John D. Grainger
The forty sieges of Constantinople. The great city’s enemies and its survival
(Pen & Sword, 2022), 288pp. $42.95
This book sets out to look at the sieges of the city of Byzantion/Constantinople over the long term, starting with the early fifth-century BC and going up to the First World War. While the title is slightly misleading for the city was not called Constantinople for much of this history, a study across time of sieges of the site would nonetheless be a valuable contribution that would help to contextualize the actions of attackers and defenders over the long term. Unfortunately, readers will need to look elsewhere for such a book, as what Grainger has provided here is a series of brief overviews of a range of sieges or blockades. Many of the short chapters are limited to explaining the general context of why the city was attacked, and only for 1204 and 1453 does any substantial military narrative emerge. The result is that this is as much a short history of the site of Byzantion/Constantinople through attacks on the city as it is a story of those assaults. Roughly the first third of the book is concerned with Byzantion. Constantine to 1453 takes up then next 120 pages, and the final thirty pages are on the Ottomans to the First World War.
While the focus of the book is on the sieges themselves, the historical context constitutes a substantial amount of the page space but is occasionally based on out-dated or limited source material. The book covers a vast amount of time and so Grainger should not be expected to know all the ins-and-outs of each case, but at times the general historical context impinges upon the discussion of the siege. The approach towards iconoclasm is particularly out of date, and this is an issue since here it informs the actions of Leo III, Constantine V, Artavasdos, and Thomas the Slav, despite the evidence pointing to a rather more complicated situation. For example, Grainger claims that the conversion of the Bulgars came about in part because Krum captured “Christians with a heightened fanaticism brought about the iconoclastic controversy,” (137) even though it has long been recognized that iconoclasm was primarily an elite phenomenon. The Bulgar polity needing constant warfare to survive is belied by the reigns of Omurtag, Boris, and Peter. Symeon was unlikely to have been impressed by the fortifications in 913; rather, he knew exactly what he was dealing with as he had lived in the city during his youth. Moreover, understanding the “continuous menace” that Symeon provided to Constantinople would have been enriched with a deeper understanding of Symeon’s policy towards Byzantium. [1]
The sieges themselves occasionally suffer a similar fate on account of being limited to few sources. For example, Grainger skips the (debated) 654 Umayyad attack on the city. [2] More problematic is the omission of a major recent study that has resolved the narrative problems for the former siege of 674-78, now the siege of 669. [3] Grainger’s account of the siege of 717 uses only Theophanes and virtually no secondary literature. Nikephoros is entirely absent, and while Grainger bemoans the lack of Arabic sources on the siege, he does not consider what might be in Syriac. The story of Leo’s trickery is taken up, with no consideration that he might have legitimately been acting in Umayyad interests until his personal situation improved. The most important study of the events of this siege does not appear to have been used. [4]
The Rus’ attacks are treated with brevity and barely counted amongst the sieges of the city, although in contrast the decades that Byzantion paid tribute to the Tylis polity are said to count as quasi-siege (44). Grainger contends that the Rus’ only raided, and while it is true that they made no attempt on the walls, the damage and danger were real enough. Yet recent work has pointed to the level of strategic deception employed by the Rus’ on the 860 attack, which leads one to suspect that had they seen an opportunity to enter the city they would have taken it. [5] Similarly, revolts that resulted in attacks on Constantinople are treated with brevity despite the fact that the accounts of them often contain far more detail than assaults by non-Byzantines. Thomas the Slav and Leon Tornikios are treated cursorily. The successful revolt of Alexios I Komnenos involved a siege, albeit one that ended through treachery, but also with a minor sack of the city. The 1187 revolt of Alexios Branas does not appear despite the vivid account of military action outside the walls of the city by Niketas Choniates.
Minor errors of fact creep in. Leo V was killed in a palace chapel, not Hagia Sophia (129). Umayyad is regularly spelled “Ummayad” and the Mardaites are consistently called “Mandaites”. Later, Isaakios II apparently lost his throne in 1195 due to the Norman sack of Thessaloniki even though that occurred a decade earlier. The Golden Gate and its fort is referred to as Yeni Kapi, for which Grainger presumably meant Yedikule. Yenikapı, when referring to the area within the Theodosian walls, is the harbour on the south-centre of the sea walls. Small errors abound. Comnenos or Komnenos (155), or Komneni in the plural (182)? Mary and Michael Whitby would be surprised to discover that they translated the Chronicon Pasquale rather than the Chronicon Paschale. Nevra Necipoğlu, Peter Frankopan, Gilbert Dagron, and Gábor Ágoston all have their names spelled incorrectly. Grainger would have benefitted from consulting Byron Tsangadas’ The fortifications and defense of Constantinople, although the book is admittedly not easy to find. [6] Tsangadas’ illuminating end notes in particular bring much of value to the study of the attacks on Constantinople during the Byzantine period. 40 Sieges has a thorough index.
A refrain throughout the book is that successful attackers needed either to control both land and sea approaches to the city or to have someone on the inside let them in. While this thesis is broadly true it does not account for changes in technology or social and military organization. Nowhere is it explored as to why the Umayyads twice attempted a long-term blockade less than a century after the Avars failed to storm the city, or why the crusaders felt a direct assault on the walls was worth the risk. The nexus between physical environment, built environment, logistics, and social and military organization are only ever touched on briefly, yet it is these factors that make the long-term analysis of sieges of the city so compelling. Unfortunately, the ultimate conclusions are that to take the city an attacker needed to control both land and sea approaches, or to have access to insiders who can open the gates, and good or bad emperors control the course of history. While this book appears to be designed to entertain rather than edify, a diachronic analysis of sieges of Byzantion/Constantinople would be a valuable contribution. Grainger’s 40 Sieges is a start, but more needs to be done.
Lucas McMahon
University of Ottawa
[1] Shepard, Jonathan. “Symeon of Bulgaria – peacemaker.” Годишник на Софийския университет “Св. Климент Охридски”. Научен център за славяно-византийски проучвания “Иван Дуйчев” 83, no. 3 (1989): 9–48.
[2] O’Sullivan, Shaun. “Sebeos’ Account of an Arab Attack on Constantinople in 654.” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 28, no. 1 (2004): 67–88.
[3] Jankowiak, Marek. “The first Arab siege of Constantinople.” In Constructing the Seventh Century, edited by Constantin Zuckerman, 237–320. Travaux et Mémoires 17. Paris: CNRS, 2013.
[4] Rodolphe Guilland, “L’expédition de Maslama contre Constantinople (717-718),” in Études Byzantines (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1959), 109–33.
[5] Jonathan Shepard, “Photios’ sermons on the Rus attack of 860: The questions of his origins, and of the route of the Rus,” in Prosopon Rhomaikon: Ergänzende Studien zur Prosopographie der mittelbyzantinischen Zeit, ed. Alexander Beihammer, Bettina Krönung, and Claudia Ludwig (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 111–28.
[6] Byron C. P. Tsangadas, The fortifications and defense of Constantinople (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1980).
