Ilkka Syvänne
Military History of Late Rome 425-457
(Pen & Sword, 2020), 180 pp. $39.95
This book is the fourth volume in Ilkka Syvänne’s series on the military history of Late Rome, which is planned to comprise seven volumes. The current volume deals with the years 425 to 457 AD, which are most famous for the Roman struggle against Attila the Hun. Therefore, this subject has had numerous publications in the last few decades.
Before we address the content of the book, we should address its length as the length of the book is a decisive factor for some when purchasing a book, especially when the book is addressed to the general public. I have noticed that in too many cases, there is lately a large difference between the number of pages of the book stated in sites on the internet, and what the book actually contains. In this book, the discrepancy is the largest yet; where on sites on the internet it is stated that there are 282 pages while the book itself is a very short one, containing just 180 pages.
The book in its format includes many illustrations, photos and maps, which is very characteristic of Ilka Syvänne’s works. Unfortunately, its other aspects are not very typical of his repertoire. Moreover, the book does not stand by itself, and it completely relies on the fact that the reader has either read the previous volumes or has them in his possession, to know the context of the period. This is because this book has a very limited introduction, which contains too many referrals to the previous volumes. Additionally, it seems as if Syvänne has reached a point where he does not use footnotes to show his references, but more as an advertisement to his other books. Yet, even when he refers to his books, there are too many occasions where the footnotes contain a general remark without stating the pages in question (for example pp.3, 6, 9, 17, 31, 82, 107, 145). Furthermore, in this book Syvänne has a tendency to refer to the reviewed book in question, without indicating a page number, and simply just stating: see above, before, below, later (for example pp.36, 37, 41, 44, 47, 49, 51, 52, 56, 69, 75, 81, 122, 132). Another issue is that he uses his books, especially this one, to state that the numbers written in ancient texts should be taken at face value, and all those who claim otherwise are wrong. I will now address this issue extensively, as the different estimations and figures in antiquity, and the debates around them, make up more than 10% of this book.
As there are so many examples in this book, I will limit myself to the most astonishing ones. The first one is with regards to Gaiseric’s Vandal army:
“In addition to this, we need to include the horses for 80,000 warriors (after years of pillaging there could easily have been three horses per warrior!), and the horses and beasts of burden for the baggage train.” (p.23)
First of all, to assume that the Vandals had 80,000 warriors is a bit of a stretch. This is because even more than 100 years later, when Belisarius invaded the Vandal kingdom in North Africa in 533 AD, the entire Vandal army consisted of at most 40,000 men. This number was almost after 70 years of relative peace, where the Vandal army did not participate in any major battle which would have depleted their manpower. Furthermore, to assume that the Vandals had more than a quarter of a million horses is pure fiction. There are no signs whatsoever that the entire Vandal army was purely equestrian at any point in time. Additionally, there is no reason to believe that every horse in Spain was commandeered by them. However, the greatest issue with the number of horses is logistical. There is no possible way that any army could have fed and watered such a large number of horses, if it moved as one cohort. The first time we come across such a large equestrian force is in the First World War, where the horses were spread across vast areas and huge forces. The problem in this case, and all the others in the book, are based on the misunderstanding of Napoleon’s army which invaded Russia. Syvänne believed that Napoleon invaded Russia with one force of 614,000 men and marched them as one group (p.3). If Napoleon could have managed to logistically supply such a large force on the move, which constantly fed from the land, then the ancient armies of antiquity could have also managed such large armies. This understanding of Napoleon’s force in the east is fundamentally wrong, as the force was supposed to garrison and conquer all of Eastern Europe. Napoleon marched into Russian territory with less than 300,000 men, due to troops being left at certain points all the way through Eastern Europe in garrison towns and cities. Napoleon arrived at Borodino with well under 200,000 men, even according to the most extreme assumptions. It is most probable that his army was only 120,000 strong, and after the heavy casualties of this battle, he probably arrived at Moscow with only half that strength. In addition, no more than 10% to 20 % of the general force was equestrian in the Napoleonic period. If we read this example correctly, and the Napoleonic period as a whole, it seems that a force of 120,000 men, with no more than 30,000 to 40,000 horses, was the largest force that could be feasibly managed as one field army at that time.
The most exaggerated numbers Syvänne accepts are those which appear in Jordane’s description of the battle in the Catalaunian Plains:
“Aetius’ battle array was a variation of the so-called mixed formation in which the centre consisted of the Alan cavalry while the wings were secured by infantry. The massive size of the allied army (at least ca. 219,000 infantry and 169,000 cavalry = ca. 388,000) enabled Aetius to post the Visigothic right flank on higher terrain so that the Alan cavalry forces occupied the entire space between the securely anchored wings…The Hun battle plan for their now ca. 400,000 warriors was a simple desperate attempt to defeat the pursuers first by trying to push the Romans away from the hills and after this had failed to defeat the Alans and Visigoths.”(p. 111-112)
These numbers are astonishingly high, and unless Ilka Syvänne accepts the ancient sources that say that there were a million Persians at the Battle of Gaugamela (which modern estimates put at 120,000 men), this would have been the largest battle before World War One. This would also mean that this battle would have well surpassed the former candidate of the largest battle before World War One, which was the battle of Leipzig in 1813, comprising 500,000 to 600,000 men. Ancient armies usually had 80,000 men at most, which is the largest feasible force you could manoeuvre as one unit in the ancient world. Just to show how exaggerated Syvänne’s estimation of the battle of the Catalaunian Fields is, his estimation would put 400,000 horses or more on this battlefield. No army, or place, in the world could sufficiently feed and water that many horses. Even at the battle of Leipzig, there were no more than 120,000 horses, including all the supply and artillery trains. Moreover, the fact that we are even comparing Leipzig to the Catalaunian fields is absurd, as Leipzig was two to three times larger than any previous battle, with the concentration of almost the entire industrial and national might of nearly all the nations of Europe. You cannot compare this battle to the crumbling, collapsing Western Roman Empire and the tribes participating in the battle of the Catalaunian Fields. It is difficult to understand why Syvänne believes that the Western Roman army had 400,000 men and that all the western units mentioned in the notitia dignitatum must have still existed and been at full strength (pp. 100-101). Furthermore, Syvänne views these assumptions as conservative estimates, which is absurd. I state this because the Western Roman Empire lost many territories at the time, including Britain, North Africa and most of Spain, their coffers were empty, and they were constantly on the defence for more than half a century. Their army at the time would have been no more than a mere reflection of its past strength. It is also improbable that the Western Roman Empire would have sent every single man at its disposal to one place, and leaving the rest of its borders defenceless.
Ilka Syvänne’s description of the battle at the Catalaunian fields consists of a few pages of mathematical calculations to illustrate the length of the line of battle. According to him, it would have been over 40 kilometres. This is a perfect example of misunderstanding how combat in antiquity worked, especially Roman military tactics. The Romans would never have formed a single line made of a few ranks. They would have always had reserve units and a few formations assembled one after the other. Furthermore, they did not act as a Macedonian phalanx, with one wall of shields and spears that, if penetrated, all was lost. Syvänne’s suggestion is especially implausible as he states that the Roman units had gaps between units in that single line. This would have made their formation and position impractical. In addition, a line of battle 40 kilometres long would mean that communication would be impossible, and assistance would be unavailable as it would take hours, even days, to move troops from one flank to the other.
To conclude, this book is, unfortunately, a missed opportunity from an author who usually provides volumes at a much higher standard. I hope that his books in the future will be similar to his previous works, and not to the current one. However, even then, a more critical eye regarding the numbers in antiquity would transform his books from good to great, as not all estimations of army sizes mentioned in ancient sources are accurate.
Haggai Olshanetsky
Bar Ilan University
