Tristan Schmidt

Armeeführung und Militäreliten in Byzanz, 1081-1203: Selektion, Hierarchie, Repräsentation

(Brepols, 2025), 561 pp. €110.00

Given the relatively specialized nature of Byzantine studies, it is understandable that the organization and practice of war in the Eastern Roman empire remain something of a closed book to most researchers in medieval military history, whose interests and knowledge tend to gravitate towards Western Europe. At the same time, military topics seem to be a much less popular subject of study amongst Byzantinists than is the case with their counterparts who specialize in the Western Middle Ages. This book is thus a welcome addition to the literature on the military organization of Byzantium in what the author terms “the long twelfth century”, that is, the period between the seizure of the throne by the (then general) Alexios I Komnenos in 1083 and the deposition of the Angelos dynasty by the armies of the Fourth Crusade in 1203, although it also includes considerable discussion of generalship in the half-century before the nominal commencement date.

The subject of the study is the “military elite”, defined as those men who acted as army generals, military governors, and garrison or divisional commanders, as it is these, rather than those in lower positions, who are sufficiently well represented in the sources to be investigated with profit. This group is examined from three perspectives: (1) the diverse factors which brought individuals to their commands and offices, (2) the rise or fall of such individuals within the military hierarchy, and (3) the representation of commanders in the contemporary sources. Each of these approaches is examined in three sections respectively covering the reigns of Alexios I (1081-1118), of John II and Manuel I (1118-80), and of the later Komnenoi and the Angeloi (1180-1203), allowing for a diachronic evaluation of the elite over more than a century. Conclusions are brought together in a lengthy final section which also gives an overview of practices such as recruitment, training, finance and payment, as well as the characteristics of the main sources evaluated.

The book assumes a considerable degree of familiarity with the history, institutions and society of the Byzantine empire on the part of the reader, as well as with the Greek terminology applied to them. One might think that the author could have provided a glossary, or an initial exposition, of the many military offices and titles employed, such as protobestiarios, stratopedarches, stratelates, strategos autokrator and so on, but the detailed discussion reveals numerous problems of interpretation which make simple definitions difficult. Although some key positions, such as megas domestikos (commander-in-chief) or doux (provincial governor) had well defined responsibilities, it becomes clear in reading that there was no hard-and-fast system of ranks among the higher commanders, who were mostly selected to take charge of particular operations, irrespective of their apparent position in the army hierarchy. While titles were clearly important among the elite, it is often difficult to distinguish the primarily military designations from the many and complex court honorifics, such as sebastos, which seems to have been awarded to most of the higher commanders. It is only at pp. 377-86 that we are given a summative discussion of titles.

Alexios I had held high military office before the coup that brought him to power, and he, his son and grandson all took a personal role in campaigning (unlike many of their predecessors), a circumstance that came to diminish the significance and competence of the very highest offices, so that Manuel I left the position of megas domestikos vacant for some twenty years. An exception was the office of megas doux (commander of the navy), which presented less of a threat to the emperor and presumably also required more specialist knowledge and experience. The personal participation of emperors (and often, their sons) in military operations enabled them to keep a tight grip on the army, and also to allow encomiasts to enhance their reputation by presenting even inconclusive outcomes as glorious victories. Yet the emperor could not personally see to all the military requirements of an empire which in the twelfth century was gradually expanding after a period of decline, but still faced a multiplicity of foes. Commanders were continually needed to lead operations in Asia Minor, Cilicia, and the Balkans, and even to Italy and Egypt. The greatest number were recruited from aristocratic Greek (and to a lesser extent, Georgian and Armenian) land-owning families, many of which could boast generations of service in the army. Under Alexios I a key role was played by a group of families based around Adrianople, but he also employed many commanders from Asia Minor who had lost their lands in the Turkish invasions, and presumably were incentivized to restore their fortunes through imperial service. Many of these men received their training while young by accompanying older family members on campaign, meaning that the same prominent families provided a pool of potential officers over several generations.

Alexios, John and Manuel all seem to have followed the policy of securing the loyalty of their commanders by granting them marriage into the imperial family; it is striking that this requirement meant that the emperors had to go to second cousins and beyond in order to find sufficient marriageable partners for promising officers. This strategy would seem to have produced an upper military class which was well integrated into the Komnenoi and Doukai families, but as Schmidt emphasizes, this was often just as much a recognition of a successful career as it was a precondition for receiving a command. A small but significant element was made up of commanders of foreign origin. Historians of the crusades will have come across Tatikios, who led a contingent who assisted the crusaders during their march across Asia Minor. He was actually a Turk, and in a multifaceted career he acted especially as a key conduit between the high command and its Turkish cavalry units. A more striking example is John Axouch, also of Turkish origin, who seems to have been brought to Constantinople as a captive or hostage in his youth. His education in the company of the young John II (and presumably, conversion to Christianity) opened up opportunities that took him as far as the position of megas domestikos. His son Alexios Axouch might have had an equally stellar career, but was eventually dismissed because he was seen as a potential threat to Emperor Manuel. By contrast, Westerners seem to have had fewer prospects (with some notable exceptions like Baldwin of Antioch and Peter of Aulps), while Varangians, despite often being responsible for the emperor’s security, evidently did not exercise command functions outside their own units.

Schmidt argues that, at least under the Komnenoi, generals were rarely punished for military failure, and often could continue their careers after defeats. Political intervention (or the threat of it), however, was another matter, especially in the last of the three periods studied. The tested model of the emperor as active field commander broke down after the death of Manuel I (1180), when his cousin Andronikos I usurped the throne from the under-age Alexios II, but was soon deposed by the nobleman Isaac II Angelos. Security concerns meant that these two ruling emperors were increasingly reluctant to leave Constantinople, while ambitious generals were growing restive at a time when the empire was repeatedly invaded by Hungarians, Cumans and Normans. It is likely that the lack of military initiative on the part of Isaac II (apart from a single victory over the Normans in 1185) led to his own deposition by his brother Alexios III Angelos. The latter evidently attempted to be more active (despite being handicapped by gout), but by this time the empire was far more weakened by invasions and dissention among the elite than it had been under the Komnenoi.

Most of the book offers an analytical discussion (which is very dense at times) rather than accounts of individual careers, and information on individuals and families is largely dispersed across the entire book; one is grateful to find some sections which give more sustained information, as in the cases of John Axouch and Theodore Maurozomes. No less than 85 pages are devoted to a valuable prosopographical resource in the form of three appendices which set out all documented campaigns over the period studied, listing the commanders involved, together with source references. It is a pity that there is no separate listing by the names of commanders and their activities, which would have allowed a clearer understanding of individual career paths and factors such as links with the imperial family.

Ultimately, this weighty volume should be regarded primarily as a work of social and political, rather than military history, but it nevertheless gives a sense of how the emperors administered their armed forces, as well as illuminating the nature of the men responsible for carrying out their policies and missions. It will undoubtedly appeal to Byzantinists: anyone wishing to understand the selection and progression of commanders in the East Roman army will find much to interest and inform them, although more generalist historians hoping to understand the military structure and practice of the empire may find it more of a challenge.

Alan V. Murray
University of Leeds
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