

2. *The Crusade of Andrew II*

Post autem Andreas Terram Sanctam
visitavit ad mandatum domini papae.

Chronicon pictum, c. 175

The "crusade" of Andrew II has been described by some historians as the Fifth Crusade, in spite of the fact that the monarch's expedition to the Holy Land was not a serious military undertaking.

Why did Andrew II go to the Holy Land in 1217? Officially, he had followed the papal summons to realize the promise his father, Béla III, had made, thereby to show his political-religious loyalty to the Roman See. But that was only a pretense on his part, because he had made almost no preparation to carry out such a large scale military maneuver in the Holy Land. The real reason for him to go must have been that it was at that time that the Byzantine-Latin throne fell vacant, and Andrew II regarded himself as a candidate for the Greek imperial throne. The king boarded ships to cross the sea to the Near East with the resolution in mind that, by imitating the political circumstances that had surrounded the Fourth Crusade, he could realize his goal of gaining great power and predominance in Byzantium - by use of physical force if necessary.

The plans of Andrew II were ruined by the election of his relative to the Byzantine throne, and the coronation of that relative by the pontiff as Byzantine-Latin emperor, which was carried out with papal approval. Since Andrew II had no alternative, he visited the Holy Land "in fulfillment of the vow his father had made," made his presence known, and departed quickly. But during his journey home, he established political-diplomatic ties with various ruling families in Asia Minor. He had, for example, his son Béla engaged to Maria, the daughter of the ruler of Nicea.

Andrew II had assumed that if not he, then someone else from among his descendants would gain access to the Byzantine throne on account of these family contacts. He did not consider that Rome would not have tolerated the formation of a new political-diplomatic configuration through the establishment of a Buda-Byzantine axis. Nor did Andrew II reckon with the tolerance level of his people;

they were not willing to support a policy so foreign to their minds and liking, and they protested against its very concept.

In accordance with its motto, "Reformatio tam in capite, quam in membris,"¹ the Fourth Lateran Council proclaimed the necessity of another crusade; let there be a truce for four years; let one-twentieth of all ecclesiastical income be spent on the organization and operation of the crusade.²

The new pontiff, Honorius III, would not tolerate any further delay by Andrew II of Hungary in taking command of the crusade.³ Politics and military events in Halich must not draw the attention of the Hungarian court away from the realization of the undertaking, the pontiff wrote warningly to the king - much as his predecessor, Innocent III, had to do on a previous occasion.⁴ As lenient as he might have been - or, because he had been - with the German emperor,⁵ the less tolerance Honorius III displayed toward Andrew II, who had no alternative but to make some pretense of preparation for the campaign.⁶

In order to understand the background of this political and military maneuvering, one needs to realize that Pope Innocent III had earlier attempted to persuade Sultan al-Adil (Saphadin) to reach an agreement with the Christians instead of fighting them. He requested that the sultan return Jerusalem peacefully to him and exchange his Christian prisoners of war for Arabs held captive by the Franks. Thereby, the fate of Christians in the East would not be worse than that of the Moslems in the West!

The pontiff had asked al-Adil to understand that he was only a tool in the hands of the Almighty; the Lord permitted his brother to capture Jerusalem only because He wanted to punish the godless inhabitants of that city. Innocent III held the opinion that the sultan was identical with the Beast of the Book of Revelations, but the six hundred and sixty-six years allowed to the beast were about to expire. It was now time to take action. The chronicler ought to mention that al-Adil had taken action - a man of practical sense was he, who had prepared for war.⁷

The Fourth Lateran Council had declared that participants of the new crusade were to be ready for departure by June, 1217.⁸ Were they to journey by sea, they were to embark at Brundisi or at Messina, and the pope would be there to bless them. Were they to go by a land route (*recte*: those who went on land to their destination),

they would be looked after by the papal legate, who would also provide spiritual comfort and political advice for them, if needed. The pontiff promised to issue from the papal treasury thirty thousand pounds of silver marks, and place a ship from the Roman port at their disposal. The curia offered ten percent of its annual income for the coverage of expenditures of the crusade, and called upon the clergy to pledge one-twentieth of their annual income for the next three years for the same purpose.⁹

The Hungarian court made the arrangement that, for the duration of the monarch's absence from the realm, Archbishop John of Esztergom would be acting governor or regent. Were the king to die on the crusade, his son, Béla, would inherit the throne and his younger son, Coloman, would remain ruler in Halich. Were both sons to die, Andrew, their youngest brother, would claim the inheritance. Since Andrew was a minor, Alice (Ahalys), a lady-in-waiting to Queen Jolánta, would look after him.¹⁰ The archbishop would have to share the government of the country with Gyula the Palatine, Grand Reeve Raphyan of Transylvania, Grand Reeve (ban[us] Bánk, and Oghuz [Agyasz], Judge of the King's Court.¹¹ Berthold, the brother of the assassinated Queen Gertrud, would protect Prince Béla. (As a matter of fact, Berthold had immediately dispatched Béla to Stein, a Meranian residence near Laibach.¹²) Were the monarch to die during the campaign, Queen Jolánta would receive eight thousand silver marks from her dowry.¹³

Did Andrew II formulate a foreign policy different from that of his predecessor? Did he earlier, before the Fourth Lateran Council, express willingness to forge ahead with a pledge to realize the vow his father had made, so that he might merit, on his own terms, the trust and good will of the Holy See?¹⁴ Did the king have any money in 1217 to organize and go on a crusade? Did he have any plans or military strategy for the campaign? Did he have a desire to go?¹⁵ The Hungarian clergy were not at all happy about the payment of one-twentieth of their annual income for the expenses of the king's crusade,¹⁶ with the exception of Bishop Kalán of Pécs, who had taken the cross, and left upon his death in 1218 an amount of money for continued military action in the Near East.¹⁷

Andrew II's first choice was to travel on land with his crusaders, a cheap and perhaps more convenient way for the journey, but for one reason. Upon the death in 1216 of Henry the

Brave, Latin emperor of Byzantium, many of the barons of the empire advocated the election of the Hungarian monarch to the Latin-Byzantine throne, on the two-fold ground that he was the husband of the niece of the deceased emperor and he was the brother of the Queen of Thessalonica.¹⁸

One may indeed draw the conclusion from a papal letter addressed to Andrew II informing him that the "Greeks" had messengers dispatched to Rome with intelligence that they intended to elect the Hungarian king, or his brother-in-law, emperor of Latin, Byzantium. The papal writ stressed the point of view that the election must not cause a delay in the recovery of the Holy Land, though Andrew II might, if he pleased, leave *early* for the crusade - before the set departure date in early June, 1217. The papal letter further created the impression - in the mind of the addressee; and in the mind of this researcher - that the curia was willing to permit Andrew II to obtain the Byzantine throne with the help of his armed crusaders, or at least influence the outcome of the election.¹⁹

And yet, another group of barons in the Latin empire voted for Peter Courtenay, the brother-in-law of Henry the Brave, and vote they did, with the full consent of the pope. As the result of papal intervention, Peter and his queen were crowned emperor and empress in Rome on April 9, 1217.²⁰ Andrew II must have been greatly disappointed, as he must have taken the outcome of the election for granted. Had he been elected Byzantine emperor, he would have chosen the land route; hence the absence of ships in the harbor at Spaleto. The idea of land travel now fell by the wayside; the king chose the sea route.²¹

Did he, understandably, lose interest and initiative to go on with the crusade after de Courtenay had been elected Latin emperor of Byzantium and the papal curia solemnly approved of the election? Only in the summer of 1217 did the king summon his troops to gather at Spaleto - an area under his administrative jurisdiction - and not in the harbor of Rome. It must have been in such a manner that Andrew II wanted to emphasize that although he performed services for Rome, he carried them out according to his own ideas.²²

Andrew II had to rent, for three thousand marks, ten ships from Venice for the transport of his forces across the sea; he further had to surrender to Venice his claim to Zara on the seashore, and reduce the import-export tax for Venetian merchants engaged in

business in regions under his administration from 3.33% to 1.12%; further, he had to grant the Venetian merchants tax exemptions on gold and silver products, silk, and precious stones.²³

It was during the summer of 1217 that the Hungarian monarch began his journey to Spaleto to board ships with his men.²⁴ En-route to the seacoast, the canons of the Zagreb cathedral had asked him to confirm them in the privileges their chapter had previously obtained from King Ladislas I.²⁵

Spaleto was filled with "crusaders" (one would be tempted to call them adventurers, on the grounds that they had no religious motivation), and the king decided to live in his tent outside of the town walls. The bishops of Győr and of Eger, the abbot of Pannonhalma, and Ugrin, his chancellor, accompanied him, with some ten thousand troops (although this writer, for one, suspects that the number was closer to five thousand, particularly when one thinks of the space on the ships, the food and supplies for that number of men).²⁶ Leopold of Austria also went along with his brothers-in-law, Otto of Meran, and Bishop Eckbert of Bamberg, the dukes of Hohenberg and Ottingen. The bishops of Münster and Utrecht had also joined the crusade.²⁷

Duke Leopold had departed earlier and reached the Holy Land in sixteen days; Andrew II, as it was his custom, was in no hurry, nor did he have enough ships to have all of his troops ferried across the sea. Many of the men had to return home, and only a small number of them went with him to the Near East.²⁸

It seems curious that the curia was concerned about the crusaders who were stranded at Messina, Brundisi, and at other Italian seaports, because of the discipline problems caused by the men. The Holy See had warned their leaders not to fail to meet with the Hungarian king and the Austrian duke on the island of Cyprus, where they were expected to attend a council, together with King John of Jerusalem and delegates of the crusading Orders, in order to determine their invasion plan.²⁹ Hugh of Lusignan of Cyprus joined forces with Andrew II, and in mid-October, 1217, they arrived in Acre.³⁰

In 1217, only a narrow strip of land on the shore, stretching from Jaffa to Beirut, remained in Christian hands. Famine and hardships had prevailed, and the price of food was extremely high. An increasing number of Franks had already departed for home from

the region. Prior to the arrival of the Hungarian king, some sixty ships of pilgrims had left the area.³¹ The arriving Hungarians - the small number of men who had accompanied the king - must not have created a good impression on the native population. The Hungarians shaved their beards in the Frankish manner, wore French arms and helmets, carried triangular shields decorated with the royal Hungarian coat of arms - that is, nine white stripes on a red base with lions in between the stripes. The influence of his second wife - she was a French princess - of King Béla III, father of Andrew II, must have left a mark upon the attitude and behavior of the king's armed contingents.³²

On November 3, 1217, a war council was held at Accon in the royal tent of Andrew II. It was attended by King Hugh of Cyprus, the King of Jerusalem, and the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and they decided to plan ahead for the capture of Damietta in Egypt (!). The council accepted the military plan of the Palestinian princes for maneuvers: they were to divert the attention of the Sultan from their original and final goal - the conquest of Egypt - by calling for a sham invasion of Syrian territory, despite the fact that they did not have enough ships to sail to Egypt and lacked trained personnel to man the ships.

In such a manner of planning, what had originally been an ideal of a papal crusade, had been turned into a personal military adventure of the princes of Palestine - and of the Hungarian monarch - in their efforts to realize their own selfish (and undefined) interests. Worse still, Andrew II remained under the false impression that he would be offered command of the entire crusading operation. He had not realized that Syria was, as it had been, in the sphere of political-diplomatic interest and the military fighting ground of King John of Jerusalem.

King John took over the military high command of the entire operation, on the grounds that he was familiar with the terrain and warring tactics prevalent in the region; he was a more qualified leader for the campaign. Besides King Andrew II, Leopold of Austria, Bohemund IV of Antioch, Hugh of Cyprus, King John Birene of Jerusalem, the Patriarch Ralph Merancourt of Jerusalem, William of Chartres, Grandmaster of the Templars, Henry of Salza, Grandmaster of the Teutonic Knights, Otto of Meran, Archbishop

Berthold of Kalocsa, and Bishop Jacob de Vitry of Acre participated in the council.³³

On November 3, the patriarch of Jerusalem appeared in the Christian camp, bringing with him the relic of the Holy Cross that had been rescued from the Battle at Hattin (1187). Contemporary sources indicate that the operation could not have been regarded as a serious and purposeful military undertaking, as it lacked foresight and precise planning. Indeed, the new arrivals failed to establish a theater of military operations at their destination. In great heat during early November, the "crusading force" of some ten (others say twenty) thousand men marched toward Lake Tiberias, crossed the Jordan river, and captured, without a fight, the entire supply depot of their Arab opponents.³⁴ The seventy-four year old Coradinus (al-Adil), lord of Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia, had expected the "westerners" to invade from the direction of Jerusalem.³⁵ In spite of the advice he received from his son, al-Adil refused to mount a defensive counterattack against the Christian forces; it may be that their great number and seemingly strong performance made the sultan overcautious.³⁶

After a three day rest, the Christian forces marched, it seems, from the southeastern shore of Lake Genezareth toward the north, instead of moving toward Damascus, and devastated the uninhabited region along the Jordan. Because of a bad harvest in Syria, the invaders could not requisition supplies of food; they were also short of horses, and, without a sufficient number of horses and available food supplies, they could not march very fast nor very far. They would not even think of a major military operation in the area. On the bridge at "Jacob's Well," they crossed the river at Haluvett Lake, marched southward on the right hand side of the Jordan. At Kafarnaum, they circled Lake Tiberias, and returned to Acre.³⁷

What were the results of this marching operation? Perhaps some booty and many fallen enemy left behind unburied, but no tangible political or military accomplishments.³⁸ It must have been out of a sense of sheer frustration that they attacked the fortification on Mount Tabor, defended by some two thousand men.³⁹

Dénes (Dionysius), commanding officer of Andrew II's men, led the attack on a gray, foggy day, the first Sunday of Advent. Dénes carried the day, but did not exploit his victory. He hesitated too long before ordering the final assault on the fort and suffered a

bloody defeat at the hands of the defenders. Humiliated, he withdrew to Acre. It might have been an irony of fate that later, after this disastrous attempt at taking the fort, the Arab leader himself ordered the destruction of the fort on Mount Tabor, on the grounds that its existence had caused resentment among Christians in the area.⁴⁰

The attack on the fort on Mount Tabor must have exhausted Andrew II's expedition to the Near East. The entire affair was a full-scale military and diplomatic disaster. Or, did the king want it to happen, in order to fulfill the letter of the promise his father made to the curia about undertaking a crusade - without actually realizing that promise? The king's written report sent to Rome might imply such a conclusion.⁴¹

In January, 1218, Andrew II boarded a ship for his journey back home.⁴² The nobles in Acre had begged him in vain to remain; in vain, the Patriarch of Jerusalem had him excommunicated for not staying, but the king left the Holy Land where he did not wish to harvest any military glory.⁴³ From among his nobles, only Bishop Thomas of Eger remained in Syria, who would take part in the siege of Damietta, and only return home in the fall of 1219. It is recorded that during the siege of Damietta, two Hungarian bishops died.⁴⁴

During his journey home, Andrew II visited Tripoli, where Bohemund IV was his friend and relative; Bohemund had been served well by the Knights of the Hospital from their fort, the Krakdes-Cheveliers.⁴⁵ The monarch paid a call on the Grandmaster of the Knights, and after consultation with his nobles, decided to pay them an annual subsidy of five hundred silver marks - out of the royal income derived from the salt mines at Szalacs.⁴⁶ The king further promised to both the garrison at Krak⁴⁷ and that of Margitia to pay each one hundred marks.⁴⁸

According to the royal writ issued by Chancellor Ugrin - a copy of which was to be retained by the Knights at Tripoli; a transcript to be sent to the Knights in Hungary - the monarch granted them the region in Janász in Hungary, as far as Csurgó, exempted them from the jurisdiction of regional administrators, and placed the Knights under the supervision of the Judge of the King's Court.⁴⁹

Andrew II had further engaged his younger son, Andrew, to the daughter of the ruler of Galicia on his return voyage, thereby to make Prince Andrew an heir to the Armenian throne.⁵⁰ The Sultan of Iconium told the king that he expected to marry a member of the

Árpád dynasty, and in order to accomplish that, he was willing to convert to the Catholic faith.⁵¹ Theodore Lascaris of Nicea had his own daughter engaged to Béla, the first born and heir of Andrew II.⁵² One may note that previously Lascaris had married the daughter of Peter of Courtenay, the sister-in-law of the Hungarian king.⁵³

John II Asen (Kajolan), son of Asen I, occupied the throne of Bulgaria and asked, in Tirnovo, for the hand in marriage of Maria, a daughter of Andrew II.⁵⁴ It was there that Andrew II received news about the outbreak of revolution in Hungary. Archbishop John of Esztergom, the regent, could not quell the uncontrollable situation. It is an irony of fate that the archbishop did not belong to the king's inner circle; in fact, he was quite unpopular with the members of that circle. The archbishop was a law-abiding person, who had served the interests of his country well.⁵⁵ The rebels attacked him, devastated his home, and forced him into exile. Only upon his arrival could the monarch recall him and compensate him for the damages suffered with a donation of the Whyncy estate along the Maros river.⁵⁶

What particular event had triggered the revolution in the country during the king's sojourn in the Near East? Could it have been the fact that Andrew II had taken the crown of Queen Gisela - the Queen of King St. Stephen - with him? This diadem of the Hungarian queens had been preserved and guarded at Veszprém. Together with the crown jewels and other precious treasures that belonged to the abbey of Tihany,⁵⁷ had the crown caused, or contributed to, the outbreak of the uprising?

Andrew II must have had an emotional urge to impress his new acquaintances abroad with his personal wealth, because it is a matter of record that, for example, Pontius, Grandmaster of the Templars, had earlier helped the king out of his financial difficulties.⁵⁸ Andrew II had been so deeply in debt that he could not even afford to send a gift with his personal delegate that he dispatched to the papal curia.⁵⁹ Queen Constance, the widow of King Emery, and crowned Empress of Frederick II since November 20, 1220,⁶⁰ had to seek diplomatic help from Rome to recover payment of the thirty thousand marks that had been left to her by her deceased first husband.⁶¹

In his dispatch to Rome, Andrew II complained to the curia that upon his arrival at home from the Holy Land, some awful conditions existed in his country; his personal and political enemies had paralyzed the realm's economy for the next fifteen years, he reported to Rome.⁶² It was common knowledge among contemporaries, however, that it was the monarch who had surrounded himself with irresponsible and unbalanced individuals as personal advisors and office holders, and it was their unqualified advice that had "unreadied" the king in domestic and economic matters.⁶³

On the other hand, even though Andrew II had the nerve to boast to Rome about his accomplishments during the "crusade," he had achieved a good deal for the Church in Armenia and Nicea, in that he had his niece marry the Sultan of Iconium, thereby converting him and his people to the faith and cause of the Roman Church.⁶⁴ From this point of view, the "crusade" of Andrew II must have been a success. He had fulfilled his promise, and his father's vow, to go on a crusade, and returned home with some of the most valuable relics from the Holy Land - or so he claimed. His "relics" included the head of Saint Stephen, the First Martyr of Christianity, and one of the six water jars from the marriage feast at Caana.⁶⁵

Although the Patriarch of Jerusalem excommunicated him on account of his early departure from Acre, he explained to Rome that he had to leave the area early because of the increasingly difficult situation at home.⁶⁶ More importantly, several Hungarian prelates had taken the cross in 1219,⁶⁷ Bishop Robert of Veszprém and royal chancellor, by birth a Frenchman of Luttich, among them.⁶⁸

It was more than likely, however, that Archbishop John of Esztergom had opposed the king's crusading venture from its very beginning on the grounds that monarch had been too involved in Byzantine politics. Before Peter of Courtenay could gain possession of his throne, the Byzantines imprisoned him, and he died in prison.⁶⁹ Peter's son, Robert Courtenay, spent the winter of 1220-21 in Andrew II's court, and in the spring of 1221, Béla, Andrew II's son and heir, accompanied Robert to be crowned the new emperor of Byzantium.⁷⁰

Had these diplomatic developments continued, and had Emperor Robert died unexpectedly - of natural or unnatural causes - the king could have, the archbishop suspected and feared, become a candidate for the Byzantine throne. The king suspended the

archbishop from exercising his functions on the grounds that he had ordained an unlearned cleric of Burgundy as the bishop of Pécs; however, the real cause of the suspension had been that Archbishop John dared to question publicly the personal behavior of the monarch and the orders given by him.⁷¹

The Hungarian monarch evidently wasted too much attention on realizing a political-diplomatic game of chess for the Latin Crown of Byzantium; that could have been the reason why the people of his own country had rebelled against him.⁷² When Andrew II had named his son Béla governor of Croatia and Dalmatia, the whole country rose against him in support of the prince,⁷³ publicly demanding that the king publicly and officially recognize the rights of his subjects, including the rights of the clergy, most probably on the grounds of a reference to article 14 of Alberic's *Decretum* promulgated during King Coloman's reign, that stated that the monarch cannot order a bishop to elevate any unqualified candidate from among the royal servants to clerical status.⁷⁴

The people of the country demanded that the law forbid a Jew or Moslem to hold public office.⁷⁵ Jews and Moslems had taken charge of collecting taxes and public revenues, acted as overseers of the salt mines and sales, and occupied positions of public trust as stewards of the royal chamber.⁷⁶ They firmly adhered to their religious faith and cultural inheritance; still, they played an increasingly important role in fiscal policy-making at the royal court. Their growing political and economic influence in and over the realm stood in sharp contrast with the laws of the land.⁷⁷

In its response to Andrew II's report to Rome, the curia had to warn the Hungarian court of King Andrew II and Queen Jolánta that they must not permit "pagans" to enjoy any predominant role in Christian business concerning the country's Catholic population.⁷⁸ Still, one may conclude from the royal response that it was the monarch's country-wide opponents who must have been afraid that the king who, by taking up the cause of the non-Christian ("pagan") element in society, could assure himself of the adherence of a loyal administrative social stratum, whose social and administrative function would easily undermine the established but aging class of officials holding public office.⁷⁹

The "Saracen" Islamic subjects of Queen Jolánta, who had been schooled at Aleppo, but were living in the country, spoke Hungarian

like natives, and fought, if and when called upon, in wars for Hungarian goals and interests. The public roles they played, and the educational background they possessed, made them a thorn of jealousy in the sides of many officials, who claimed to be the king's most loyal subjects.⁸⁰

Could it be further concluded from the aforementioned papal letter - and so stated for the record - that it was what might be referred to as reliance upon the loyalty of the non-Christian ("pagan") officials of the realm that encouraged Andrew II to go on his sham-crusade so as to prove to his opponents, and to the papal curia, that the Hungarian king could always count on the support of a certain social element of his country's population?⁸¹

Andrew II had seriously misjudged his people's aversion to "foreign" ventures - the king's "crusade" - and to "foreigners" living in their midst, serving as royal officials in their society.

NOTES

1. On the IV Lateran Council, see *MGHSS*, XVI, 674,1-15; XVI, 356,14-25; XIX, 151,20-22; XIX, 300,33-40; Mansi, *Concilia*, XXII, 1081; Ordericus Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 15 vols. (Lucca, 1738-56), anno 1215, par. ii:4-7; Innocent III's opening remarks, in Friedberg, *Corpus*, II, 5ff., with the seventy canons printed selectively, arranged by subject in various collections of Canon Law, *ibid.*, II, xii. The question is, of course, whether one has access to the full text of the resolutions? - cf. H. Jedin (ed.), *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, 10 vols. (Freiburg i. Br., 1962, etc.), III-2, 206; Haller, III, 465ff.

2. Directives on the crusades were summarized by Potthast, nn. 5012, 5048, and 5050a; Mansi, *Concilia*, XXII, 1057ff.; circumstances surrounding the death of the pope were recorded by Honorius III on July 25, 1216 - cf. Potthast, n. 5317; P. Presutti (ed.), *Regesta Honorii papae III* (Rome, 1888), nn. 2-7; Raynaldus, *Annales*, anno 1216, n. 9.

3. See the papal writ of January 30, 1217, Potthast, n. 5440; *VMH*, n. 5; domestic troubles prevented the king from earlier departure - Thuróczy, *Chronica*, c. 100 (in Galántai and Kristó, 136f; in Schwandtner, I, 149, ii:73). Were the king to die, his son would succeed him, although Archbishop John of Esztergom would exercise royal powers at first, and the seashore would be controlled, in the king's name, by the General of the Order of Templars - Potthast, n. 5456; *VMH*, n. 6; A.L. Tautu (ed.), *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX* (1216-27; 1227-41) (Rome, 1950); *CD*, III, 189.

4. In 1213, the curia granted a three year delay to Andrew II, Potthast, n. 4669; *MPL*, 216, 757 has a different date. The Holy See formed no legal claim for intervention, Potthast, nn. 347, 924, and 4725; *MPL*, 214, 308bc-309ab, 214, 180ab, 216, 817ff. Innocent III set 1217 as the date for the crusade, Potthast, n. 4669; *MPL*, 216, 757ac. R. Röhricht, "Der Kreuzzug Königs Andreas II von Ungarn." *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, 16 (1876), 139ff., esp. 142; on the papal attitude toward the crusade(s), see A. Keutner, *Papsttum und Krieg unter dem Pontifikat des Papstes Honorius III (1216-1227)* (Munster, 1935), 13ff.

MPL, vols. 214-217 is still the main source collection of Innocent III's Register, with the exception of O. Hageneder and A. Haidacher (eds.), *Die Register Innocenz' III, 1 Pontifikatsjahr (1198-1199)*, Publikationen des Österreichischen Kulturinstituts in Rom, Abt. II, Reihe I, vol. I (Graz-Cologne-Vienna, 1964); and O. Hageneder, W. Maleczek, and A. Strnad (eds.), *Die Register Innocenz' III, 2 Pontifikatsjahr (1199-1200)*, Abt. II, Reihe I, vol. II (Rome-Vienna, 1979); vols. xvii-xix of the Register were lost - *MPL*, 216, 991b, and the abbreviated summary is less reliable - cf. H. Röscher, *Papst Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge* (Göttingen, 1969), 140; and yet, Potthast, nn. 5127-5314, based his data on the summary assuming that the list of addresses might render the needed information - see A. Haidacher, "Beiträge zur Kenntnis der verlorenen Registerbände Innocenz' III," *Römische Mitteilungen*, 4 (1960-61), 37ff. The Register was prepared from original documents, or from concepts contained in the documents - on this, see F. Kempf, *Die Register Innocenz' III: eine paläographische-diplomatische Untersuchung* (Rome, 1945), 65ff.; on the meaning and importance of the Register, *ibid.*, 102ff.; on the officials who put it together, *ibid.*, 119ff.

5. He had been the emperor's tutor, later papal chamberlain for years - cf. Gebhardt, I, 355; Hampe, *Hochmittelalter*, 317; idem, "Kaiser Friedrich II," *HZ*, 83 (1899), 1ff., esp. 15f., and 39f.

6. On February 11, 1217, in Potthast, n. 5456; *VMH*, n. 6; neither had the curia shown much understanding for John of England, who had delayed taking the cross; Potthast, n. 4960; *MPL*, 217, 245; C.R. Cheney and W.H. Simple (eds.), *Selected Letters of Innocent III Concerning England* (London, 1953), 194ff., nn. 72.

74. King John had to face a domestic opposition - see Cheney and Simple, n. 80. The pope had argued that he was acting as John's feudal overlord - King John had been a papal vassal since 1213, Potthast, nn. 4842 and 4843, dated November 4, 1213; *MPL*, 216, 922f. and 924b; but as the visible head of the Church, see writs of August 24, 1215, Potthast, nn. 4990 and 4991; Cheney and Simple, nn. 82, 83, he had taken action - McIlwain, 231; as Röscher, 161, remarked, "der Ordinatio charakterisiert das Charakter der geistigen Körperschaft." Sidney Painter, *The Reign of King John* (Baltimore, 1949), 285ff.; H. Conrad, "Gottesdienst und Heereverfassung in der Zeit der Kreuzzüge," *Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, kan. Abt., 61 (1941), 71ff.

7. The papal appeal, dated April 26, 1213, Potthast, n. 4719; *MPL*, 216, 832ff.; Raynaldus, *Annales*, anno 1213, n. 3. The papal delegation sent to the Sultan was mentioned by R. Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem* (Innsbruck, 1898), 718, note 6. Al-Adil, The Beast of the Book of Revelations - Potthast, n. 4706; *MPL*, 216, 818b. On the military readiness of the sultan, see Raynaldus, *Annales*, anno 1214, n. 7. The crusade had its share of preachers from abroad, with the problem remaining, in what language did they sermonize? Did they use interpreters? How effective were the sermons delivered through interpreters in Hungary? On the role of non-native preachers, see R. Röhricht, "Zur inneren Geschichte des Kreuzzuges," in his *Studien*, 5ff.. On preaching in the thirteenth century, see W. P. Ker, *Medieval English Literature* (Oxford, 1948, a reprint of the 1912 edition), 154ff., and G. R. Owst, *Preaching in Medieval England* (Cambridge, 1926), 96ff., and 222ff.

8. The papal writ of December 5, 1216, addressed to the French-German clergy and the faithful, supported the crusade - Potthast, n. 5381; Presutti, n. 151; C.A. Horoy (ed.), *Honorii III Romani Pontificis opera omnia*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1879-82), I, n. 184; Röscher, *Innocenz III*, 140ff. On the small number, but deep faith of the crusaders, see Potthast, n. 5622; Presutti, n. 885. T.C. VanCleve, "The Fifth Crusade," in R.L. Wolf and H.W. Hazard (eds.), *The Later Crusades, 1189-1311*, vol. II of *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K.S. Setton, 4 vols., 2nd ed. (Madison, 1969, etc.), 377ff., who briefly referred to the participation of Andrew II in the crusade.

9. On taxing the clergy for the crusade, see Presutti, nn. 101 and 102; Horoy, I, nn. 57, 58, and 65; see further the papal warning to John of Esztergom and the archbishop of Spaleto, Potthast, nn. 5362 and 5365; *CD*, III-1, 183. The curia also made comments on the king of Norway, Presutti, n. 399; domestic troubles had delayed Andrew II from departing earlier, Thuróczy, *Chronica*, c. 100 (Schwandtner, I, 149, ii:73).

10. Potthast, n. 5456; *VMH*, n. 6.

11. *RA*, n. 313; *VMH*, n. 7.

12. Pauler, II, 58.

13. *RA*, n. 321; *VMH*, n. 22; *ÁUO*, VI, 383 (and 550f.); also, *MGHSS*, XXVI, 765; the family background of Jolanta is discussed by Röhricht, *Studien*, 23; Hóman-Szekfü, I, 437f.

14. Innocent III's encouraging letter, dated January 29, 1198, Hageneder, *Register I*, n. 10. In 1213, the curia granted a three year delay, Potthast, n. 4669; *MPL*, 216, 757, with a different date; Röhricht, in *Forschungen*, 139ff. Röscher, 262, noted that before Innocent III, there had been no papal intervention in the crusades; Innocent III saw it differently, *ibid.*, 265 and 268ff.; still, judged by the correspondence, one may conclude that the pontiff had formed no legal claim for intervention, Potthast, nn. 347, 924, and 4725!

15. In contrast to the papal point of view, "firmum habuisti propositum ... peregrinationis arripere;" *VMH*, n. 5; Presutti, I, n. 218.

16. *VMH*, n. 8.

17. Potthast, n. 5970; *VMH*, n. 29; Czínár, *Monasterologii*, I, 69ff.; *CD*, III-1, 277.

18. Potthast, n. 5440; *VMH*, n. 5; Röhricht, *Studien*, 23.

19. King Andrew II's departure is dealt with in the papal writ of January 30, 1217, Potthast, n. 5440; on conditions at Spaleto, see Thomas of Spaleto, c. 26, or R. Röhricht (ed.), *Testimonia minora de quinto bello sacro chronicis orientalibus exercitiis* (Genoa, 1882), 229; Röhricht, *Forschungen*, 142, commented on the chronicler's report of ten thousand horse and an immense multitude of troops.

20. *MGHSS*, XIX, 301; "Chronicon fossae novae," Muratori, *RISS*, VII, 895; see also, "Catalogus pontificum et imperatorum Romanorum Casiensis," *MGHSS*, XXII, 362.

21. Cf. the papal writ of April 24 (25), 1217, Potthast, n. 5586; *VMH*, n. 12. It is very likely that had Andrew II been elected emperor, he would have taken the land route, as indicated by the absence of ships at Spaleto. The king must have taken the outcome of election for granted.

22. For remarks on the number of ships that were at the disposal of the monarch, cf. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 578,33-35.

23. *ÁUO*, VI, 380ff.; Dandolo, in Muratori, *RISS*, XII, 339.

24. Röhricht, *Testimonia*, 229.

25. *RA*, n. 323; *RHM*, 409ff.; *VMH*, I, 83f., third paragraph; also, *RA*, n. 325; *VMH*, I, 73ff.

26. Röhricht, *Forschungen*, 142; Thomas of Spaleto, c. 26; also in *MGHSS*, XXIX, 577,44; Katona, V, 262f.

27. Potthast, n. 5585; *VMH*, n. 12; Raynaldus, *Annales*, anno 1217, n. 26. On the earlier departure of Leopold, see "Annales Clausterneoburgenses," *MGHSS*, IX, 622,35-39; *Chronica regia*, 238f.; Ebendorfer, 198f., and 108,11-22; Jacob de Vitry's *Epistolae*, n. 3 (dated September, 1218), in R. Röhricht's edition, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 15 (1895), 568; *Annales Marbacenses*, anno 1217, 87,12-21.

28. de Vitry, letter 3; papal writ of November 24, 1217, Potthast, n. 5622; *CD*, III-1, 230f.; J.R. Sweeney, "Hungary in the Crusades, 1169-1218," *International History Review*, 3 (1981), 467ff.

29. The letter of Honorius III to the Master and the members of the Order of St. John of the Hospital, Potthast, n. 5585; *VMH*, n. 13; papal writ addressed to the archbishop of Genoa and other Italian bishops, Potthast, n. 5586. The papal letter mentioning "P. Albanensem episcopum, Apostolicae Sede legatum," spoke of "Pelagio Albanensi episcopo," alias Pelagius, the papal legate - cf. Potthast, n. 5583; J.P. Donovan, *Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade* (Philadelphia, 1950), 29ff.

30. de Vitry, letter 3. Hans Eberhard Mayer, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart, 1973), 195, spoke of "österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen."

31. "Annales Ceccanses," *MGHSS*, XIX, 302,15-22.

32. Thuróczy, *Chronica*, c. 100, actually said that Andrew II had become the commander in chief of the crusading force; in Schwandtner, I, 148, ii:72.

33. On the war council, see *Chronica regia*, 242f.; "Oliveri Relatio de expeditione Damiatina," *ibid.*, 325; and "De expeditionibus in Terra Sancta factis," *ibid.*, 343f.; also recorded by L'estoire d'Eracles, cf. *Historiens croisades*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1841-95), II, 321ff., a part of *Recueil des historiens croisades*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1841-1906), cited hereafter as RHC Hist. orientaux; compare with Raynaldus, *Annales*, anno 1217, n. 31., and de Vitry, letter 3.

34. de Vitry, letter 3; Röhricht, *Geschichte*, 725f., follows the letter in his interpretation; *idem*, art. cit., "Kreuzzug Andreas." See "Oliveri Relatio," c. 1, in *Chronica regia*, 325.

35. Coradinus, cf. *Chronica regia*, 242f. Oliver of Cologne (Paderborn), *Historia Damiatina*, ed. Hermann Hoogweg, vol. 202 of *Bibliothek des Literarischen Vereins in Stuttgart* (Tübingen, 1894), 163ff.; Mayer, 197.

36. A bad harvest and scarcity of horses had slowed down the operation - de Vitry, letter 3; *Bullarium Romanum*, 24 vols. (Turin, 1857-72), III, 333.

37. "Oliveri Relatio," c. 1, in *Chronica regia*, 325; also, *ibid.*, 243.

38. See the letter of the Grandmaster of the Templars to Rome, *ÁUO*, I, 144ff.; *CD*, III-1, 230ff. R. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades du royaume Franc de Jerusalem*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1936), III, 202, made Andrew II responsible for anything bad that had happened; Thomas of Spaletto, c. 26, acknowledged the king's faults, but absolved him by saying that he might have been poisoned, and therefore could not think clearly; also, *MGHSS*, XXIX, 578,46-48.

39. The fort with seventy-seven towers, constructed by Coradinus himself - *Chronica regia*, 243; "Oliveri Relatio," c. 2, *ibid.*, 325f.; *RHC Hist. orientaux*, II-1, 113f.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*, II-1, 321ff.; *Chronica regia*, 244; also, 343, 344. Andrew II would not take part in further expeditions - de Vitry's letter 3; Oliver, c. 3, in *Chronica regia*, 326; Röhricht, *Forschungen*, 148; J.M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213-1221* (Philadelphia, 1986), 132ff.

42. See his letter to Rome, *RA*, n. 355; *VMH*, n. 32; *CD*, III-1, 250ff.; on the excommunication by the patriarch, see Dandolo, "Chronicon," x:4,29-35, in Muratori, *RISS*, XII, 339f.

43. *Chronica regia*, 243; Oliver, c. 4, *ibid.*, 326; Röhricht, *Quinti scriptores*, II, 133.

44. Cf. "Chronicon Rheinhardbrunnensis," *MGHSS*, XXX-1, 592,44-47.

45. *Chronica regia*, 243; Röhricht, *Forschungen*, 148.

46. *RA*, n. 329; *VMH*, n. 23; *CD*, III-1, 233ff.

47. *RA*, n. 331; *VMH*, n. 26; Röhricht., *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani*, n. 241; *CD*, III-1, 233ff.

48. *RA*, n. 330; *VMH*, n. 24; Katona, V, 287f.; the king's letter to Rome is recorded by Potthast, n. 6845.

49. *RA*, n. 328; *VMH*, n. 25; *CD*, III-1, 239ff.

50. Andrew II's writ to Rome, *RA*, n. 355, and the papal response, dated March 5, 1219, Potthast, n. 6001; *VMH*, n. 33.

51. *VMH*, I, 21, last paragraph.

52. "... filiam Comnini Theodori Lazcari filio nostro duximus in uxorem;" *VMH*, I, 21,3-4.

53. See A. Gardner, *The Lascarids of Nicea: The Story of an Empire in Exile* (London, 1922), 53f.; Ostrogorsky, 343.

54. "... cum Azeno Bulgariae ... nostra filia patrimonium celebravimus;" *VMH*, I, 21-45.

55. *RA*, n. 354; *ÁUO*, VI, 399ff.

56. Grand Reeve Nevke had arranged a truce between the archbishop and the canons of the Esztergom chapter - *ibid.*; Knauz, I, 221f.; *MGHSS*, IX, 622.

57. *RA*, nn. 340 and 383; *HO*, V, 8 and 9; further, Gregorius Pray, *Dissertatio de sancto Ladislao rege Hungariae* (Posonii, 1774), 109.

58. *RA*, n. 353; *VMH*, n. 143 (anno 1226!); on the background, cf. Hóman-Szekfű, I, 439ff., and Székely, 1309ff.

59. "Porro vestra non miretur Sanctitas, si de bonis regni nostri ad praesans iuxta honorem vestrum et nostrum vobis cathecizare non possumus;" *VMH*, I, 21, concluding paragraph.

60. See "Annales Cavenses," iii:193, in Muratori. *RISS*, VII, 926; "Annales Sense," anno 1220, *MGHSS*, XIX, 227; Richardi de s. Germano "Chronicon," in Muratori. *RISS*, VII, 992; *Annales Marbacenses*, 84,17-18 and 89,8-12.

61. Cf. Svrita (Zurita), *Indices*, 103; Gebhardt, I, 340 and 352; the Salzburg archbishop conducted the inquiry - letter of Pope Honorius III to Eberhard of Salzburg, November 23, 1220, Potthast, n. 6409.

62. *RA*, n. 355.

63. Of whom he did not speak too highly, "quam plurimi potentum et nobilium regni, satellites Sathanas, regiam non verentes offendere maiestatem;" *ÁUO*, VI, 400; also, the tone and content of papal writs, cf. Potthast, nn. 6328 and 6329; *VMH*, nn. 40 and 42.

64. *VMH*, I, 21f.; Thuróczy, *Chronica*, c. 100, to prove that he had no clear idea about the king's Near Eastern adventure.

65. Thuróczy, *Chronica*, c. 100.

66. *Ibid.*; *Chronica regia*, 243.

67. *MGHSS*, XXX-1, 592,44-47. It should be noted that between 1217 and 1219, various individuals signed writs as bishops of Győr and Várad - see *RA*, nn. 338 to 354.

68. Thomas of Spaleto, c. 27.

69. *CD*, III-1, 187; Gardner, 94; W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece, 1204-1566* (London, 1908), 82f.

70. Robert Courtenay became emperor in 1219; he died in 1228, cf. Ostrogorsky, 345.

71. Cf. Knauz, I, 217, 218, and 221; *MGHSS*, IX, 622.

72. *VMH*, n. 85.

73. See the papal writ of March 13, 1224, Potthast, n. 7190; also, n. 7192; *VMH*, nn. 98 and 101.

74. *RA*, n. 404; Potthast, n. 7189; *VMH*, n. 97; Alberic's Decrees, in *RHM*, 362; Kosztolnyik, *From Coloman*, 46ff.; Katona, V, 431f.

75. See Alberic's Decrees, aa. 74 and 75, *RHM*, 368f.; also, Coloman's *Lex Iudaeis data*, *ibid.*, 371f.; Kosztolnyik, *From Coloman*, 54, n. 43; 55, n. 67; see further Coloman's First Synod of Esztergom, art. 60, *RHM*, 356f., or Marczali, *Enchiridion*, 113; Kosztolnyik, 58ff., and Decrees I and II of Andrew II, aa. 24 and 31. Marczali, *Enchiridion*, 141a and b; *RHM*, 415 and 432.

76. There will be more detailed data available by the time of Béla IV - *CD*. IV-1, 174 and 272f.; Knauz, I, 550.

77. See Sámuel Kohn, in *Történelmi tár*, 106 and 108.

78. See papal writ of December 15, 1222, in Potthast, n. 6900; *VMH*, n. 73.

79. Potthast, n. 6639; *VMH*, n. 58.

80. For details, see Röhrich, *Beiträge*, II, 260f., and 260, note 35.

81. The provisions of the Decree (Golden Bull) of 1222, aa. 11 and 24 concerning Jews and foreigners had to be repeated, and slightly rephrased, in the Decree of 1231, aa. 23 and 31; cf. Marczali, *Enchiridion*, 138ab and 141ab; Katona, V, 355.