

MOUNTED INFANTRY IN MEDIÆVAL WARFARE

By J. E. MORRIS, D.Litt., F.R.Hist.S.

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I HAVE put together here a certain number of facts of some interest. A good deal of my material is already common property, and may be found in the volumes of the Records Commission or in Mr. Joseph Bain's 'Calendar.' Yet some is new, simply because the old manuscript catalogue of the Exchequer Accounts in the P.R.O. was not so good or systematic as the present printed catalogue, and therefore a gleaner in the field traversed by Mr. Bain may yet pick up much. I have already used or referred to some documents, partly in a paper read some years ago to the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archæological Society,¹ partly in a work on Bannockburn which the Cambridge University Press has just published. I was ambitious to put before this Society some results of my researches, as this is the sixth centenary year of that battle, yet hesitated to offer a paper on the battle itself. But one cannot look at any of the facts without reference to that epoch-making event, and so I tried to find a thread upon which to string them. The most suitable title for my paper seemed to be 'The Development of Mounted Infantry,' because, although some of the documents illustrate the fortunes of an infantry which was very much not mounted, it was just the striving of the English leaders after Bannockburn to find the most suitable type of soldier and the most suitable tactics, a striving necessitated by failure and the terrible experiences of the northern counties at the hands

¹ *Transactions*, New Series, vol. iii.

of the Scottish raiders, that at last produced the finest fighting man of the middle ages, viz. the horse-archer. He is a familiar enough figure in the Hundred Years. From Crecy and Poitiers one traces him back to the first decade of Edward III, and he is found at the siege of Dunbar in 1338. He may have been evolved earlier, but there are no extant rolls to illustrate Halidon Hill. His forerunner, the hobelar, can be traced ; likewise his antipodes, the heavily-armoured foot spearman, whom Edward II fondly imagined to be the ideal soldier capable of turning the fortune of war in favour of England against the nimble Scot.

Modern phrases one cannot avoid using. But one need not think of lifeguards when talking of 'heavy,' or of hussars when talking of 'light' cavalry of the middle ages ; mediæval 'mounted infantry' were not like seventeenth century dragoons, nor were they companies of line battalions put on horseback for special purposes. The mediæval definition of 'heavy' cavalry is that the men, whether the superior knights or the inferior *scutiferi*, rode 'covered' horses—*cum equis coöpertis*—and in the reign of Edward I they were the only English cavalry. In the marshals' registers of feudal service, and in the pay-rolls where we have details of the horsemen in the King's pay, the evidence is very clear, and the *servientes cum equis discoöpertis* were so few as to be negligible. In spite of the experience of the Crusades, the Western nations in the thirteenth century thought that only the armoured man on the armoured horse was needed ; practically all cavalry action was shock action, and the only duty of cavalry was to charge, not to scout. In England the mounted cross-bowmen need not be considered ; they were mere mercenaries and banned by Magna Carta ; the few Gascons in Edward I's service were brought over at rare intervals, and then only for a few weeks' service. Now Hemingburgh states that at Falkirk there were 3000 heavy and 4000 light horsemen, and this must be explained, if not at once rejected. I have already suggested in print that, as the value of a

horse ranged from 100 marcs—or even £100 in Edward II's reign—down to 100 shillings, it may well be the case that the proportion of good horses to indifferent rounseys was 3:4. But if the cheapest rounsey could carry the weight of an armoured rider as well as its own horse-armour, even though possibly that armour were of boiled leather in place of iron, the man was technically a 'heavy' horseman and entitled to his one shilling a day. Much more wildly wrong is Barbour, who makes a total of 40,000 cavalry at Bannockburn, but says that 3000 only were 'helit' or covered. Such is the first elementary fact of the problem.

The second elementary fact is that there was a need for light cavalry or mounted infantry. Edward I knew well that combination of horse and foot in battle was essential, but the difficult thing was to bring the enemy to accept battle; in the two chief actions in Wales, where he was not present in person, the enemy were forced to fight only because in the one case they were waiting for Llewelyn, and in the other they were surprised by a night march; at Falkirk the Scots stood their ground, as experience had not yet taught them how to foil an invasion by starving the invaders. In all three battles the English horse attacked ahead of the foot, and were repulsed until the archers were brought up. But in Scotland the campaign was more important than the battle, and Bruce's great contribution to military history is that he mounted his men on ponies to avoid battle, to starve out the English, and to retaliate by devastating raids. Who does not know the story of that raid of 1327 so graphically described by Jehan le Bel of Hainault, who himself rode with the heavy English cavalry and tells us how he ached in every limb under his iron armour, while the Scots mocked and easily kept a little distance ahead? ¹ Therefore more important than combination of

¹ But almost every writer quotes from Froissart. In several recent books which give *origines* to illustrate English history Froissart's passage is given; yet he simply copied from Jehan le Bel, whose evidence is that of a soldier on actual service.

horse and foot in battle in Anglo-Scottish wars was the discovery of some method to catch the Scots and bring them to battle ; this means that light cavalry or mounted infantry had to be evolved.

The true light horsemen, *scutiferi* or *valetti cum equis discoöpertis qui dicuntur hobellarii* or *hoblarii*, came originally from Ireland. I have not found the word used in documents before 1296, when a considerable force was brought over from Ireland to make a diversion against the south-west of Scotland, while Edward's main army invaded from Berwick towards Dunbar. The force was commanded by Sir John Wogan, Justiciar of Ireland, and after all the units were concentrated together its total strength was one earl (Richard de Burgh, Earl of Ulster, who drew 8s. a day, the earliest instance that I know of an earl having so high a wage), eight bannerets including Wogan himself, 26 knights, 285 men-at-arms, 260 hobelars, 28 crossbowmen, and 2600 foot. An entry on the roll¹ specially informs us that in Ulster's retinue there were three horses for each knight and man-at-arms, and in Eustace le Poer's retinue even as many as four, and we may assume that each hobelar had only his own hobby or pony, for otherwise we should have had similar information. The pay of the hobelars was 6d. a day. They were light lancers, moss-troopers or border prickers, of the type familiar to us from Scott, and ideal scouts in rough country.

Now the derivation of 'hobby,' from which presumably 'hobelar' comes, is not clear. Skeat and Stratmann are against an Irish derivation, and in the 'New English Dictionary' it is merely suggested that the word may be of 'native origin.' But in Jamieson's 'Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language' a certain Maffaeus is quoted as saying that Ireland 'produces excellent horses which the inhabitants call Ubinos or Hobinos.' One need hardly go any further, for the Celtic *obann* means 'quick, nimble,

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{5}{28}$. This roll is calendared by Stevenson, but not by Bain.

sudden.' Beyond doubt Ireland was the original home of the hobelars.

Probably after the campaign of 1296 some Irish hobelars remained behind on either side of the Solway Firth, and then it occurred to somebody to mount and equip Englishmen like them. In 1299 Robert Clifford, commanding in Annandale, requests that the wages be paid of one 'Richard le Bret, an Irish hobolour, retained to spy the passings and haunts of the enemy by night and day, and who has been on duty for six weeks and three days, lest he take himself off for want of sustenance.'¹ In garrison in the pele of Lochmaben, when attacked by the Earl of Carrick, were four men-at-arms, five hobelars, and nine archers.² There are other notices of the presence of hobelars in Annandale, and in January 1300 the officials in Ireland were ordered to send over victuals and hobelars.³ Then in 1301 another considerable force came over, with Sir John Wogan again in command, but without the Earl of Ulster; 7 bannerets, 14 knights, 260 men-at-arms, 390 hobelars, 6 crossbowmen, and 1570 foot. The document⁴ is a single membrane with a slip attached; it is not a pay-roll, and does not give the duration of service or any other details than the bare numbers; but it also gives the numbers of the previous force in 1296. In fact it is a memorandum of the Irish contingents on two occasions, and is tolerably good evidence that no Irish were brought over in the intermediate years, *i.e.* that there were none at Falkirk. It is clear from these facts that the hobelars were known to be of value in this district, the Western March, long before the reign of terror began which was the result of Bruce's systematic raids south of the border.

But as yet very few hobelars were raised for border warfare, and when first Bruce raided the defence was entrusted to heavy cavalry. From the Scottish Roll 4 Edw. II we know that Robert Clifford in 1310 was in command

¹ Bain, ii. No. 1084.

² *Ibid.* Nos. 1127 and 1128.

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³ *Ibid.* Nos. 1089 and 1115.

⁴ *Exchequer Accounts*, §.

of at least eight bannerets and twenty-six knights who had letters of protection, and this indicates a total force of perhaps as many as 150 heavy cavalry of all ranks. In the autumn of 1311 he had fourteen knights and thirty-six men-at-arms; the horses were registered, and ten knights and ten men-at-arms lost their mounts in a fight at Faringley, which is just across the border in Scotland.¹ At Carlisle there were in garrison in 1311 a very few men-at-arms and hobelars and 100 archers; in 1312, when Andrew de Harcla first took command, 30 men-at-arms were in pay with 12 hobelars and 120 archers.² Meanwhile in eight castles and towns in Scotland—Berwick, Roxburgh, Edinburgh, Linlithgow, Stirling, Perth, Dundee, and Bothwell—there were in pay altogether 730 heavy cavalry, 130 hobelars, 98 crossbowmen, and 124 archers; the figures vary very much from month to month, and these are for August 1311. At Berwick Ralph of Monthermer was in command of two bannerets, 11 knights, 125 men-at-arms, and 50 hobelars; in January 1312 the numbers were two bannerets, five knights, 140 men-at-arms, 73 hobelars; and six months later the men-at-arms were raised to 180, and the hobelars reduced to 48.³ The yearly cost of these garrisons came to at least £16,500, and to this must be added the cost of maintenance at Carlisle and at least another dozen castles and peles which are known to have been garrisoned in Scotland at one time or another. The drain on the resources of Edward II at this date has not been, perhaps, sufficiently taken into consideration. The facts are of value, as the period was just the eve of Bruce's series of swoops upon the castles.

Andrew of Harcla—or Hartcla or Hertcla, in modern spelling Hartley, for his manor of Harcla, which was confiscated after his execution for treason, was presumably near

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{1}{4}$ (Bain, iii. No. 278).

² *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{1}{2}$ (Bain, No. 304).

³ Bain, in an appendix, pp. 393-434, from Cotton MSS., *Vespasian* 116. The figures for Stirling, Perth, and Dundee, are for heavy cavalry only.

Kirkby Stephen, below Stainmoor, in east Westmorland, where 'Hartley Castle' is marked on the Ordnance map—seems to have done most to develop the hobelar system. Robert Clifford¹ having been killed at Bannockburn and his heir being young, not only the defence of the country but also the custody of the castles of the great Vipont barony came upon Andrew; the crown had a right to see to the security of private castles in a time of danger. Thus at the time of his treason he was responsible for the castles and peles of Appleby, Brougham, Pendragon, Naworth, Cockermouth, Egremont, and Highhead, and the united garrisons of these seven came to 34 men-at-arms, 50 hobelars, and 50 foot²; this, however, was in 1323, a year of truce, and the numbers would have been much larger in war-time. But Brough, one of the Vipont castles, was held independently by Sir Robert Wells, who contracted with the King to hold it with 15 men-at-arms and 20 hobelars, of whom 10 men-at-arms and 10 hobelars were to be at the King's cost; in the document Wells appears to be the owner of the castle (*à qui le dit chastel est et qui ad la garde du meisme cal*).³ Meanwhile Sir Andrew had in garrison in Carlisle in the July of 1314 6 knights, 100 men-at-arms, 46 hobelars, and 326 archers; of these, 16 hobelars and 40 archers were Irish. Sallying out, he met and fought some Scots raiders *iuxta le Redecros supra Steynmor*, where he lost 25 horses; and later, in another fight at 'Penresax,' he lost 11 horses. The 'Redecros' lies above the pass which leads north of Stainmoor into Yorkshire; and if 'Penresax,' otherwise unidentified, be Pendragon, it is in the other pass from the upper Eden into Yorkshire south of Stainmoor.

¹ This Clifford was son of Isabella, co-heiress of Robert de Vipont, hereditary sheriff of Westmorland in her father's place, and lady of Appleby and Brougham; her sister Idonéa, the other co-heiress, inheriting Brough and Pendragon, married John Cromwell, but he disappeared from Westmorland after her death, and thus later all the Vipont lands and castles came to the Cliffords.

² *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{13}$, portions of the same document which have been separated.

³ *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{1}{13}$. The year is 1316.

Each is now traversed by a main line of railway, and thus it would seem that twice Andrew headed off the Scots as they were crossing by a natural valley from Yorkshire into Westmorland. In 1315 he defended Carlisle against Bruce himself, and beat him off, as the Lanercost chronicle tells us. His numbers in this year were 83 heavy cavalry, 45 hobelars, and 395 archers; but these are the figures of two months before the siege.¹ Then the documents fail us. But we know that he was a prisoner of the Scots in 1316, and was released, partly for money, partly in exchange for two Scots whom he had captured.² In 1319 he led to the siege of Berwick 360 hobelars and 980 foot archers, and Sir Robert Wells led independently 40 hobelars and 20 archers, Sir Hugh Lowther 25 hobelars and 28 archers, and Sir Anthony Lucy 73 hobelars, and these contingents from Cumberland and Westmorland made up more than one half of the light cavalry and one sixth of the foot of Edward's army. Clearly something was being done in these counties, and Sir Andrew stands out as a military reformer. He is praised by Thomas Gray in the 'Scalacronica' for his feats of arms. Thus it is with some wonder that we find that complaints were in 1319 preferred against him and his brother John; they were accused of favouring rebels and robbers, of failing to support Sir Anthony Lucy, and generally of not defending the border adequately.³

This army which laid siege to Berwick—it was the only occasion since Bannockburn when Edward made a serious effort to resume the offensive, for the Scots had captured Berwick in 1318—was composed of 6150 foot, 53 crossbowmen, and 845 hobelars.⁴ About 2400 of the foot were

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{3}{4}\frac{1}{2}$ (Bain, No. 403), for 1314; $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}$ for 1315; $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{4}$ for 1316. One entry informs us that a few horsemen were paid 8d. a day, being *scutiferi ad arma cum sufficientibus armaturis et hakenays*, i.e. the man is armoured, but the horse not. They are intermediate between men-at-arms and hobelars.

² Bain, No. 515.

³ See Bain, Nos. 675, 799.

⁴ *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{4}$. My totals do not quite agree with Mr. Bain's; see No. 668.

Welsh,¹ 1740 were from Yorkshire, 160 from Nottinghamshire, 530 from 'divers counties,' and 1028 from Cumberland and Westmorland under Andrew and his colleagues. If we are to judge from the roll, as the numbers vary from week to week, the loss of life in the assault fell upon Yorkshire and divers counties, for the other contingents hardly lost a man. Besides the 500 hobelars led by Harcla, Wells, Lowther, and Lucy, 36 came from Castle Barnard, 24 from Norham, and 45 from Tynedale; therefore such men were being raised now on the Eastern as well as the Western March. Bruce saved Berwick by making a counter-invasion as far south as York, in which occurred the affair known as 'the chapter of Mytton.'

Yet the marvel is that still heavy cavalry were raised, at least on the Eastern March. In 1315 Aymer of Valence had 69 knights and 219 men-at-arms to defend the border.²

¹ In another document, *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{1}{20}$, we have an interesting detail about the North Welsh contingent. They reached Chester 400 strong, *en route* for Newcastle, and there 'eux demorerent par iiij iours par raison du contek (q) feut entre les gentz de la ville et eux en quieu contek furent tuez et naufrez plusurs deux, tant come ie fu a Salopesbire a cheuir deniers, . . . et dilloeqs sempartirent a grant peyne queux ne fuissent retournez a lour pais.' Then the contingent from Clun and Oswestry and Powys were not allowed to march by way of Chester, 'mais por pear (q) la Justice auoit lour menours ne autres ne voleient il lour chemyn prendre par Cestre.' This tussle at Chester between the Welsh soldiers and the townsfolk may be compared with the trouble on the eve of the battle of Falkirk, and if such scenes were common it is easy to understand why the Kings, as soon as ever the north-country English were able to fight their own battles, no longer cared to bring up Welshmen to Scotland. $\frac{1}{20}$ and $\frac{1}{20}$ belong to the same expedition.

² *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{1}{5}$. This is a horse-list for the months July to October. Not all the 288 men served at the same time. The horses had gone up in value since Edward I's reign; Aymer's own charger was priced at £100, and the cheapest mounts of the men-at-arms at £10. The list may be usefully compared with the number of letters of protection issued to Aymer's followers according to the Scottish Roll of 8 Edw. II. Thus forty-five out of the sixty-nine knights, and sixty-five out of the 219 men-at-arms, had protections. Now, from Scottish Roll 7 Edw. II, I have collected 830 names of men with protections. If, therefore, in 1315 we find protections granted to 109 out of 288 men known to have actually served, the 830 protections of 1314 indicate a total of about 2000 heavy cavalry in all at Bannockburn, or perhaps 2500.

In 1319, after his retreat from Berwick, Edward commissioned Sir John Cromwell and the Earl of Angus to hold the border with 28 knights and 153 men-at-arms of their own retinues, 7 knights and 44 men-at-arms of the royal household, 10 Gascon men-at-arms and 46 mounted crossbowmen; 288 men all told.¹ And we know from Jehan le Bel how this use of heavy cavalry was normal even down to 1327 in spite of bitter experience, except where such sensible men as Andrew of Harcla or Gray of Heton were in command.

In 1322 we have the critical battle of Boroughbridge, which Professor Tout has pointed out as an important link in the chain of battles between Falkirk and Crécy. Harcla came south to fight in his King's cause against Lancaster and Hereford. He dismounted his cavalry, mostly hobelars we may guess, to defend both ford and bridge in solid schiltroms, *more Scotico*, while his archers he posted on the flanks of each schiltrom. Similarly Sir Thomas Gray of Heton made his celebrated sortie from Norham Castle on foot against the Scots cavalry, and then the women of the garrison led out the horses for the pursuit; this was the occasion when Sir William Marmion charged ahead on his warhorse, and wore his gilded helm and crest in honour of his lady, as Norham was the place of danger where some great feat of arms could be done. The castle was often attacked, but Gray's son, in the 'Scalacronica,' does not give us the date of this particular exploit. We have the direct evidence of the elder Gray that 100 Scottish men-at arms and 100 hobelars were encamped to besiege it in the September of 1322; that was the same month when Edward, not satisfied that the Bishop of Durham and his

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, 1½. This is a contract, not a horse-list. Except Cromwell's own comitiva, the household, and the Gascons *par reson de leur lounteine*, the men-at-arms were only paid 8d. a day. From the same document we learn that the King paid for fifteen men-at-arms at Bamborough, twenty men-at-arms and twenty hobelars at Alnwick, eight men-at-arms and eight hobelars at Warkworth—all these in excess of the regular garrison in each castle, and this shows that the King saw the necessity of helping the private owners of castles.

brother, Henry Beaumont, were taking proper steps to defend it, made Gray enter into a contract to maintain 20 men-at-arms and 50 hobelars at the royal wages over and above the bishop's men in garrison. Gray, most probably, was constable for the bishop before 1322, for he was connected with the Beaumonts and rode in Henry Beaumont's retinue to Bannockburn, but from this September he was as constable responsible for Norham to the King. Therefore the date of his sortie with Marmion remains unknown.¹

Harcla's victory over Lancaster and Hereford at Boroughbridge was on March 15, and on March 25, as soon as ever Edward knew that the two rebels were crushed, he decided to invade Scotland to avenge Bannockburn. He committed his crowning folly. That some reform was needed after Bannockburn no one would dispute; likewise that that reform should have been in the direction of a considered plan of combination for mutual support of horse and foot. But Edward could see nothing beyond the fact that horse had been routed at Bannockburn, and 'preferred infantry' for the coming campaign. He was quite ignorant of the importance of rapid movement before battle, and thought only of action in battle. So he sent writs all over England to summon from every county armoured foot, *pedites armati*, and even the phrase *homines pedites ad arma* was used. For this is the second point; he called for heavy foot spearmen, not archers. Now this was not entirely new; in June 1310 he had summoned from Wales *homines pedites ad arma*; in May 1311 he had demanded *unum hominem fortem et defensabilem ac armis competentibus bene munitum* from every village or township in England; not only were *electores* and *ductores* nominated for each county, but in the Exchequer Memoranda of 4 Edw. II we find small sums of money allocated for the preliminary

¹ Bain, Nos. 770, 772, 777, 783. *Parliamentary Writs*, ii. 604. The siege of Norham was proceeding on September 20, 1322, *diversis ingenis et machinis*, and in the *Scalacronica* the Scots who wounded Marmion made a surprise attack.

expenses of the levy. The writs were indeed cancelled. But it is clear that the idea of collecting heavily-armoured infantry from every county had occurred to Edward before Bannockburn. *Arma* in this connexion means defensive armour, for in one passage we read *sagittariis et aliis hominibus sine armis*.

On March 25, 1322, Edward summoned at his wages no less than 39,000 English foot, a proportion to be *armati cum aketonis bacinettis et cirotecis ferreis*, and the residue to be *armis competentibus muniti*, 6,000 Welsh foot, and 6,000 Irish foot, with 1,000 hobelars.¹ The demands were afterwards modified. In May it was given out that Parliament had sanctioned the levy of one man from each *villa, civitatibus et burgis exceptis*, and this was to be at the cost of the county. But if the cities and boroughs did not pay an aid they were to supply *armati* at their own cost: Winchester, for instance, fifty, Salisbury and Coventry and Northampton forty each, Exeter twenty-six, Oxford twenty-five, and so on. Finally 10,000 men were demanded, to take the King's wages, from twenty-three counties, over and above the one from each villa. A special corps of 300 archers was to come from Kent and Sussex, and this is the solitary mention of archers in this year. Reference is made to the Statute of Winchester, and all men between sixteen and sixty are to be arrayed in the northern counties. The Yorkshiremen are to be ready *de die in diem*, and compulsion is authorised. Northumberland and the bishopric of Durham are not called upon, and Harcla was specially commissioned to array all the men of Cumberland, Westmorland, and Lancashire for the defence of the border only.

But these writs, of which there are many printed pages, are of little value in comparison with the pay-rolls. Most fortunately we have full means to calculate the exact numbers of the foot of the army, though one feels annoyance that these rolls should have been preserved and not

¹ These writs are all in the printed *Rotuli Scotiae* and in *Parliamentary Writs*, ii. 558 onwards.

those of the Bannockburn year. They are numbered in the Exchequer Accounts $\frac{16}{4.10.11.12.14.15.16.17}$, but only one has been calendared by Mr. Bain. At the end of July and early in August there assembled at Newcastle 4439 English foot from twenty counties, 6460 Welsh foot, with 376 English, 10 Welsh, and 139 Irish hobelars, and 25 Irish men-at-arms.¹ Some few of the men were fully *armati* and had 4*d.* a day; some contingents, those of Norfolk and Suffolk, and some of the men of Cheshire, were *di-armati* at 3*d.*; Kent and Sussex supplied 186 *sagittarii electi* out of the 300 summoned; but quite the majority of the men were *non armati*, and how many of these were archers there is nothing to tell us. Of the cities only Salisbury is represented by ten men and Derby by twenty. A separate slip of parchment gives details of the Norfolk contingent under Sir John Howard; the men were all half-armoured, and none were bow-armed; they left home 454 strong and mustered 435 at the rendezvous, but evidently were reinforced later, for by the time they had reached Leith their number was up to 485. On August 5 the King was complaining that some of the men had already deserted;² and the pay-roll shows that he had right to complain, for the Wiltshire contingent dropped from 400 to 280 men within a fortnight, the Kent and Sussex archers from 186 to 147, the Notts men from 169 to 130. One small Irish corps reached Newcastle, as already mentioned; another corps set sail on August 18, consisting of 4 bannerets, 6 knights, 63 men-at-arms, 189 hobelars, and 93 foot, and was in the King's pay up to November, but cannot have been in time to take part in the invasion of Scotland.³

The only document of this series which has been

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{16}{14}$.

² *Parliamentary Writs*, p. 602: 'receptis vadiis nostris se ab obsequio nostro sine licencia nostra elongarunt.'

³ This fact is worth consideration, for some writers argue that large numbers of Irish swelled the English army at Bannockburn; here, in 1322, we see thousands summoned, very few hundreds serving.

calendared by Mr. Bain is a slip giving sums of money and measures of flour served out to the men when they had reached Leith. It mentions the English contingents only, and adds a good deal to our knowledge. The date is August 23. Thirty-three counties are now represented, and several contingents are stronger than they were at Newcastle, perhaps because the deserters had been caught. Norfolk has now 485 men, Wiltshire 304, Yorkshire 912, Lincolnshire 450. Some cities also are represented, London with Middlesex supplying 161, York 60, Exeter 26, Oxford 25, Canterbury 20, Rochester 9, and these are the exact numbers originally demanded; Salisbury has now produced the extra thirty men that were missing at Newcastle. Buckingham, Cambridge, Ely, Derby, and doubtless other towns, have sent men, but they are merged in the full contingents of their respective counties. The total, which I make to differ slightly from Mr. Bain's figures, comes to 7053 men.¹ If some reasonable proportion of the Welsh be added we have a force of infantry, of more than average strength for that day, close on 14,000 in all.

A great many barons and knights had contracts with the King this year, but, as 15 Edward II covers from the summer of 1321 to the summer of 1322, it is impossible to calculate whether they contracted to serve him against Lancaster and Hereford or against the Scots. Scattered in the Pipe Rolls of Edward III are accounts of money paid for service under Edward II; for instance, Lord William de Ros of Hamlake had out 100 men-at-arms of all ranks and sixty hobelars for exactly one month, February 25 to March 25, *quo die recessit*, i.e. the very month of the crisis of the rebellion in which the battle of Boroughbridge was fought. Therefore it seems that the contracts were not made for the war against Scotland.

To describe the feeble invasion, the weariness and starvation of the 'infantry preferred' whom Bruce saw no need to fight in pitched battle, the return, and the

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, 1½. Bain, No. 765, and Introduction, p. xxix.

counter-invasion into Yorkshire, where Edward was nearly taken, would be out of place. The interest comes from the fact that the raising of foot from the whole of England was an experiment, and the figures that I have offered show how far the experiment was successful as regards numbers. The men cannot but have been an untrained mob, and their fighting power contemptible. But the first occasion¹ when all England except the border counties sent men is a sort of prelude to the many occasions during the Hundred Years when the machinery for enlisting and equipping the contingents was in existence, for from various entries in the French Rolls I take it that the county authorities, when ordered to produce so many hundreds of archers, knew where to find them on some system. But of course the other experiment of the year, the attempt to pit against the Scots armoured foot spearmen, was not repeated by Edward III. It was not even repeated by Edward II himself. I have a few scattered instances from the Pipe Rolls of Edward III of troops raised in the autumn of 1326. Sir John Howard, under the command of Thomas of Brotherton, raised in Norfolk and Suffolk, to go to the mouth of the Orwell to resist certain rebels and enemies landing there, 4 knights, 23 men-at-arms, and 30 hobelars; thence they marched to Gloucester and remained there for most of October and November. In Oxfordshire were raised, and led to the King *pro defensione regni*, 11 men-at-arms, 21 hobelars, and 350 foot *tam sagittarii quam pedites*; and, from an unnamed county, 5 men-at-arms, 16 hobelars, 46 *pedites armati* at 3*d.* a day, and 34 *non armati* at 2*d.* Therefore heavy infantry had dropped out of favour.

Better days for England dawned in 1333. Baker of Swinbroke seems to be right when he wrote of Halidon Hill

¹ Mr. W. M. Mackenzie denies that this was the first occasion. But the men of the 'divers counties' in previous armies were very few, and 'divers' does not mean 'all.' Edward I once summoned thousands of foot from all the counties for a French war; but clearly he only meant to indicate the number liable to be called out. The statement is absolutely true that 1322 is the first year of a levy from all England.

that there the chivalry of England learnt to dismount to fight. The battles of Boroughbridge and Dupplin Moor were earlier, and Harcla had first set the example. But at Boroughbridge it was comparatively easy to block the exits from bridge and ford with dismounted horsemen and to post the archers on the flanks, and at Dupplin Moor there were only 1500 English in arms, according to the chronicler's figures, forming a centre of dismounted lancers and two archer wings. At Halidon Hill, the King was present in person with a large number of barons, as we see by the list of those who signed the treaty for the surrender of Berwick ; and he had an army large enough to be divided into three brigades in the fighting line and a reserve, besides the men besieging Berwick. We have another fact, which is absent from Boroughbridge and Dupplin Moor, and which gives to the new tactics their value, namely that horse and foot are now for the first time brigaded together ; in action each brigade has dismounted knights and men-at-arms in the background and two sloping wings of archers ; now put three such brigades into line, and at once are formed the *hereses* or hollow wedges which link one brigade to another. Halidon Hill is the first battle in which the great men fight on foot, and is the first in which the hollow wedge of archers appears. I can offer no figures as to the strength of the army. From the Scottish Roll 7 Edward III can be collected the names of many who had letters of protection for the war. Thomas of Brotherton, then Earl of Norfolk and Marshal, had with him at least 12 knights and 21 men-at-arms, and this implies a troop of at least sixty horse in all if to each knight be added a full complement ; Ralph Basset, banneret, had 4 knights and 21 men-at-arms ; and so on. Foot were summoned from the counties which usually provided foot before the experiment of 1322, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Leicestershire, Gloucestershire, but not Cheshire or Lincolnshire ; the bishopric and the border counties were expected at this date simply to defend

themselves. Writs were sent to Wales, but were cancelled ; therefore the statement of Capgrave, who wrote a century later, seems to be quite right ; ' In this batayle wonne the archeres of Ynglond a perpetual laude.'¹ The fact indeed is clear, and the period has now begun when the best and most numerous of the ' English ' archers are no longer, as at Falkirk, Welshmen. Moreover, the proportion of archer to non-archer foot is now very high. From Lancashire were summoned 1200 archers and 200 hobelars ; from Derbyshire 500 archers and 200 hobelars ; from Nottinghamshire 500 archers and 200 hobelars ; from Warwickshire and Leicestershire 1000 and from Gloucestershire 300 foot, of whom the greater part were to be archers ; 1000 from Shropshire and Staffordshire, and 5510 foot *tam sagittarii quam alii* and 1080 hobelars from Yorkshire. But writs of summons are unsatisfactory as evidence of numbers, and one is weary of trying to calculate from such means how many men served at Falkirk or Bannockburn or Hali-don Hill. As early as April Edward III was complaining of delay. In June, a month before the battle, he blamed the arrayers for sending *debiles corpore et insufficientes ad pugnandum, omissis fortibus et validis pro pecunia ab eis extorta*. After the battle a very large number of men, both knights and others, received the King's pardon for various specified offences : for instance, one man who had committed highway robbery on a monk in Sherwood Forest ; others were pardoned in vague terms. These men, the Feebles and Shadows who had been impressed into the ranks in place of Mouldy and Bullcalf, plus the murderers and robbers and poachers, won the victory to their perpetual laud.

But in 1333 the horse-archer has not yet appeared. We have to wait four more years for him. At the end of 1337 William Montague, newly created Earl of Salisbury, raised an army. We have exact details of his force, and in it all the English archers are horse-archers and the only

¹ Rolls Series, p. 202.

foot are Welsh.¹ Three earls at a fee of 8s. a day, the other two being Hugh Audley, Earl of Gloucester, and Richard Fitz Alan, Earl of Arundel, seven bannerets, 60 knights, 450 men-at-arms, 1970 horse-archers with their officers, and 466 Welsh foot were mustered at Newcastle in December and January. The horse-archers were drawn from 21 counties, Lancashire, Yorkshire, the Midlands, the Thames Valley, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Kent, but from no other county of the south coast and no county on the Welsh border except Gloucestershire. The siege of Dunbar began early in 1338. A very large number of workmen were drawing wages from March to June. A chief engineer, John of Brabant, drew 4s. a day, and three other engineers 1s. each, and we read in the roll of 'sows' and other machines which had been put together or repaired at Newcastle and Berwick, and of stones and gorse and sand brought to fill up the castle ditch for an assault in May.

But meanwhile the numbers of the army fell off, and Salisbury had with him in March 490 heavy cavalry of all ranks, 1040 horse-archers, and 260 Welsh foot; in June, when the siege was raised, he had 487 heavy cavalry, 710 horse-archers, and 160 Welsh. I take it that the difference between the January figures at Newcastle and those of March at Dunbar indicates that a proportion of the men were dismissed, as a very large army was not required for the siege, both castle and port being small; and the difference of the figures between March and June indicates the losses during the siege. The pay of the horse-archer was 4*d.* a day for each man and 6*d.* for each vintenaar, but Salisbury had a body of thirty in his personal retinue at 6*d.* each *quia electi*.

We must not jump to the conclusion that henceforward all the archers were always mounted. For instance this

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, 28. Also £500 was paid to Edward Balliol, Arundel, Percy, Neville, and Beaumont, and if the whole sum was for the wages of men-at-arms it would have maintained 100 knights and men-at-arms for about two months. The county horse-archers were 1874, and the extra hundred were in the retinues of lords.

same year 1338 Edward III¹ was going in person to Flanders, and there were mustered at Norwich to go with him 1140 foot-archers from fifteen Midland counties, Shropshire included, but Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire excluded, and from Lincolnshire and Somerset and Dorset. The shipping seems to have been insufficient, and therefore he dismissed a few men and took over 964 only. They were paid the 2*d.* a day which had been normal since Edward I's reign. There were also mustered here eighty-four horse-archers, sixty of them in the retinue of Henry, Earl of Derby, and twenty-four in that of John Segrave, all at the higher wage of 6*d.*

As the question of the provenance of the archers is of some importance, I offer the following table. It gives some idea of the need of bringing soldiers from other parts of England to the border, also of raising the contingents for foreign service as much as possible from the midlands. Just as the raiding Scots exhausted the northern counties so that the men were wanted for defence and could not be called upon to bear the burden of offence, so the counties of the south coast had to defend themselves against the Normans ; indeed, a primary cause of the French war was the defence of the coast, and the bitter devastation of Normandy in 1346 was the result.

The next step is that the princes, earls, barons, and bannerets, who raised heavy cavalry by contract with the King, began to add to them horse-archers in equal numbers. Then wages went up fifty per cent., 6*d.* being given to the horse-archer, 3*d.* to his comrade on foot. I have not yet satisfied myself when first this increase became general.² In 1346 the men abroad had the higher rate of pay, the men at home the previous rate ; in fact the increase seems to arise from the commercial necessity of paying men highly for foreign service rather than from a generous feeling that, as they had now justified themselves as the best soldiers of the

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, 31.

² See above ; a few horse-archers in retinues had the higher pay in 1338.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF COUNTY LEVIES

| | 1322 ¹ Foot, mostly <i>di-armati</i> and non- <i>armati</i> | | 1337-8 ² Horse-archers for siege of Dunbar | | 1338 ³ Foot-archers, mus- tered and taken to Flanders | |
|-------------------------|---|--------|--|-------|---|------|
| | July | August | Dec. | March | June | July |
| Yorks. . . | 390 | 972 | 409 | 236 | | |
| Lancs. . . | | | 212 | 177 | 4 | 4 |
| Cheshire . . | 541 | | | | | |
| Salop . . . | | 190 | | | 97 | 80 |
| Staffs. . . | | 175 | | | 109 | 106 |
| Derby . . . | 80 | 140 | 100 | 55 | | |
| Notts. . . | 169 | 120 | 100 | 45 | | |
| Lincs. . . | 140 | 450 | 121 | 56 | 120 | 98 |
| Rutland . . | | 33 | 40 | 16 | | |
| Northants . | 440 | 247 | 140 | 55 | 90 | 78 |
| Leics. . . | 195 | 106 | 60 | 40 | 60 | 60 |
| Warws. . . | 159 | 150 | 59 | 40 | 60 | 60 |
| Worcs. . . | | 90 | | | 60 | 60 |
| Herefs. . . | | 100 | | | | |
| Gloucs. . . | 111 | 176 | 99 | 59 | | |
| Oxfords. . . | 125 | 185 | 60 | 26 | 40 | 36 |
| Berks. . . | | 152 | | | 40 | 26 |
| Bucks. . . | | 169 | | | | |
| Beds. . . | | 124 | 78 | 31 | 51 | 40 |
| Surrey . . . | | 119 | | | 60 | 56 |
| Hunts. . . | 105 | 79 | 125 | 56 | 40 | 30 |
| Cambs. . . | 168 | 143 | | | 40 | 30 |
| Herts. . . | 114 | 115 | | | 40 | 36 |
| Middles. . . | | 161 | | | 20 | 12 |
| Norfolk . . | 435 | 485 | 114 | 35 | | |
| Suffolk . . | 240 | 324 | | | | |
| Essex . . . | 140 | 326 | | | | |
| Kent . . . | 300 | 269 | 96 | 46 | | |
| Sussex ⁴ . . | | 175 | | | | |
| Hants . . . | | 229 | | | | |
| Wilts . . . | 401 | 344 | 61 | 35 | 74 | 70 |
| Dorset . . . | | 137 | | | 50 | 60 |
| Somerset . . | | 180 | | | 80 | 60 |
| Devon . . . | | 222 | | | | |
| Cornwall . . | | 166 | | | | |

¹ The July figures are from *Exchequer Accounts*, $\frac{13}{14}$; those of August from $\frac{14}{15}$.

² *Ibid.* $\frac{20}{21}$.

³ *Ibid.* $\frac{21}{22}$.

⁴ The 300 are from Kent; the 186 are the elect archers of Kent and Sussex.

age, they should be duly rewarded. Sir Thomas Dagworth contracted to serve in Brittany with 200 men of his personal retinue, viz. 14 knights, 65 men-at-arms, and 120 horse-archers at the rate of 6*d.* a day, plus 300 extra men-at-arms and 600 horse-archers at a lump sum of £2880 for three months. He was to receive compensation at the rate of £10 for the horse of each man-at-arms lost on service, and £1 for each archer's hackney; this latter entry indeed is cancelled, but it gives the requisite information that the average price of an archer's hackney in 1346 was £1.¹

There is no new evidence that I know of about Crécy and Calais. It is a fact of common notoriety that the great men had retinues of men-at-arms and horse-archers in equal numbers. In the last month of the great siege, in anticipation of a French attack from the outside, when Edward made an effort to obtain large reinforcements, 5000 men-at-arms of all ranks and 5000 horse-archers were in camp, with 15,000 foot-archers, presumably of the county levies, and 600 hobelars; foreign mercenaries and Welsh non-archer foot at the rate of 2*d.* a day brought the gross total up to 32,000 men. Sir James Ramsay has stated that this figure represents the total of all who served from the first landing in Normandy down to the fall of Calais. It is difficult to argue, for we have only transcripts of a document which has disappeared. But in no extant document is such a gross total given, so that a guess in this particular case has no warrant. Various clues, such as the issue of protections to certain lords and their followers found in the French Roll, men who were still in England in May or June, but whose names appear in the transcripts of the muster-roll, indicate that we have in the figures the total of the men encamped before Calais, after special efforts had been made to bring over large reinforcements from England, in July 1347. Out of the retinues present at this date before Calais let us pick those of the lords who are known to have been previously at Crécy, and let us assume that they had

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, 35.

received reinforcements since the battle sufficient to make good the losses of the campaign and battle, then about 2500 represents the heavy cavalry at Crécy, and therefore about 2500 the horse-archers. When I worked some years ago at General Wriottesley's 'Crécy and Calais,' picking out the name of every lord and knight who had a protection or was otherwise known to have sailed to Normandy, I found a total of 500; adding 100 for possible omissions and multiplying to allow for three men-at-arms to each knight, I got nearly the same result. A roll of names of the garrison of Calais in 1356 gives us what was possibly its average strength during the English occupation, at least at this period. Sir Roger Beauchamp, captain, was in command of ten knights, 37 men-at-arms, 10 hobelars, 140 horse-archers, and 280 foot-archers; at Guines were one knight, 43 men-at-arms, 20 hobelars, 10 horse-archers, and 50 foot-archers; and there were a few more men in smaller forts in the neighbourhood.¹ The continued existence of the hobelar indeed surprises me, for in England the horse-archer has by this date quite supplanted him.

I come now to my latest find, and feel doubtful in my own mind whether to feel pleasure or to be angry about it; the roll is valuable, certainly, but it is in its right place and is duly catalogued; in fact neither myself nor anybody else had ever looked for it. The roll gives the accounts of John Woodhouse² on the Scottish border from the middle of the nineteenth to the twenty-first year of Edward III. From it we learn that in August and September 1346 the Scots raided towards Carlisle, and, besides whatever local levies were raised, a force of 6 knights, 54 men-at-arms, and 127 horse-archers were sent across *de gentibus extraneis*; this or some similar phrase occurs elsewhere in the roll, and simply indicates men from other counties of England distant from the border. We have already had evidence that the Cumbrians and Northumbrians, also the men of the bishopric, were expected to defend themselves only, and not to raise

¹ *Exchequer Accounts*, 27.

² *Exchequer Accounts*, 25.

men for offensive war in Scotland ; here we see them, it is clear, serving in defence without pay, while the few men from distant counties brought up to help them are paid and styled 'strangers.' But a larger force was coming up. In Lancashire were quickly raised 4 knights, 60 men-at-arms, 960 horse-archers, and 240 foot-archers, who were paid for eight days by their own county, and then took the King's pay for five days, viz. October 13 to 17.¹ The battle of Neville's Cross was fought on October 17. Yorkshire sent 15 men-at-arms, 29 hobelars, and 3020 horse-archers, who received eight days' pay from their own county and the King's pay October 12 to 16 ; but I take it that, their service ending on October 16, they were just one day too late for the battle. That men could be found, concentrated, brought over the Pennines from Lancashire to Durham, and then win a victory, all within the space of thirteen days, is a proof that there had been an awakening since 1327. And, reading between the lines of the document, we can picture the mortification of the Yorkshiremen that they had not hurried up quite fast enough to share in the glory. The campaign cost the King £307 ; surely it was the shortest and cheapest on record. The horse-archers were paid 4*d.* a day, and it cannot be said that their services were very magnificently rewarded.

Of course it is not to be argued that these 1264 Lancastrians alone won the battle. The unpaid levies of Cumberland and Westmorland, Northumberland and Durham, have to be added ; also the north-country lords would have

¹ A study of the Latin of the roll, given later on, shows that 3 knights, 42 men-at-arms, 640 horse-archers, and 240 foot-archers were paid October 13 to 17 inclusive, and one knight, 18 men-at-arms, and 320 horse-archers for only four of the five days. Possibly, therefore, these last were not up for the battle, just as, I take it, was the case of the Yorkshiremen. But they seem to have been all led *usque bellum iuxta Dunelm*, whereas the Yorkshiremen were led *pro bello predicto*. I should say that the smaller Lancastrian contingent was up a day sooner than the larger, and that the four days were October 14 to 17 ; perhaps the 240 foot-archers impeded the others.

I find now that I have given the figures wrong in my *Bannockburn*, p. 102, the Yorkshiremen being entered there as 3200 in place of 3020.

brought up their personal retinues. Next year arrangements were made to put into the field, to take the offensive in Scotland, 480 men-at-arms and 480 horse-archers; their names are in the Scottish Roll for 1347, and they were Edward Balliol, titular King of Scotland, at a special fee of 16s. a day; the Earl of Angus at 6s. 8d.; Lords Henry Percy and Ralph Neville, who had commanded at Neville's Cross; Lord Mowbray, Thomas Lucy, Thomas of Rokeby, John of Stirling, Robert Bertram, Heron, Dacre, John Coupland, warden of Roxburgh, and Thomas Musgrave, warden of Berwick. Woodhouse's roll tells us that they served for one month, eleven lords and bannerets, 78 knights, 414 men-at-arms, and 464 horse-archers of their retinues, together with 1986 horse-archers and 120 foot-archers *partium extraneorum* or *longinquarum*; of the horse-archers the only recorded detail is that 46 came from Salop. Therefore at least 500 heavy cavalry and 500 mounted infantry must be added for the Neville's Cross army, perhaps more; but it seems likely that men could be raised locally with greater ease for a raid over the border than for defence, for when raiding Scots were on English soil the primary instinct was to defend one's own homestead rather than to concentrate and leave family and property defenceless. However that may be, we are still considerably short of the 900 men-at-arms and 9000 archers that the 'Chronicon de Melsa' considers to have been present at Neville's Cross.

The main fact is quite clear. Mustering quickly and moving quickly, the horse-archers brought the Scots to action, unlike the heavy cavalry of 1327, who were only ridiculous. Then in action, dismounted and shooting from their hollow wedges, backed by similarly dismounted knights and men-at-arms, they made victory sure because they had a fine missile weapon. The long bow made all the difference between them and the mounted Scots, also between them and the English and Irish hobelars of what may be called the intermediate period. The light lancer or moss-trooper was a good man, but the mounted archer was a better.

Some of the other details of the roll are of interest. Four of the Lancashire leaders and their men were justly rewarded by an extra gift of money for their good turn-out. Robert Bertram took prisoner William Douglas, and was given the task of taking him to the Tower with the Earls of Fife and Menteith. John Coupland was entrusted with the custody of David Bruce, 'the self-styled King of Scotland,' but not a hint is given that he was the captor. Indeed, as David was so badly wounded that two barbers-doctors of York had to be brought up to Bamburgh Castle to extract the arrow and heal the prisoner, the story of Coupland's desperate struggle and capture has the appearance of being an after-thought.

The following are the relevant portions of Woodhouse's roll :—

Item in vadiis lxiiij hominum ad arma quorum iiij milites, unde iij milites xlij homines ad arma, dcxl sagittarii equites et ccxl sagittarii pedites, per v. dies a xiiij die Octobris dicto anno xx° usque xvij diem eiusdem mensis proxime sequentem utroque die computato, et unus miles xviiij homines ad arma et cccxx sagittarii equites per iiij dies infra tempus predictum, de comitatu Lancastrie conductorum usque bellum iuxta Dunolm' post vadia sua viij dierum que capiebant de patria transacta ad proficiscendum in comitiva predictorum archiepiscopi Henrici et Radulfi et aliorum magnatum bello predicto contra Scotos inimicos Regis, quolibet milite capiente ij s, homine ad arma xij d, sagittario equite iiij d, et sagittario pedite ij d per diem, per literam predictorum archiepiscopi Henrici et Radulfi, prout patet per capita hominum predictorum contenta in vij indenturis factis inter Johannem de Leiburn constabularium belli predicti et dictum Johannem de Wodehous———c li xiii s. iiij d.

Item in vadiis xv hominum ad arma ductorum, xxix hobeliorum, et M.M.M.xx sagittariorum equitum per iiij dies a xij die Octobris dicto anno xx° usque xvij diem eiusdem mensis proxime sequentem de comitatu Ebor', conductorum pro bello predicto, post vadia sua viij dierum que capiebant de patria transacta (etc., as above)———ccvij li iiij s. viiij d.

Item Johanni de Haverington, A de Hoghton, Willelmo de la Legh, Nichole Boteler, et hominibus secum venientibus de

dicto comitatu Lancastrie pro bello predicto pro bono apportu suo ultra vadia sua predicta de dono Regis per literam dictorum Archiepiscopi Henrici et Radulfi———xx li.

Item Roberto Bertram et Thome de Rokeby le cosyn pro expensis suis de Bothale in comitatu Northumbrie usque Turrim London', ducentibus comites de ffife et Meneteth et Willelmum de Douglas et alios in custodia sua existentes, pro se et hominibus suis in eundo, ibidem morando, et redeundo per literam Leonelli custodis Anglie et duorum predictorum, ad acquietanciam ipsorum Roberti et Thome———xl li.

Item eidem Roberto Bertram pro deliberatione filii Eustachii Loreigne unius custodum castri de Rokesburgh, nomine Willelmi Dougles, nuper in bello apud Dunolm' per ipsum Robertum de guerra capti, per breve Regis et acquietanciam ipsius Roberti———xl li.

Item Johanni de Coupeland pro expensis et custibus quos posuit circa custodiam Dauid de Brus qui se dicit Regem Scotie, nuper capti apud bellum predictum, pro toto tempore quo in custodia ipsius Johannis extitit apud Werk super Twedam per literam Leonelli custodis Anglie et acquietanciam ipsius Johannis———xx li.

Item Magistris Willelmo de Bolton et Hugoni de Kilvington Barbers de Ebor', medicis, euntibus de Ebor' usque castrum de Baumburgh in comitatu Northumbrie pro sanatione dicti Dauid de Brus qui iacuit ibidem sagitta vulneratus ad bellum predictum ad dictam sagittam extrahendam, et ipsum Dauid in festinatione sanandum, pro expensis suis in eundo, ibidem morando, et redeundo, per literam Leonelli custodis Anglie et acquietanciam ipsorum Willelmi et Hugonis———vi li.