Arthur C. Wright
English Collusion and the Norman Conquest
(Pen & Sword, 2020), 224 pp. $44.95
Arthur Wright’s book, English Collusion and the Norman Conquest, describes itself on the inside cover as ‘a comprehensive analysis of eleventh century warfare as exposed in the record of the Norman Conquest of England’, but this description is not borne out by the contents. Whilst it certainly does contain sections analysing the military history of the Norman Conquest, the book’s focus instead appears to be seeking to counter the orthodoxies of the popular historical narrative of what occurred during the conquest and its aftermath up to 1106. The result is a revisionist step-by-step narrative, during which Wright makes several original arguments, starting off with the one that William I ‘probably had no intention of becoming King of England when he set out’ (p. vii) to invade England in 1066.
The core argument which runs throughout the book is that some English people cooperated with William I when he conquered England in 1066, and that English cooperation continued to be provided throughout his reign as without it the Norman Conquest could not have succeeded. Wright makes his argument with conviction, and it is broadly plausible as the primary sources clearly demonstrate widespread English cooperation after the English nobility submitted in 1066. The book is not written from a neutral position, as Wright takes a strongly pro-English and anti-Norman position in his views. However, he also greatly admires William I and demonstrates this throughout the book.
Wright trained as a military historian before working as a museum curator and is now retired. He specialises in the study of the Domesday Book and has written three books as a result of his research. He has also written a book on the Bayeux Tapestry. This book builds upon Wright’s previous books by incorporating their analysis into a revisionist narrative of what occurred between 1066-1106, and as a result Wright references them extensively throughout the book.
Wright uses both the introduction and chapter one to introduce readers to several of the arguments he plans to cover in the book as well as some of his opinions about the historiography. The main part of the book is a step-by-step revisionist narrative of what occurred between the evening after the battle of Hastings and the battle of Tinchebray in 1106, which is covered by chapters two through to chapter nine. Chapters two to four are focused on military history and cover the events which took place between the evening after the battle of Hastings up to late 1074.
In the following four chapters (5-8), Wright maintains his step-by-step narrative structure but increasingly moves away from focusing on the purely military part of the Norman Conquest to focus on the administrative history of it. In these chapters, Wright examines the English taxation system, or geld as it was known then, and how it was assessed and paid. This leads into the argument that Wright has championed in his previous books on the Domesday Book that the reason behind the diminishing geld returns in the late 1070s was due to widespread tax evasion by the tenants-in-chief, and that Bishop Odo of Bayeux was the principal offender. From there, Wright argues that Bishop Odo was arrested for planning to usurp the English throne, and that his arrest allowed William I’s officials to discover the extent of his tax evasion. Finally, Wright discusses William I’s response to the 1085-1086 invasion scare and the Domesday Book. Here, Wright summarises the arguments he made in his previous books on the Domesday Book that the Domesday surveys were designed to provide a full audit of how much land there was in England, who held it, and how the yield of geld had changed in William I’s reign.
Chapter nine consists of three parts. The first is a discussion of how much money a geld could produce. The second covers the oath taking ceremony at Old Sarum in 1086. Wright argues that this was a significant moment in England’s political history because it marked ‘the creation of the English class system’ (p. 142). The remainder of the chapter covers the contemporary reaction to William I’s death, and his legacy down to 1154.
In chapter ten, Wright summarises what he wrote for chapters two to nine, as far as the end of William I’s reign. In chapter eleven, Wright switches his focus to social history, arguing that the English people in the eleventh century were better educated than many historians give them credit for, and that England in the eleventh century was culturally superior to the rest of Latin Europe. Chapter twelve changes the focus again, this time to economic history. Wright discusses economic theory, medieval taxation, and what the English economy consisted of in the late eleventh century. The book then ends without any sort of conclusion chapter and goes on to a notes section and index.
The book is particularly strong when it focuses on purely military history. This is demonstrated in chapter two when it makes a detailed examination of the situation and problems facing the Norman army in the direct aftermath of the battle of Hastings. Wright makes a clear and convincing argument that despite their victory against Harold Godwinson’s army, William’s army was in a very bad state due to a shortage of supplies and large numbers of wounded troops.
Unfortunately, Wright lets himself down on several points. Wright has made several factual errors in this book, most notably with regards to the invasion and early reign of King Cnut. Wright argues that the Norman army’s initial intention was ‘to extort a massive ransom, just as Cnut had done some half century before’ (p. 131), whilst earlier in the book he states that this payment, when it was paid in 1018, was ‘offered to Cnut’ (p. 17). This is a major factual error, as King Cnut fought a war of conquest in 1015-1016 and raised a massive tax from his English subjects in 1018.
There is very little focus on the details of the English collusion which occurred. Instead, Wright uses broad brush strokes to argue that it must have happened instead of providing readers with detailed examples. Furthermore, Wright speculates extensively throughout the book, which makes it harder for readers to follow the flow of his arguments.
The most serious weakness of the book is with regards to its use of the primary sources. Wright makes many valid points, but it is often unclear to readers how many of them are based upon evidence provided by primary sources since most of the references are to secondary sources. When Wright stated that he favours the theory that Bishop Odo planned to usurp the English throne in 1082, he did not name the sources upon which the theory is based in either the text (p. 89) or the notes section at the back of the book. Finally, in the notes section for chapter nine, Wright explains why he does not trust Henry of Huntingdon as a source and quotes some excerpts from his chronicle, but Wright does not name the edition or the manuscript he found the excerpts in or provide the relevant page/folio numbers (p. 199, no. 15).
Wright has drawn on a good range of secondary sources, but he has also left out many of the academic publications which were published after 2000. This is unfortunate, because some of them align with his arguments at certain points in the book. Another problem is that Wright does not include a bibliography, thereby making it harder for readers to use the book as a guide for further reading. Finally, the lack of a conclusion means that it is hard for readers to succinctly summarise the book’s arguments.
Wright does not make a judgement either way, but the book seems to be aimed at a general audience rather than an academic one since two thirds of the book is a step-by-step revisionist narrative of what happened between 1066-1106. The book’s weaknesses mean that it would not be a good book for most academic historians to use as a secondary source, but those specialising in the economic history of eleventh century England would benefit from reading chapter twelve. Nonetheless, despite the book’s weaknesses, many amateur and undergraduate historians would benefit from reading this book because it challenges the popular historical narrative of the Norman Conquest and forces those who wish to find out whether the book’s arguments are correct to read the primary sources for themselves, thereby allowing them to form their own opinions on the subject.
Andrew Rollo, MA
