnote{76} They

\footnote{72. \textit{William of Tyre, op. cit.,} p. 549; \textit{Manfroni, op. cit.,} I, 162; \textit{Hodgson, op. cit.,} p. 254.}
\footnote{73. \textit{Runciman, op. cit.,} II, 167.}
\footnote{74. \textit{William of Tyre, op. cit.,} pp. 549-550. \textit{LaMonte says, «... the matter was settled in a manner peculiarly characteristic of the Crusaders, though hardly in keeping with the shrewd business methods of the Venetians.» Op. cit.,} p. 141. It is this sort of exaggerated and gratuitous contrast between knights and merchants to which we object. It is also not very historical of LaMonte to refer to the method of settling the dispute as «amusing.»}
\footnote{75. \textit{William of Tyre, op. cit.,} pp. 549-550.}
\footnote{76. \textit{Prawer} explains that the Venetians and other Italians did not actually take up residence in Jerusalem, probably because, as an inland city, it was not as well suited to their wholesale trade as the ports. J. \textit{Prawer, The Latin Settlement of Jerusalem, in Prawer, Crusader Institutions,} pp. 95-96. The article first appeared in «Speculum», XXVII (1952), 490-503.}
should use their own weights and measures. They should pay no duties, except for the usual one-third on the transporta-
tion of pilgrims. Annually, they should receive 300 bezants from the Tyrian treasury in repayment of a loan. Venetian judges should have complete jurisdiction over cases between Venetians or when a Venetian was the defendant and even authority over non-Venetians dwelling within a Venetian settlement. If a Venetian died in the kingdom, his property should fall under Venetian jurisdiction. They should be exempt from the law of shipwreck. If the joint operations succeeded in capturing Tyre or Ascalon, the Ventians should receive one-third of the city in full sovereignty. 77

The _Pactum Warrundi_ provided more than commercial privileges. The concession of one-third of Tyre or Ascalon as a semi-independent seignory, Prawer maintains, signaled a critical turning point in the history of the Latin Kingdom. He suggests that the Venetians were the first of the Italians «to think in terms of colonization and settlement.» The grant of a surrounding rural area, including perhaps 120 villages, is Prawer's key evidence of «political thinking.» 78 The treaty marks the first grant of extraterritoriality in the Levant. 79

Finally, it is worth noting how Gormond and William forestalled future opposition to the treaty's provisions:

_We ... will, with the help of God, bring the king, if he is ever released from his captivity, to confirm the above agreement taking oath on the Gospels; and if it happens that someone else becomes king in the kingdom of the Jerusalemites, then, either he will be made to confirm the above-mentioned promises before he is appointed or otherwise we shall not agree in any way that he should be elevated to kingship. In the same way the successors of the barons and new barons will make the confirmation._ 80

77. TAFEL and THOMAS, op. cit., I, 84-89. The treaty is also summed up in Baldwin's confirmation in 1125. _Ibid._, I, 90-94. WILLIAM OF TYRE includes a copy. _op. cit._, pp. 550-553. See SANUTO (TORSELLO), _op. cit._, p. 159; DANDOLO, _Chronica_, pp. 233-234; M. SANUTO, _op. cit._, p. 181.

78. PRAWER, _Italians in the Latin Kingdom_, p. 225.

79. LAMONTE, _op. cit._, p. 110. J. PRAWER points out that a similar attempt was not made again by the Italians until the Genoese Benedetto Zaccaria tried to establish a Genoese state in the Levant 200 years later. He also calls attention to the status of the Venetians and their doge in the Latin Empire after the Fourth Crusade. _Italians in the Latin Kingdom_, pp. 224-225.

80. TAFEL and THOMAS, _op. cit._, I, 88. Trans. by PRAWER, _Italians in the Latin Kingdom_,

35
The siege of Tyre began on 16 February 1124.81 The city, as the northern barons had argued, was extremely well-fortified. Tyre was encircled by water, except for the very narrow strip joining it to the mainland. Facing the shore, it had a triple wall with towers and a ditch. The side looking out on the sea had a double wall, also with towers. The city’s main weakness was its lack of wells. Yet, by the time the crusaders arrived and blocked the single aqueduct bringing water from the shore, the cisterns were stocked from the winter downpours.82 Soon after the siege began, the assailants realized that their plans for conducting an attack by land and by sea would not succeed. The Venetians were unable to take the sea walls, and the Franks found themselves outnumbered by the defenders who cast stones from engines and shot Greek fire. The Venetians decided to give up the attack by sea, dragged their vessels onto the beach (with one galley cruising the harbor to prevent any Saracen craft from entering or exiting), and came to the aid of the Franks on the causeway. Franks and Venetians fell to the construction of war engines from the timber and supplies the Venetians had transported. The archbishop paints an image of the two parties working diligently and eagerly for the success of their common land-based assault.83 The Historia ducum Veneticorum reports that the Venetians loaned the patriarch and the barons, who were very hard pressed for cash, 100,000 bezants.84

Venetian accounts offer lively details of the Republic’s role in the siege. They tell how the Franks suspected the Venetians had tired of the prolonged effort and planned to flee when a Saracen force arrived. Doge Michiel scotched these rumors by removing a plank from each galley on the

81. Fifteen days before the calends of March. FULCHER OF CHARTRES, op. cit., p. 696.
83. WILLIAM OF TYRE, op. cit., pp. 563-564; SANUTO (TORSELLO), op. cit., p. 160; von HEYD, I, 144; RUNCIMAN, op. cit., II, 169; MANFRONI, op. cit., I, 162.
84. P. 74.
beach. Martino da Canal even attributes the Egyptian surrender to Michiel's cleverness. When a carrier pigeon bearing the atabeg's promise to relieve Tyre fell into the crusader's camp, Michiel replaced the original message with a forgery in Arabic instructing the Tyrian garrison to surrender.

The Egyptians submitted early in the summer of 1124. In triumph, the standard of the king of Jerusalem was hoisted over the gate of Tyre, the Venetian banner over the Green Tower, and the colors of Tripoli over the Trinaria Tower. The *Historia ducum Veneticorum* claims that the joy of the barons led the to offer the crown of the imprisoned Baldwin to the doge, and when Michiel refused it, they tried to give the Republic half or even two-thirds of Tyre: the Venetians replied that they were content with the one-third promised them. More reliable sources simply report that the division of Tyre went smoothly according to plan, the Venetians receiving, naturally, their portion in the area of the harbor. The Franks returned to their homes in the Holy Land, and the Venetian fleet set out for the lagoons.

Although the Venetians profited from the conquest of Tyre, as they had certainly intended, it does not follow that their attitude toward the campaign was cynical or their gains unjust. Prawer, who generally depicts the Venetians in a judicious and balanced manner, writes, however: "The Venetians pompously declared that they came to fight for the liberation of the Holy Land, but this did not prevent the doge who participated in the siege of Tyre from exacting one-third of the captured city and its territories, plus almost

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total exemption from tolls and customs and the granting of privileges which made Venice as powerful as the king in this great northern port. Why not? Did the king and barons not always claim their share of the spoils? The Venetians with their considerable fleet and 15,000 men were by no means minor participants in the enterprise. With money and blood they earned their share of the conquest. They are not condemned in the original sources: Fulcher of Chartres speaks warmly of them as «our Venetians.»

On the return voyage the Venetians stopped at Rhodes for supplies. Because of the bad relations between the Greeks and the Venetians they were refused, whereupon they attacked and sacked the city. They then went on a rampage against the possessions of the emperor, pillaging Samos, Chios, Mytilene, Lesbos, Andros, and other towns. At Chios they acquired the body of St. Isidore. They assaulted and occupied Modon at the southwest corner of the Morea and they devastated Cephalonia. Proceeding up the Adriatic, the fleet punished those towns which had rebelled and gone over to the Hungarian king. They recaptured Spalato, Trau, and Sebenico, and leveled Zara, gaining a great trove of booty. Loading their spoils and prisoners on board, they finally headed home, chanting the Te Deum.

Fulcher of Chartres, who seems to have been entirely unaware of the Venetian assaults on the Byzantine islands en route to the Holy Land, did learn of the havoc they wrought on their return journey, and he spares no words condemning them. He notes how they «laid violent hands upon the islands

90. The Crusaders' Kingdom, p. 86.
91. Ibid., p. 19. See also von Heyd, op. cit., I, 131-132, and II, 145.
of the emperor among which they passed», pillaging, taking young boys and girls captive, and carrying off a great deal of money. Yet he concedes that the blame does not lie entirely upon the Venetians. The Venetians and the emperor raged against each other furiously, for they were enemies. Insofar as the guilt was the emperor's, he ruled badly: insofar as it was the Venetians', they acquired damnation upon themselves. The Venetians had reason to avenge themselves, and the emperor, as Fulcher says, more justly, to defend himself. And, as usual, the innocent suffered.

Although, as here, the sources do occasionally criticize the Venetians, as well as other seafarers, for their depredations, on balance, as we have seen, they regard the crusaders from the lagoons with great favor.

The Venetians provided an indispensable service in the First Crusade and the conquest of the Latin Kingdom, as most historians concede. LaMonte's assertion that Venice «took no active part in the first crusade» rests upon the assumption that the venture ended on 15 July 1099 with the capture of Jerusalem. If one accepts his definition of the First Crusade, of course, LaMonte is correct; we have no desire to linger over that semantic question. To complete and preserve the crusading victory, however, far more than the Holy City was required: reinforcements, material, economic support,


95. «Hi enim versus imperatorem, is quoque contra Veneticos crudelissime tunc utrobiue desaeviebant. Inimici erant adinvicem. ... Si culpa est imperatoris, male quidem ipse imperat. Si autem Veneticorum, ipsi sibi damnationem adquirunt. ... Habent Venetici ulciscendi se occasionem, habet et imperator defendendi se, ut sit, iustiorem. Insontes autem in medio positi et eorum iniuriae non obnoxii luunt et iniuste perdurunt.» Fulcher of Chartres, op. cit., pp. 760-761. The following passage condemning those who practise piracy at sea against pilgrims going to the Holy Land. Fink believes this to be ambiguous, and that it might not refer specifically to the Venetians. In Ryan trans., Fulcher of Chartres, op. cit., p. 277, n. 2. We believe that it does not, because the Venetians were not attacking pilgrims at sea, although the Venetian attacks upon Greek possessions may have occasioned it.

96. As in the case of Albert of Aachen. Supra, p. 28.

and the ports through which these could be channeled were essential. The Venetians and the other maritime republics ensured the capture of these ports, a matter of life or death to the Franks. The Venetian triumph at Tyre in 1124 prevented the Moslems encroaching north from Ascalon, won for the crusaders control of the sea for a generation, and, in consequence, the Christian Levant could rely upon safe communication with Western Europe. In light of these facts one could argue for extending the First Crusade until 1124, if mere labeling were worth the argument. The facts are that reinforcements and supplies arrived *ultra mare* on Italian vessels and that the economy of the Christian Levant thrived on Italian commerce. In the sources the solid contribution of the Venetians to the conquest of the Latin Kingdom is a matter of consensus, not seriously disputed.

Repeatedly, however, modern historians tell us that the Franks paid a stiff price, and that the Venetians drove hard bargains. It would be silly, of course, to suggest that the Republic expected no compensation for its services. Genoa and Pisa secured their concessions, and it was only natural that Venice would acquire broad privileges when its participation was crucial. None of the original sources, however, charges that the agreements with the Venetians were extortionate. Compared with what Genoa and Pisa contributed and obtained, they surely were not. Archbishop Daimbert, representing Pisa, received from Godfrey a portion of Jaffa, giving Pisa its first base in the Levant. Subsequently the Pisans obtained five


houses in Tyre. The Pisans set in motion the practice of acquiring commercial privileges in the Holy Land. The Genoese first obtained privileges from Bohemond in Antioch. The rights they obtained from Baldwin I in 1104 were much broader: tax exemption throughout the kingdom, one-third of Acre, Arsut and Caesarea, as well as a third of any additional towns they helped to capture; 300 bezants in annual revenue; streets in both Jerusalem and Jaffa; one-third of the port incomes in Acre.\textsuperscript{102} The Venetian privileges gained in 1100 and 1110 in no way compare favorably with those of the Genoese. The first had little, if any, immediate value, and the Venetians may not even have obtained a fair and agreed share of the booty. Venetian gains after the Battle of Sidon in 1110 were also smaller than those that Genoa already had. There was no concession of a proportion of the towns conquered, port revenues, or any income from the royal treasury. By the 1120's Venice was markedly behind both Pisa and Genoa in obtaining commercial privileges in the Holy Land. The Republic of St. Mark rapidly overtook and probably surpassed its rivals with the \textit{Pactum Warmundi}. As Heyd notes, however, the gains of each of the three maritime powers paralleled the extent of their participation.\textsuperscript{103}

The question of the motivation of the Venetians is perhaps the most interesting one. Jean Lestocquoy has reminded us that among the medieval bourgeois religion was not a mere facade.\textsuperscript{104} We would emphasize, as Prawer does, that the Italians shared the mixed motives of other crusaders.\textsuperscript{105} This is not to argue the purity of their religion. Undoubtedly, as Prawer also says, «the city of St. Mark was not insensitive to the mark of silver,» but the combination of striving «for earthly gains while accumulating celestial credit» was hardly

\textsuperscript{102} LaMonte, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 264 and 269; Prawer, \textit{Histoire du Royaume Latin...}, p. 259; \textit{Id.}, \textit{The Crusaders' Kingdom}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{103} Von Heyd, \textit{op. cit.}, I, 131-132 and 149. See also Hodgson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 257.

\textsuperscript{104} J. Lestocquoy, \textit{Aux origines de la bourgeoisie: les villes de Flandre et d'Italie sous le gouvernement des patriciens, XI\textsuperscript{e}-XV\textsuperscript{e} siecles}, Paris 1952, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{The Crusaders' Kingdom}, p. 484. He finds no exaltation, however, in the Italian sources. We should recall that most non-Italian sources were written by clerics, most Italian sources by laymen.
peculiar to Italians. Very few crusaders from whatever land were among the saintly elect immune to the lure of worldly advantage. It is well known that Pope Urban II offered to those who would take the Cross a land flowing with milk and honey.

When compared to the worldly-wise creators of the crusading states and the pious clerics and monks who stole relics, the Venetians can hardly be regarded as uniquely greedy. The promise of gain certainly helped to arouse enthusiasm, although any crusader would probably assert—and possibly believe—that his sole reason for taking the Cross was to free the Holy Places from desecration by the infidel. All the crusading barons sought lands. The sources also associate plentiful booty with crusading and the favor of the Almighty. The juxtaposition of material and religious motives is shown in the words passed among the ranks of the crusaders shortly before the Battle of Dorylaeum on 1 July 1097:

Stand fast altogether, trusting in Christ and the victory of the Holy Cross. Today, please God, we will all gain much booty.

Rosalind M. Hill explains that it was absolutely impossible to distinguish one motive for joining the crusade from another. Devotion and greed were intertwined inextricably. Behavior varied from individual to individual, and each crusader probably behaved inconsistently. Hill rightly scolds the unfortunate tendency to view the men of the past as

106. Ibid., p. 19.
107. See the sources listed in Riley-Smith, art. cit., p. 722, n. 4.
109. «Factus est itaque sermo secretus inter nos laudantes et consulentes atque dicentes: 'Estate omnimodo unanimes in fide Christi et Sanctae Crucis victoria, quia omnes divites si Deo placet effecti eritis.'» Anon., Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum: the Deeds of the Franks, ed. by R.M. Hill and R. Mynors, with trans. by R.M. Hill, London 1962, pp. 19-20. It also appears in Tudebode, op. cit., p. 53. The Hills have translated it in «Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society», CI (1974), p. 35. Riley-Smith tells the story of the Italian priest who said that «different people give different reasons for this journey. Some say that in all pilgrims the desire has been aroused by God and the Lord Jesus Christ. Others maintain that the Frankish lords and most of the people have begun the journey for superficial reason.» Art. cit., p. 721. This, however, suggests only the mixed motives within the host, while the prayer before Dorylaeum illustrates the mixed motives within individuals, which is a point we wish to emphasize.
one-dimensional characters driven by clearly defined and unwavering intentions.  

Although the motives of the Italians were somewhat different from those of the Franks, for they lived in different subcultures of Latin Christendom, bourgeois values are not inferior to feudal values, as many historians of the crusades seem to believe. In contexts other than the crusades, in fact, modern historians tend to applaud the appearances of bourgeois standards.  

We have not meant to whitewash the Venetians engaged in the conquest of the Latin Kingdom, for they were undoubtedly as covetous as ambitious barons or pious monks – or, for that matter, professors of history. No less, but no more. We have aimed at redressing the one-sided view of Venetians (and, by implication, other Italians) as exploiters of the crusading movement. In fact, they compiled an honorable record of crusading accomplishments, gained appropriate rewards, and shared the motives of other crusaders.

110. «Introduction», Gesta, pp. XX-XXI. See also D.C. Munro, The Kingdom of the Crusaders, New York 1936, pp. 30-35.  