Love and Hate in Medieval Warfare:  
The Contribution of Saint Augustine*

Augustine's pivotal role in shaping Christian attitudes toward warfare has long been recognised, and yet the spiritual and intellectual evolution that led to his thoughts on war has received less attention. His influence on medieval mentalities has rarely been studied systematically in regard to his thoughts on war, and few attempts have been made to discern how these thoughts could be applied to specific historical situations.¹ This essay attempts partially to fill these lacunae. How did Augustine develop his notions of love and apply them to warfare? What was the direction of his ideas, and what difficulties did it raise? How were his notions received and applied in the Middle Ages? Taking into account some excellent recent work, I hope to provide some reflections on the perplexities of the medieval just war and to bring these reflections to bear on the practice of warfare during the Hundred Years’ War.

For Augustine, love was the motive for all actions, and guided decision-making. He exploited the various meanings of the concept that are camouflaged by the English word 'love'. Basically, he contrasted caritas, charity, the love of the redeemed, with libido, lust, the love of the unredeemed. Libido, his generic term for earthly desires, was linked with cupiditas, cupidity or avarice. The libido dominandi or lust for domination became the primary motive for the actions of unredeemed humanity. Caritas, ordered love, contrasted with libido or cupiditas, disordered or inordinate love. What determined an individual’s moral status was the quality of his love, which was located in the inward disposition of his heart, his praeparatio cordis, rather than in his outward acts. Here Augustine cautioned

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that, since it was difficult for an individual to know himself inwardly, so it was even more difficult for him to ascertain the quality of love in another person from evidence provided by that person's actions.²

Proper love that sought to correct vices justified corporal punishment. Thus the father punished the child against its will but for its own good. Similarly, the schoolmaster’s rod was used to coerce his pupils to learn not only their immediate lessons but also the virtue of self-discipline. Likewise, the ruler and his officials such as soldiers were to inflict physical punishment to heal perverted souls even at the sacrifice of their bodies. Properly motivated punishment was aimed at the restraint of evil, wickedness and vice. With abundant familial imagery Augustine emphasised the need for love as the core of inflicting punishment, rather than malicious pleasure.

To understand how Augustine applied this linkage of love and corporal punishment to warfare, it is necessary to make a biographical digression. In his early adulthood Augustine was a Manichean. Stemming from Persian Zoroastrianism, Manicheanism posited a cosmological and eschatological dualism in which the universe was a battleground between two independent forces, good and evil. Light was opposed to dark, spirit to matter. These forces were locked in implacable hostility; there were no compromises between them. The individual soul chose whether to range himself on the side of goodness and escape from the prison of the flesh, or to abandon himself to the fleeting delight of the corruption of the flesh. The ultimate triumph of goodness was assured, and Manicheanism was a deterministic myth. Since it condemned all unnecessary involvement in matters of the flesh, it advocated non-participation in politics and a doctrinaire pacifism. For a while the young Augustine found Manicheanism appealing because it both explained and excused his fleshly lusts and assured him of his ultimate salvation. Yet he came to be disenchanted with Manicheanism, in part because it could not adequately explain the interpenetration of good and evil motives. His conversion to Christianity, balanced by an alienation from Manicheanism, led him to biblical exegesis as a means of refuting Manichean claims.

Since Manicheans rejected the Creator-God of the Old Testament because He created matter, the leaders of the Old Testament could not use them as normative models. Similarly the Manicheans rejected the Incarnation in the New Testament, but did see merit in the spiritual philosophy of the Pauline Epistles. This position provided Augustine with a challenge he could not refuse: he had to defend the normative integrity of both Testaments. Augustine’s analysis of warfare had also to justify warfare on Christian principles at the time when, as a newly-minted Christian bishop, Augustine had to reassure fellow Christians that they could subscribe to the inherited Roman just war tradition. Out of these two psychologically perceived imperatives, to defeat Manicheans and to justify Christian participation in the ailing Roman Empire’s wars, Augustine fashioned his justification of war.

Augustine’s first task was to fix war within the providential control of a good God over the activities of a world made imperfect by evil and sin. He refused either to condemn war outright or to glorify it. War was both a consequence of sin and a remedy for it. It had originated in the fratricide of Cain and Romulus and now took the form of the war between the spirit and the flesh that raged within every person.³ The vice of restless ambition and the desire for earthly glory made warfare endemic in human society, and made just wars a sad duty for wise men.⁴ Still, death in warfare was not the worst calamity to befall mortal men. In an anti-Manichean passage that medieval scholars would refer to as Quid culpatur, Augustine asked:⁵

For what is culpable in warfare? Is it because some men, who will die sometime anyway, are killed so that others may be tamed to live in peace? This censure is one of cowardly, not conscientious men. The desire to harm, the cruelty of vengeance, warlike and implacable intention, ferocity of rebellion, lust for domination, and similar motives, these are what are culpable in warfare.

³ E.g. De civitate Dei, xv. 5; xxii. 22; Sermo XXV, 4. 4.
⁴ De civitate Dei, iii. 14; v. 17. 2; xix. 7. Cf. J.J. O'Donnell, Augustine (Boston, 1985), p. 58, where he claims that Augustine should not be seen as the ‘patron saint’ of the just war. Still, it appears that Augustine fostered the just war even in spite of himself.
⁵ Contra Faustum Manichaeum, xxii. 74; Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, xxv. 672: ‘Quid enim culpatur in bello? An quia moriuntur quandoque moritur, ut domentur in pace victuri? hoc reprehendere timidorum est, non religiosorum. nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si qua similia haec sunt, quae in bellis iure culpatur’.
This passage is central to Augustine’s thought on war, for it located evil in warfare not in killing itself but in the often wicked inward motivations of the belligerent. More will be made of this later.

This passage was stimulated by one of Augustine’s Manichean opponents, Faustus, who claimed that God’s command that Moses wage wars was proof that God Himself was the author of evil. Augustine countered that Moses’ wars were just and righteous retribution to those who deserved it. Wars that punished sin and luxury might be waged by good men to curb licentious passions.6 Inspired by the Old Testament, Augustine argued that by divine judgement wars punished conquered people for their sins, and such punishment could be meted out even for crimes unrelated to the war.7 Wars as instruments of divine Providence chastised the wicked and tested the fortitude of the righteous.8 The Romans who destroyed Jerusalem were themselves wicked and ungodly, and yet they still served as God’s instruments in punishing the Jews.9 For good men, wars were necessary if distasteful, and, while Providence governed the outcome, victory did not always go to the righteous.10 The belligerent with the just cause could claim no right to victory, but only hope that God would grant it.11

If Christians were to wage war with full scriptural support, the right to warfare also needed a firm grounding in evangelical precepts. There were two especially troubling Gospel injunctions that had to be met head-on: ‘resist not evil’ (Matth. 5.39) and ‘turn the other cheek’ (Luke 6.29). Here Augustine returned to his analysis of love. The real danger in being a soldier was not military service itself but the malice and lust for revenge that often accompanied it. When done without taking pleasure in it, punishment of evil-doers to prevent them from doing further wrong became an act of love.12 The command to turn the other cheek referred to the intention rather than the act. Patience and benevolence of heart were not incompatible with inflicting physical punishment. When Moses put sinners to death he was motivated not by cruelty but by love. Hatred had to be overcome by love for one’s enemies, but love did not preclude a benevolent severity.13

7 De civitate Dei, xii. 15.
8 De civitate Dei, i. 1; v. 23.
9 Enarratio in Psalmmum LXXIII, 7–8; Contra Faustum Manichaeum, xxii. 75.
10 De civitate Dei, iv. 15.
11 De civitate Dei, xii. 1; xii. 13. 1–2; Epistula CLXXXIX, 6.
12 E.g. Epistula CXXXVIII, 2. 15; Epistula CLXXXIX, 4; Sermo CCCII, 15; Epistula XLVII, 5.
13 De sermone Domini in Monte, 1. 19. 59; 1. 20. 63; Epistula CXXXVIII, 2. 13–14; Contra
This line of reasoning convinced Augustine that warfare and evangelical doctrine were at least compatible. Now the intention rather than the hostile act itself became the criterion of righteous warfare. Practically any hostile act was justifiable provided it was motivated by love. The good Christian could suffer injury and yet retaliate, could love his enemy and yet kill him, both forgive him and punish him. The evangelical precepts of patience were transformed so that love was no longer an inhibition on warfare. In some cases it even necessitated it.\textsuperscript{14} Now the soldier of Christ could fight not only the sin within himself but also that of other men, men whose inward thoughts remained hidden to him.

One obvious danger in this line of reasoning is that it could lead to a shoddy rationalisation of unrestricted warfare. Sensitive to this danger, Augustine sought to prevent love from serving as a blanket justification of well-nigh universal violence against other sinners. He thus had to limit the right to legitimate authoritative recourse to violence. First, he limited the sorts of persons who could engage in war, and second, he restricted the conditions under which warfare could be waged justly by his definition of the just war. In the first place, Augustine prohibited private persons from killing, even in self-defence. Only those violent acts performed in the line of duty by legitimate public officials escaped the evangelical stigma attached to killing.\textsuperscript{15} A private person could only kill out of hatred, passion and loss of love, while a public official should be able to kill without such sinful passions. In his interpretation, the pacific precepts of the New Testament justified private pacifism and public warfare. What was now required was a definition of a just war. In commenting on the eighth book of Joshua, Augustine said, 'iusta bella ulisciscuntur injurias'; just wars avenge injuries. Injuries were committed when a people or a city neglected to vindicate wrongs done by its members, or to restore what it had wrongfully seized.\textsuperscript{16} At least on the surface this differed little from Cicero's standard definition, and contained nothing


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Contra Faustum Manichaeum}, xxii. 70; \textit{De libero arbitrio}, i. 5. 12. 34; \textit{Epistula XLVII}, 5.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Quaestiones in Heptateuchum}, 6. 10; \textit{CSEL}, xxviii. 2 428 et seq.: 'Quod deus iubet loquens ad Iesum, ut constituat sibi rerorsus insidias, id est insidiantes bellatores ad insidiandum hostibus, hinc admonemus non injuste fieri ab his qui iustum bellum gerunt, ut nihil homo iustus praecipue cogitare debat in his rebus, nisi ut iustum bellum suscipiat, cui bellare fas est; non enim omnibus fas est. cum autem iustum bellum susceperit, utrum aperta pugna, utrum insidiis uincat, nihil ad iustitiam interest. iusta autem bella ea definiri solent quae ulisciscuntur injurias, si qua gens uel ciuitas, quae bello petenda est, uel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est uel reddere quod per injurias ablatum est. sed etiam hoc genus beli sine dubitatione iustum est, quod deus imperat, apud quem non est iniquitas et nout quid cuique fieri debeat, in quo bello ductor exercitus uel ipse populus non tam auctor belli quam minister iudicandus est'.
specifically Christian. The formula admits of two different interpretations, one looking back to the Ciceronian just war, the other looking forward to a more 'theocentric' view congenial to the Middle Ages. The crucial phrase is ultiisci iniurias.

The more narrow view, essentially Cicero's rebus repetitis, would require a clear violation of the pre-existing rights of the injured and therefore justified party. The resulting war was limited in its aims to the redress of grievances and compensation for losses, to a simple return to the status quo ante bellum, much like the pursuit of compensatory damages in private law. In the broader interpretation, Augustine's just war could be seen as a penal sanction like the awarding of punitive damages in private law. This version of the just war theoretically unlimited in its licit use of violence, for it avenged the moral order injured by the sins of the guilty party. Transgressions meriting punishment could be seen not only as crimes but as sins, when evaluated according to Augustine's broad concept of justice that included respect for divine rights. True justice demanded righteousness, which in turn required that God be rendered His due. Hence any violation of God's laws could be seen as an injustice warranting unlimited punishment. Motivated by a righteous wrath, just warriors could kill with impunity even the morally innocent. Objective determination of individual guilt was both impossible and irrelevant; what mattered was punishment of the subjective culpa or guilt of the enemy population. Augustine's emphasis on ultiisci iniurias when coupled with his near equation of justice with righteousness and his near equation of sin with crime paved the way for later justifications of holy wars and Crusaders to punish all manner of wickedness and vice. In effect Augustine espoused the concept of war guilt.

In the very same passage where he defined the just war Augustine declared that any war waged on divinely command was a just war. Unlike earlier Christian writers, Augustine by his position and disposition could not avoid dealing with divinely ordained wars. In his view Joshua undertook the war against the people of Ai as a minister of justice, and the war was just sine dubitatione since it had been occasioned by an offence against God. As His executors, the Israelites could wage

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war without *libido* or disordered love. Here Augustine seemed to choose the broader construction of his just-enunciated *ulisci iniurias*. Divinely ordained wars served for him as a kind of *deus ex machina*. The *bellum deo auctore*, however indirect the authorisation, would allow holy wars and Crusades to take refuge under the just war umbrella.

Augustine’s just war contained three general requirements: proper motivation; legitimate, especially divine, authority; and the just cause of avenging injuries. This was nothing more than an overall framework. We must now search in Augustine’s occasional comments in order to flesh out his thought on war. A just war could not be motivated by an unalloyed desire for conquest, glory or wealth.18 Clearly, God or the ruler had the unique responsibility to decide whether recourse to a just war was warranted. Soldiers alone should do the fighting in obedience to superior authority unless the commands clearly contravened divine precepts. To allow selective obedience would open the gates to private violence exercised out of a *libido dominandi*, which Augustine considered the most degrading form of action.19 Augustine seemed to absolve the individual soldier of moral responsibility for his official actions.

Whenever Augustine discussed authority and obedience, he naturally turned to the highest authority, God Himself. In the Old Testament account of the war of the Israelites with the Amorites (Numbers 21.21–25), the Israelites were depicted as defeating their foes, but in Augustine’s account it was God who effected the defeat of the Amorites in order to fulfill His promises to His Chosen People. God’s authority and aid justified a war that would otherwise appear to be an illicit usurpation of Amorite territory.20 This is just one example of how Augustine twisted the literal meaning of Scripture to fit his purpose. In the *City of God* Augustine enumerated circumstances in which divine authority made exceptions to its own prohibition on killing. Some men waged war in obedience to a direct divine command, while others put wicked men to death in conformity with God’s ordinance. In either case their obedience rendered them innocent of transgressing the commandment ‘non occides’.21 In sum, Augustine’s just war like the rest of his thought was permeated with divine activity and authority as mirrored in the Old

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18 Cf. Deane, *St. Augustine*, pp. 154 et seq.
20 *Questiones in Heptateuchum*, 3. 44. Cf. Brown, ‘Saint Augustine’, p. 4 n. 11. Since God ordered Joshua to set ambushes, these and any other means could be employed in a just war: above, n. 16.
21 *De civitate Dei*, i. 21.
Testament. The just war became an all-purpose instrument of God’s will rather than the mere legal formalism that it had been for Cicero.

Indirect evidence for this expansion of the just war concept can be seen in Augustine’s complex thought about religious persecution. Since wickedness included the sin of improper belief, Augustine was able to see a divine purpose in the persecution of heresy. He never explicitly related the just war to religious persecution, but his analysis of love was the common ground for his attitudes both toward such persecution and toward warfare. Augustine saw all forms of religious belief other than orthodoxy as posing a common threat to the faith, and he eventually concluded that the ecclesiastical hierarchy had the right and the duty to seek imperial coercion of heretics qua heretics.22

As with warfare, Augustine’s thoughts on coercion developed by his exegesis of both testaments. The moral status of persecution was determined by its motivation. Thus both Pharoah and Moses persecuted the Israelites, but the former was moved by hatred and libido dominandi, while the latter was moved by love to administer beneficial discipline. The Church as Moses’ successor was right to urge the persecution of heretics as an act of charity.23 In the parable of the Great Supper (Luke 14.16–24), Augustine interpreted the phrase ‘compelle intrare’ to refer to heretics who were ‘compelled to come in’ to the orthodox Church. Once inside by compulsion, they would gradually give inward assent to its teachings. Here Augustine explicitly forbade the use of physical violence, a fact his followers often neglected in view of his abundant use of military metaphors and euphemisms for violence.24 Since Peter had attempted to defend Christ by the sword, orthodox Christians could rightfully fight to defend the Church. (Here Augustine bent the meaning of Scripture, for Christ had actually rebuked Peter for wielding the sword). Christ’s injunction to ‘resist not evil’ did not preclude legitimate authorities from violently expelling impious men whose rule injured God. In effecting coercion of heresy the Church was imitating God himself.25 With its influence the clergy was able to compel men to the good.26 Since it could not directly employ violence, however, it must seek protection from the emperors who

23 Epistula XCHI, 2. 6 and 8; Contra Epistulam Parmeniani, 3. 1. 3; Epistula CLXXIII, 2.
24 Contra Gaudentium, i. 25. 28; Sermo CXII, 7–8.
25 Contra litteras Petilianii, i. 19. 43; ii. 80. 178; ii. 88. 195. Epistula CLXXXV, 22–3.
26 Epistula CLXXIII, 10.
now served God by chastising heretics. If the imperial government could not licitly punish religious error, then it had no right to punish any other crimes, since religious error like secular crime proceeded from the evils of the flesh.

In reality Augustine’s thoughts on war and religious persecution were really clusters of ideas grouped around the central themes of love and its expression and sin and its punishment. *Ulcisci iniurias* could serve a host of purposes. Augustine evolved these attitudes in the course of grappling with the meaning of Scripture for his own situation. It has been claimed that Augustine’s just war merely restored rights that had been violated. At face value this is what he seemed to say, but when viewed in the context of his attitudes, his version of the just war could also defend and avenge the moral order. His thoughts exhibit a pervasive concern with coercion and discipline in all their many forms. His criteria of cause, intention, authority and obedience were all based on the Old Testament examples of punishment and war, on to which were grafted the New Testament doctrines of love and purity of motive. Hence he refused to condemn categorically what we would call aggressive or offensive wars. The reason he did not do so, I suggest, was that he was convinced of the necessity and the inevitability of aggression. As love for something presupposes hatred for its antithesis, so love of God required hatred for the enemies of God, or, more properly, for their sins. Is it any wonder then that the Old Testament wars or the wars of the Middle Ages undertaken supposedly on divine sanction were often so violent? Augustine provided a major inspiration for medieval holy wars, not only by his attitudes but by his juxtaposition of hostile and bellicose imagery with the imagery of love and family life. Since God could still order a just war, His earthly officials could do likewise when acting on divine inspiration.

This combination of love and divine authority was to prove an unstable and explosive mixture in lesser minds than Augustine’s, where it became a motive for what looks to modern observers like unlimited savagery. His own justifications of violence were balanced by his stern condemnation of the evils of warfare enshrined in his *Quid culpatur* and elsewhere throughout his writings. His thoughts on war constituted a finely nuanced and delicately balanced ensemble that could disintegrate if too much strain was placed on any one component of it. Medieval writers would transform this ensemble of thoughts evolved over a lifetime into

27 *Epistula LXXXVII*, 8; *Epistula CLXXXV*, 7, 28; *Epistula XCIII*, 3, 9–10; *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, i, 27, 53.
28 *Contra Gaudenium*, i, 19, 20.
abstract and impersonal propositions that distorted the integrity of Augustine’s thought processes. In wrenching his thoughts out of context, however, they rendered one man’s inner turmoil over war and coercion influential throughout the Middle Ages.  

Augustine’s life and writings are full of ironies, ambivalences and seeming contradictions. He hated war, and yet, perhaps in spite of himself, he gave it its most potent Christian justification. As a former Manichean heretic he first developed his thoughts on warfare and his exegetical techniques out of necessities he perceived in his anti-Manichean polemic. As Robert Markus has shown, conversion presupposes alienation, that is, conversion to something presupposes alienation from something else, in this case, Manicheanism. Thus he had to defeat Manichean pacifism. He succeeded only too well, but he also retained a residue of Manichean habits of mind, such as the ultimate separation of good from evil and the necessity of good to combat evil, of the elect to discipline the reprobate. And so evil would remain for him an integral part of life here below; there must also be heresies so that truth could be pushed further. To this task he brought brilliant insight but also much aggression and hostility. Karl Morrison observes that kinesthesia was very much a part of Augustine. Struggle, stress, effort, anxiety both muscular and mental he considered to be normal parts of human life. In Augustine this anxious energy was internalised, channeled away from more normal modes of expression into doctrinal conflicts. Aggression, a kind of intellectual libido dominandi, and perhaps even pride mark his career. Withal, he was about as honest a person as one is likely to find. Ultimately, I suggest, he did not condemn aggressive warfare outright because he was too aware  

30 During the early Middle Ages Augustine’s views on warfare were primarily known through florilegia. Around 1140, Gratian’s Decretum adopted many of his views, whence these became part of medieval reflections on war: cf. Russell, Just War, pp. 56–84 et passim. For the awareness of just war concepts by combatants, see R.H. Schmandt, ‘The Fourth Crusade and the Just War Theory’, Catholic Historical Review, lxi (1975), 191–221.  
of the hold that aggression had on the human personality. Hence it was an
ambivalent legacy of love and violence that Augustine bequeathed to subsequent
ages.

Few people in the Middle Ages or at any time could hope to act as
consistently with their best internal dispositions as Augustine appeared to.
Certainly we would not expect this harmony to prevail in medieval knights or even
in many bishops, with their enhanced political roles, and yet Augustine’s life and
writings provided one model for their behaviour. Men of action were not likely to
scruple about the inward moral status of their adversaries. Instead, bishops and
canon lawyers constructed schemes of authority, hierarchy and subordination to
guide their coercive actions. The Augustinian texts justifying religious persecution
they bent to justify war and killing in general, although, true to Augustine, they
sought to refuse themselves the right to participate directly in actual fighting.

It is obviously more difficult to show immediate Augustinian influence on lay
belligerence in the Middle Ages. His ideas had to be mediated by clerics, but
mediated they were, and to an audience permeated with the Germanic warrior
ethos of competition and aggression and vengeance. Medieval laymen were
receptive to the Augustinian suggestion that war, like other earthly trials, led to
spiritual growth and made men stronger. The profession of warfare was given a
Christian benediction, if Carl Erdmann is to be believed. Partly due to Augustine,
Christianity became a fighter’s religion. Love of Christ could motivate men to
liberate the holy places where Christ lived and died. As Jonathan Riley-Smith has
shown, clerical crusading recruiters often preached hatred under the guise of
love. 34 Crusades against heretics were motivated by a similar hatred or misguided
love. The world of the chivalric Crusader was very different from Augustine’s, to
be sure. Notions of authority and the relation between public authority and
private freedom of action had been transformed. Augustine had condemned
warfare motivated by glory, conquest or greed, but the medieval knight fought for
precisely these motives, and for his personal honour. Augustine’s emphasis on the
ius ad bellum, the right to go to war, came to be overshadowed by the ius in bello,
that complex of rights and prescribed conduct in hostilities that formed a pragmatic
law of arms. As a guide to action, Augustine’s just war was superbly flexible,
especially as to means. If warfare was justified, the actual strategies of making war
were left to the judgement of the fighters. In this context did the internal
restraints of Augustine’s Quid culpatur have any relevance or influence
whatsoever?

LOVE AND HATE IN MEDIEVAL WARFARE

A provocative recent book provides an opportunity to compare Augustine’s contribution with the behaviour of English knights during the Hundred Years’ War. In *Chaucer’s Knight* Terry Jones challenges the conventional wisdom that Chaucer’s portrait in the General Prologue and Knight’s Tale of the *Canterbury Tales* is a celebratory portrait. Rather, according to Jones, Chaucer portrays the Knight as a greedy and bloodthirsty mercenary unmoved by the ideals of chivalry. Chaucer’s portrait is thus ‘a sparkling and witty parody’. It is generally conceded that English soldiers at all levels fought out of such motives as honour, pride and greed. Assuming that men usually act out of a mixture of motives, I wish to suggest that Englishmen of Chaucer’s age also fought because of hatred and bloodlust.

Augustine made quite clear that he did not condemn warfare itself but rather the evils that so often took place within it, and he required soldiers to maintain a pacific and loving attitude if they were to avoid sin. Violence was sometimes licit; love of violence was not. This attitude was compatible with an outward belligerence unrestrained by formal limitations on military conduct. A problem with this was that the quality of a soldier’s love was incapable of objective assessment by human agency. Here I suggest that the inward hatred of a soldier was similarly inaccessible, and could only be indirectly examined through outward acts of hostility, personal memoirs and literary works. We cannot know directly what was said in the confessional, and our pursuit of hatred as a motivation cannot be as conclusive as an evaluation of greed, honour or even pride, but nevertheless it may shed some light on military engagements that have sometimes been depicted as massacres. We do have at least the opinion of one recent writer who concludes that Englishmen of the fourteenth century were animated by hatred and fear of the Scots and the French.


37 In a near-contemporary context the Polish jurist Paulus Vladimiri maintained that the way to judge someone’s intention was from evidence provided by that person’s acts: F.H. Russell, ‘Paulus Vladimiri’s Attack on the Just War: A Case Study in Legal Polemics’, *Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government*, ed. B. Tierney and P. Linehan (Cambridge, 1980), p. 253 n. 60.

38 Barnie, *War*, pp. 34, 48, 51, 93, 100.
To get closer to an appreciation of how just war theorist could interpret military practice, let us consider two fourteenth-century engagements that have been seen as unjustifiable massacres because of excessive violence directed against non-combattants. The first is the sack of Alexandria in 1365 by Peter of Lusignan, king of Cyprus. Philippe de Mézières, the leading propagandist of the Crusade in his day, took part in this engagement, as did Chaucer's Knight in his way. According to Jones' scrutiny, the battle is an example of the unrestrained brutality and rapacity in which Chaucer's Knight habitually participated. This sack, directed against the formidable and hated Mamluks, appears to have been a signal success in the otherwise fitful crusading movement of the time. It was carried out with unbridled cupidity and ferocity, and yet yielded no long-term strategic advantage. The other engagement is the siege and sack of Limoges in 1370 by Edward, the Black Prince. Its bishop had previously been loyal to the English, but then switched his allegiance to the French king. Deciding to punish not only the bishop but the inhabitants of Limoges, the Black Prince razed the town and slaughtered the inhabitants. This sack has been viewed as an extreme example of the needless and indiscriminate massacres of the Hundred Years' War and as a blot on the reputation of the Black Prince.

These two cases require further consideration to see if they merit the condemnation for brutality that Porter sees as the key issue in the evaluation of Jones' thesis. Was the violence against non-combattants excessive and immoral?

Augustine had counseled mercy to non-combattants, but he refused to condemn categorically all instances of killing non-combattants, for they were thereby punished for sins committed elsewhere. Fourteenth century public opinion did not necessarily see the problem in this perspective, but the laws of war did not accord an absolute immunity from violence to non-combattant residents of a besieged town. After all, these were presumed to have aided the defence effort, however indirectly. For different reasons, then, the laws of war agreed with Augustine that non-combattants were not necessarily innocent and therefore to be protected from violence.

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40 Barnie, *War*, pp. 76-9, 81-2; Porter, 'Chaucer's Knight', p. 63; M. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London and Toronto, 1965), pp. 1, 3, 49. Jones omits analysis of this event, since Chaucer's Knight was not in attendance.
41 Porter, 'Chaucer's Knight', p. 57.
As part of the Crusading movement, moreover, Peter’s sack of Alexandria was, in the opinion of the time, a battle in which the inhabitants, as enemies of Christ, were entitled to no quarter. As one of the few Crusading victories of the century, this sack must have been greeted with enthusiasm in Europe. It also helps reveal the dark underside of the Crusading ideal that saw Christians and Muslims as implacable enemies locked in mortal combat, and that could not take into account the suffering of eastern Christians at the hands of the Crusaders. Yet many prominent men still sincerely and deeply believed in this ideal. For some of them the Crusade had taken on the role of a *deus ex machina* as a means of restraining inter-Christian violence, such as that draining the resources of the English and their enemies the Scots and the French.\(^{43}\)

The assault on Limoges provides an even clearer test for the application of just war theories. The denizens were being massacred until some French knights personally surrendered, at which time the Black Prince’s anger abated. At first glance the assault appears as an indiscriminate massacre that some segments of contemporary opinion including Froissart condemned. The Black Prince was renowned for his merciless bloodlust. And yet, according to Augustine’s just war, the assault could appear to have the just cause of avenging injuries. The Black Prince waged this battle to avenge his honour that had been injured by the betrayal of the bishop. In this he appears to have been within his rights, and entitled to take whatever measures were necessary legitimately to punish the revolt. It could be argued that the English war in France, of which this battle was a part, was unjust, or, that this operation was carried on out of motives of personal spleen and vengeance rather than obedience. But these arguments would misconstrue the operation of chivalry and the laws of war. Medieval princes were content to repeat the phraseology if not the ideology of the just war, and thus adduce plausible if not always convincing justifications for their actions. There was no accepted tribunal for adjudicating the just cause of a war, and so in effect in a war between princes each side was considered to be acting justly unless it was determined otherwise. Moreover, since Augustine’s time, increasing emphasis came to be placed on the responsibility of individuals to judge for themselves whether and how they should participate in a given war. Many battles and sieges were waged out of personal interpretations of what chivalrous honour required. These were campaigns of individuals more than wars of nations.\(^{44}\) The Black Prince

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made his judgements palpably in conformity with both the just war and the laws of war prevailing in his time, and so his actions in Limoges could be defended as licit.\(^{45}\)

If the foregoing interpretation is allowed, then some of Jones's line of historical argumentation for the satirical nature of Chaucer's portrait collapses. Yet there is more to his argument, for if these brutal massacres did not affront established customs, they nevertheless have been seen as unwarranted acts of violence. Why is this? Avenging of injuries was licit, but at what point did it become unalloyed vengeance? When did prosecution of a just claim degenerate into the ferocious bloodlust condemned by Augustine? Killing in a just war was licit, but wanton cruelty was not. Here I suggest that greed, pride, and chivalric honour are insufficient explanations of such passionate motivation. The hidden motive that explains the ferocity is a hatred that, although perhaps originating in right motivation, degenerates, building on itself in the heat of battle, and results in unbridled ferocity against non-combatants. The actions that were taken to effect such massacres were in themselves licit as far as human agencies of the time could discern. Thus, on theological, canonical and historical grounds Chaucer's portrait of the Knight was no satire but an accurate and contemporary portrayal of the chivalric ideal. Glorious ideals could coexist, albeit sometimes uncomfortably, with baser motives and actions.\(^{46}\) If the deeds here described, and many others like them, appear to be in conformity with law and custom, at the same time they could be deemed spiritually and eschatologically culpable in the inward disposition and in the mind of Augustine. A very partial solution to this issue might emerge from a search for indirect manifestations of inward hatred in warfare contained in literary works.

The two massacres analyzed above provide an opportunity not only to assess Jones' argument and the operation of the law of arms in the fourteenth century, but to evaluate Augustine's contribution to medieval attitudes on war. In effect, his advice was, 'he who loves much, chastises much.'\(^{47}\) According to Maurice Keen, on the other hand, warriors in the Hundred Years' War were motivated by the need for outward show to prove that they were individuals serving in a divinely ordained profession. Since their inner motives were glossed over as irrelevant to


\(^{46}\) Not wishing to poach on the turf of literary critics, I must leave open the question of whether there are literary reasons for considering Chaucer's portrait a parody in some sense.

\(^{47}\) Contamine, *War*, p. 265.
perceptions of proper and conventional chivalric behaviour, they are not available for our immediate examination. Yet, if these hidden inner motives of hatred, revenge, cruelty and savagery were still operative, then the teachings of the bishop of Hippo were relevant to the situation in which the bishop of Limoges found himself. That this is not mere speculation is attested by the dilemma perceived by Henry of Grosmont, duke of Lancaster. Outwardly, Henry was a paragon of the conventional chivalric ideal of his age, a good Christian soldier. Inwardly he was tormented by his awareness of the sinfulness of his own motives.48 His spiritual conflict reflects both Augustine’s analysis of a warrior’s motivation and Keen’s analysis of the dilemmas faced by a chivalric knight. Remarkably, the positions of a fourth-century bishop and a twentieth-century scholar reveal unanticipated convergence. Consequently, the analysis by Jones is on target, but for the wrong reasons. According to what we know about late medieval warfare and the mercenary element therein, Jones is wrong when he so sharply distinguishes vile and venal mercenaries from well-principled knights.49 But, on Augustinian and on moral grounds of the late twentieth century, Jones is right to condemn Chaucer’s Knight for having an inward disposition incompatible with those of a proper Christian soldier. In this unhistorical sense Jones may be said to have a measure of revenge.

These massacres also demonstrate a weakness in Augustine’s view and in the attitudes of medieval warriors. There was simply no way for an objective human determination of the quality of an individual’s motives. As Keen remarks, it was left to God to separate the sheep from the goats.40 There could thus be no objective limits placed on the level of brutality and violence in a particular campaign. This is why these two massacres outwardly resemble the wars of the Old Testament analyzed by Augustine. Avenging of injuries could easily become a lust for vengeance where hatred and animosity could easily come into play. The long

49 There are some other points to criticise in Jones' view, especially his rather simplistic view of the role of mercenaries. He claims (p. 9) that mercenaries proved to be the undoing of the whole system of knighthood, and that (p. 213) tyrants and mercenaries went together. From what we know, it appears that mercenaries could not be so readily distinguished from chivalric knights: Keen, Chivalry, pp. 229–31; Contamine, War, pp. 99, 151, 155. It also appears that Englishmen in the fourteenth century did not go in for much organised crusading as a group, so Chaucer’s solitary knight-errant was more typical than Jones would have us believe. Moreover, there are various degrees of pacifism; there seems to have been very little absolute pacifism in the upper crust of English society in Chaucer’s time, and the anti-war sentiment thus should not be confused with pacifism.
50 Keen, Chivalry, pp. 15, 162–3, 199.
experience of English frustration in the Hundred Years' War and the much longer history of frustration in the Crusading movement transformed Chivalric aggressiveness into a fixed hostility and hatred. Compounding this attitude of frustration-aggression was Augustine's contention that if the cause of a war was just, any means could be employed to win it. This countenanced even bigger military operations. Medieval warfare came to be focused on cities as the true masters of space. States were anxious to wage as total a war as possible, and large-scale massacres were the inevitable result.

Augustine was deeply concerned with the ambivalence of war, for he both justified it as a function of divine providence and unequivocally condemned the inward faults to which it inevitably gave rise. This stance reinforced the ambivalence in medieval attitudes toward warfare. Was the Christian soldier a chivalric hero or a venal robber? Augustine established the parameters for medieval attitudes toward warfare. Is it then any wonder that his ambivalence has continued to haunt medieval and modern sensibilities?

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51 As far as I have been able to determine, anthropologists have reached no consensus on motivations in warfare, although they admit that reasons of revenge and an 'us versus them' mentality play a part. According to one, hatred of the enemy is a mere rationalisation. When removed from hatred, war is free from guilt (which Augustine himself seemed to suggest): A.F.C. Wallace, 'Psychological Preparations for War', War. The Anthropology of Armed Violence and Aggression, ed. M. Fried, M. Harris and R. Murphy (Garden City, New York, 1968), pp. 177–8, 182. In response, another claims that hate merges with a perception of conflicting interests between the antagonists: S. Diamond, 'War and the Dissociated Personality', ibid., p. 187. Some psychologists find that frustration leads to hostility and hatred embedded in fixed ideas. Even when the frustrations are removed, these fixed ideas remain. Such hatreds are taught in early childhood and, reinforced by social pressures, are carried on to the next generation. These pressures transform aggressiveness into animosity: R. Fine, 'The Stress of Peace', The Emotional Stress of War, Violence and Peace, ed. R. Parker (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1972), pp. 93–4; and G. Bouthoul, 'The Emotional Processes in the Genesis of Collective Aggressiveness', ibid., p. 107. This interpretation would seem to be consonant with the interpretation of the massacres discussed here. Perhaps Clausewitz came even closer when he observed, 'Two motives lead men to war: instinctive hostility and bellicose intention ... even the most civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other': Carl von Clausewitz, On War i. 1. 3, tr. J.J. Graham (New York, 1956, 3 vols), i. 3.

52 Contamine, War, p. 101.
53 ibid., pp. 290–1.
54 Cf. ibid., pp. 270, 296, 302, where Christianity is seen as sacralising and sublimating warfare and warrior values, and also as living in symbiosis with them.